SYNAXIS LAND COMPANY, TE DEUM, LLC AND JAMES R. MIKES

v.

HUNT REAL ESTATE SERVICES, INC.

LUCAS, Judge. For nearly a decade, James R. Mikes and his affiliated entities, Synaxis Land Development Company and Te Deum LLC (collectively, the "Borrowers"), have been embroiled in litigation with their lender, KRDM Investments, LLC (KRDM), over the

- 2 - manner in which KRDM (and its predecessor, Pilot Bank) accounted for the Borrowers' debt and whether KRDM appropriately released mortgage liens on the Borrowers' properties. Two foreclosure actions, counterclaims, and a subsequent settlement agreement had liquidated the amount of the debt that was owed and released KRDM from liability. The finale of this litigation, the Borrowers' seventh amended complaint against KRDM's manager, Hunt Real Estate Services, Inc. ("Hunt"), was all that remained. Hunt sought summary judgment, arguing that the underlying issue asserted in the complaint—whether the Borrowers' collateral was appropriately released—had been decided in the prior litigation and was, thus, res judicata. As Hunt argued in its motion: "The totality of the Seventh Amended Complaint is nothing more than Plaintiffs['] impermissible attempt to have a 'second bite at the apple' at its claims and damages that were denied by the Court in the Prior Foreclosure Litigation."¹ See Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 1The "Prior Foreclosure Litigation," as Hunt refers to it, was previously brought before this court in case number 2D14-5741. We affirmed that appeal without an opinion. See KRDM Invs., LLC, v. Te Deum Land Co., 184 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (table decision). A different trial judge had presided over the Prior Foreclosure Litigation.

- 3 - 130 (Fla. 2000). The movant for summary judgment bears "the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966). The proof must be conclusive, and it must "overcome all reasonable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the opposing party." Id. (citing Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1965)). "If the record reflects the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, or the possibility of any issue, or if the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue might exist, summary judgment is improper." Competelli v. City of Belleair Bluffs, 113 So. 3d 92, 92–93 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting Snyder v. Cheezem Dev. Corp., 373 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)). If there are no issues of material fact, the record must further establish that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d at 130; Poe v. IMC Phosphates MP, Inc., 885 So. 2d 397, 400–01 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Greene v. Twistee Treat USA, LLC, 302 So. 3d 481, 482-83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). Although the legal basis for holding Hunt directly liable for KRDM's prior alleged contractual breaches may be somewhat attenuated, we cannot agree that the record, when viewed in its entirety, precluded the Borrowers' claims as a matter of law.² ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM and SMITH, JJ., Concur. 2Indeed, in reviewing the sequence of orders and judgments entered in the course of the "Prior Foreclosure Litigation," it is unclear to us if the lower court ever actually decided the issue of whether KRDM appropriately released the Borrowers' collateral. For that reason alone, summary judgment was improper.