STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
STEPHEN CARMODY, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1989-12-21
No. 88-2150
DAUKSCH and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
553 So. 2d 1366 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1989) Caution
Cited by 16 cases

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Synopsis

The State appeals a trial court's order suppressing evidence obtained from a warrantless arrest of Carmody for illegally transferring a license plate. The court reverses, holding that although the stated reason for arrest was invalid, the arrest was nonetheless valid because the officer personally observed Carmody committing other offenses (running a stop sign and failing to produce a valid driver's license) for which warrantless arrest was authorized.


Holding

The arrest was valid and the evidence admissible. Although Kusek could not validly arrest Carmody for the license plate offense (which he did not personally observe Carmody commit), Kusek did personally observe Carmody run a stop sign and fail to produce a valid driver's license—both offenses for which warrantless arrest is authorized when committed in the officer's presence.


Headnotes

[1] A warrantless arrest is valid if the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed any offense, even if the officer articulates an inval…

[2] A law enforcement officer may make a warrantless arrest for an offense committed in the officer's presence.

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Key Quotes

“That Kusek did not arrest Carmody for either valid reason, but instead arrested him on an unsupportable one, does not affect the validity of the arrest.”

Establishes the core holding that the stated reason for arrest is irrelevant if valid grounds for warrantless arrest existed and were personally observed.

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Facts & Procedural History

Deputy Kusek stopped Carmody's vehicle after observing it run a stop sign. Carmody could not produce a valid driver's license or vehicle registration.…

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Opinion of the Court
SHARP, Chief Judge.

SHARP, Chief Judge.

The state appeals from the trial court’s order suppressing evidence seized from appellee, Carmody, following a warrantless arrest by a police officer for a traffic viola tion. The officer arrested Carmody for transferring a Pennsylvania license plate to a vehicle illegally, a misdemeanor in the second degree,1 but he did not personally see Carmody transfer the tag. Relying on Phillips v. State, 531 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), the trial court suppressed evidence linking Carmody to various recent bank robberies, obtained as a result of the arrest. We reverse because in this case the police officer had a valid basis to make an arrest on other grounds.

The facts were not in material dispute. Deputy Kusek saw Carmody’s vehicle run a stop sign. He stopped the car and sought to check Carmody’s driver’s license and vehicle registration. Carmody could not produce either one. Kusek determined that the vehicle had a Pennsylvania tag which did not belong to the vehicle. Car-mody explained he had just picked the car up at an auto auction, but the dates did not jibe with the license tag.

Kusek ran a license check on Carmody and found he had a license issued in the name of Baker. Upon request, Carmody was unable to produce any document on his person or in the car to establish his identity. Having observed a wallet in Carmody’s pocket, Kusek suggested that Carmody look through it to see if he did not have some form of identification.

Carmody flipped through the wallet, saying he had nothing. He then handed the wallet to Kusek, and told him to look for himself. In so doing, Kusek saw a folded piece of paper which contained a hand written note. It said: “Remain calm. Put all your money in the envelopes. No tricks. No red dye.”

After seeing the note, Kusek suspected he was dealing with a robbery suspect. He arrested Carmody for the license plate offense and seized the note. He also contacted a robbery detective who knew of various recent bank robberies in the Orlando area in which the robber had used similar notes. Kusek took Carmody to police headquarters where he was subsequently identified as the person who had written the other notes used in the bank robberies. This case involves Carmody’s prosecution for those robberies.

We agree that Carmody’s arrest for the license tag offense was invalid because the police officer did not observe Carmody doing the act forbidden by the statute (illegal attachment), and he did not have a warrant. Phillips. However, Ku-sek did personally observe Carmody run a stop sign, and he witnessed Carmody’s failure to produce a valid driver’s license. Both are offenses2 for which a law enforcement officer is authorized to make a warrantless arrest, when the offense is committed in the officer’s presence.3

That Kusek did not arrest Carmody for either valid reason, but instead arrested him on an unsupportable one, does not affect the validity of the arrest. Thomas v. State, 395 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). See also, State v. Blanco, 513 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Gasset v. State, 490 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 500 So. 2d 544 (Fla.1986); State v. Irvin, 483 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 491 So. 2d 279 (Fla.1986); McCarter v. State, 463 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 472 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1985). Phillips is factually distinguishable because Phillips apparently did not commit other acts for which a valid arrest could have been made without a warrant. Since we find a valid arrest occurred, although not for the offense stated, the evidence seized is admissible and the motion to suppress should have been denied.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

DAUKSCH and HARRIS, JJ., concur. . § 320.261, Fla.Stat. (1987).

. §§ 316.123(2)(a), 322.15(1), Fla.Stat. (1987).

. 901.15(1) and (5), Fla.Stat. (1987).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2002)
    …y, or that the State also argued that there was probable cause to arrest Chavez for stealing property of Mrs. Scheinhaus, does not invalidate Chavez’s arrest based upon probable cause in connection with Jimmy Ryce’s kidnapping. Cf. State v. Carmody, 553 So. 2d 1366, 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (observing that the validity of Carmody’s arrest was not affected where, despite two valid reasons providing probable cause for the arrest, he was arrested on an unsupportable one); McCarter v. State, 463 So. 2d at 549 n. 1…
  • Indialantic Police Dep't v. Zimmerman, 677 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    …wn v. United States, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). When Officer Baker was given an improper registration for the vehicle, he had grounds to detain and arrest Zimmerman. § 320.261, Fla. Stat. (1993). See generally, State v. Carmody, 553 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Phillips v. State, 531 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). He also requested and obtained permission to search the truck. The odor of marijuana coming from the knapsack would have permitted him to discover the contraband inside the…
  • Dewayne Fripp v. State, 766 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …degree misdemeanor. See § 322.39, Fla. Stat. (1999). A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when the person has committed a misdemeanor “in the presence of the officer.” § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1999); see State v. Carmody, 553 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). At the time of the arrest, the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated section 322.03(1). Fripp also argues that the evidence at trial was “insufficient to prove obstruction” under section 843.02.…

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