SCOTT R. SPRINGER
v.
LIZABETH MARIE SPRINGER
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The appellate court reversed a trial court's decision that awarded a former husband the monetary value of a dog instead of the dog itself, as determined in the final dissolution judgment. The court held that the trial court erred by modifying the property rights established in the final judgment, rather than enforcing them.
Yes, the trial court erred by awarding the fair market value of the dog. Once a final judgment of dissolution is rendered, property rights are fixed and vested, and a court cannot modify them unless jurisdiction is specifically reserved.
[1] A general reservation of jurisdiction in a final dissolution judgment for purposes of enforcement does not authorize a trial court to modify the property rights establish…
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This quote establishes the legal principle that final judgments fix property rights and limit the court's ability to modify them.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA former husband sought to enforce a final judgment of dissolution that declared a dog to be his nonmarital property. He also asked that the former wi…
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BLACK, Judge. Scott Springer, the former husband, challenges the order on his motion for contempt and/or for writ of execution. In the motion, the former husband sought the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the final judgment of dissolution to the extent that the judgment determined that certain personal property—a dog—is his nonmarital property.1 As there is no merit to the former husband's assertion that the trial court erred in declining to hold the former wife in contempt, we affirm the trial court's order in that regard without further comment.
"Once a final judgment of dissolution of marriage is rendered, property rights are fixed and vested and a court is without jurisdiction to modify those rights unless it specifically reserved1 "While a dog may be considered by many to be a member of the family, under Florida law, animals are considered to be personal property." Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d 109, 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (first citing County of Pasco v. Riehl, 620 So. 2d 229, 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); and then citing Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)).
jurisdiction to do so." Frank v. Frank, 253 So. 3d 12, 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (citing Encarnacion v. Encarnacion, 877 So. 2d 960, 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). Even though the final judgment of dissolution contained a reservation of jurisdiction for its enforcement, such a general reservation did not authorize the trial court to change the former husband's established property right to a monetary award. See Bridges v. Bridges, 848 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); see also Farid v. Rabbath, 273 So. 3d 221, 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ("[U]nless there was a reservation of jurisdiction over the distribution of property by the final judgment of dissolution, the final judgment establishing property rights could not be modified.").
The facts of this case are similar to those of Bridges. In that case, Ms. Bridges filed a motion to enforce the final judgment of dissolution, alleging that Mr. Bridges had taken personal property from the marital home that belonged to her under the terms of the judgment. 848 So. 2d at 404. Following an evidentiary hearing on the motion for enforcement, the trial court entered a money judgment against Mr. Bridges for the value of the personal property. Id. Mr. Bridges challenged that order on appeal, and this court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify Ms. Bridges's property rights once those rights had been adjudicated in the final judgment and in the absence of an express reservation of jurisdiction to modify the final judgment. Id.; see also Damian v. Damian, 955 So. 2d 1178, 1181–82 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying rather than enforcing the property rights adjudicated in the final judgment of dissolution).
The trial court erred as a matter of law by acting in excess of its jurisdiction by modifying the final judgment of dissolution with respect to the nonmarital property. We therefore reverse the order on appeal to the extent that it awarded the former husband the fair market value of the property and remand for entry of an order enforcing the final judgment of dissolution.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. ATKINSON and LABRIT, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Encarnacion v. Encarnacion, 877 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- Bridges v. Bridges, 848 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Cnty. OF Pasco v. Chris and Wendy Riehl, 620 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Damian v. Damian, 955 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- Julianne R. Frank v. Frank, 253 So. 3d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)
- Hala M. Farid v. Rabbath, 273 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)