JOEY WAYNE BRIDGES, APPELLANT,
v.
DORA FAYE BRIDGES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a post-dissolution enforcement matter, the circuit court awarded Mrs. Bridges monetary damages for personal property that Mr. Bridges allegedly removed from the marital home in violation of the dissolution judgment. The appellate court reversed, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to modify the property rights awarded in the final dissolution judgment by converting personal property into a money judgment.
The circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the money judgment because a court generally has no jurisdiction to modify property rights after those rights have been adjudicated in a final dissolution judgment. A general reservation of jurisdiction in the dissolution judgment did not empower the court to convert the wife's award of tangible personal property into a money damages award.
[1] A circuit court lacks jurisdiction to modify property rights adjudicated in a final judgment of dissolution, even with a general reservation of jurisdiction for enforceme…
[2] A general reservation of jurisdiction in a dissolution judgment does not empower the court to convert an award of tangible personal property into an award of money damage…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Usually a court has no jurisdiction to modify property rights after those rights have been adjudicated in a final judgment of dissolution.”
Establishes the primary legal principle that courts lack power to alter property divisions in final dissolution judgments
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn May 2000, a final judgment dissolved the Bridges' marriage, awarding the marital home and its contents to Mrs. Bridges. In June 2000, Mrs. Bridges …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion To Enforce Final Judgment cases and more on FLexlaw
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
In May 2000, the circuit court entered a final judgment dissolving the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Bridges. Then in December 2000, on Mrs. Bridges’s motion to enforce the judgment, the court awarded her money damages in lieu of personal property she had received in the dissolution judgment. Mr. Bridges challenges that December order in this appeal. We reverse because the circuit court had no jurisdiction to enter it.
The dissolution judgment awarded the marital home and its contents to Mrs. Bridges. In June 2000, she filed a motion for contempt, contending that Mr. Bridges had removed certain items from the home that belonged to her under the terms of the judgment. He moved to dismiss the contempt motion on the ground that contempt was not a proper remedy to enforce an award of personal property. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the motion. Mrs. Bridges then filed a motion to enforce the final judgment, again alleging that Mr. Bridges had taken her property. After hearing some evidence about the allegedly missing items, the court entered a money judgment against Mr. Bridges for the value of the property, $12,000.
Usually a court has no jurisdiction to modify property rights after those rights have been adjudicated in a final judgment of dissolution. Mason v. Mason, 371 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Although the dissolution judgment in this case contained a reservation of jurisdiction for its enforcement, this general reservation did not empower the court to, in essence, change the wife’s award of tangible personal property into an award of money damages. See Harman v. Harman, 523 So. 2d 187,188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding a general reservation of jurisdiction did not preserve the court’s jurisdiction to alter the property rights determined in the final judgment of dissolution). Therefore, we reverse the order awarding money damages to Mrs. Bridges.
Because our reversal is grounded on lack of jurisdiction, the December 2000 order has effectively been expunged. Marshall & Spencer Co. v. People’s Bank of Jacksonville, 88 Fla. 190, 101 So. 358, 359 (1924). Therefore, we need not address Mr. Bridges’s contentions that he did not receive due process and that the court’s valuation of the personal property was not supported by the evidence. Further, the order will have no res judicata effect or law of the case implications in any other lawsuit Mrs. Bridges may wish to file. See Polk County v. Sofka, 730 So. 2d 389, 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
Reversed.
WHATLEY and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Solmo v. Friedman, 909 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…er orders as the Court deems necessary and just in the premises” has been held to be an insufficient reservation of jurisdiction to later re-adjudicate property rights. Harman v. Harman, 523 So. 2d 187, 187-88 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Bridges v. Bridges, 848 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). In Harman, the trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, giving the wife the use and possession of the marital home and requiring the husband to pay the mortgage, maintenance and insurance costs of the…
-
Spencer v. Spencer, 898 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…rders. See Sapp v. Sapp, 275 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). On the other hand, proceedings to enforce dissolution judgments cannot be used to modify property’rights unless the court specifically reserved jurisdiction to do so. See Bridges v. Bridges, 848 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Agerskov v. Gabriel, 596 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Thruston v. Conley, 693 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Here, the injunction' prohibits Mr. Spencer from disposing of “all of the marital tangible personal property previ…
-
Damian v. Damian, 955 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…t and proper” was insufficient to give the trial court jurisdiction to modify property rights that it had previously adjudicated in the final judgment). Discussion We agree with the Former Husband that this court’s decisions in Bridges v. Bridges, 848 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and Harman v. Harman, 523 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), are controlling here. In Bridges, the wife moved to enforce a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The trial court awarded the wife “money damages in lieu of personal…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Marshall & Spencer Co. v. Peoples Bank of Jacksonville, 88 Fla. 190 (Fla. 1924)
- Mason v. Mason, 371 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Harman v. Harman, 523 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Polk Cnty. v. Sofka, 730 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)