REINALDO DIAZ,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Reinaldo Diaz petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel over ten years after his conviction became final. The court dismissed the petition as untimely under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d)(5), which imposes strict time limits on such claims.
The petition was untimely and procedurally barred. Under rule 9.141(d)(5), such petitions must be filed within two years of finality unless the petitioner alleges with specific factual basis that he was affirmatively misled about the appeal results, and in no case more than four years after finality.
[1] A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review must be filed within two years after the judgment and sentence become final on direct rev…
[2] A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review may not be filed more than four years after the judgment and sentence become final on dir…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review shall not be filed more than [two] years after the judgment and sentence become final on direct review unless it alleges under oath with a specific factual basis that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the results of the appeal by counsel. In no case shall a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review be filed more than [four] years after the judgment and sentence become final on direct review.”
This quote establishes the two- and four-year filing deadlines under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d)(5) that govern ineffective assistance of appellate counsel petitions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDiaz was convicted in 2007 of five counts of robbery with a deadly weapon, two counts of falsely impersonating an officer in the commission of a felon…
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PER CURIAM.
Reinaldo Diaz petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We dismiss the amended petition as untimely pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d)(5). In 2007, Diaz was convicted of five counts of robbery with a deadly weapon, two counts of falsely impersonating an officer in the commission of a felony, and one count of grand theft in the third degree, and was duly sentenced.
We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct review in Diaz v. State, 8 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
On June 5, 2009, the mandate issued, and Diaz’s judgment and sentence became final. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d)(5) provides: A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review shall not be filed more than [two] years after the judgment and sentence become final on direct review unless it alleges under oath with a specific factual basis that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the results of the appeal by counsel. In no case shall a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review be filed more than [four] years after the judgment and sentence become final on direct review. As Diaz filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 3, 2020,1 more than ten years after his judgment and sentence became final, we dismiss the petition as procedurally barred under rule 9.141(d)(5).
See Mendoza v. State, 224 So. 3d 836, 837 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“Because Mendoza’s petition was filed . . . 1 The petition was amended on February 6, 2020.
more than four years after his judgment and sentence became final on direct review, we dismiss [the] petition as procedurally barred under rule 9.141(d)(5).”) (citing Melara v. State, 997 So. 2d 1135, 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)). Dismissed.
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Diaz v. State, 8 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…with a deadly weapon, two counts of falsely impersonating an officer in the commission of a felony, and one count of grand theft in the third degree, and was duly sentenced. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct review in Diaz v. State, 8 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). On June 5, 2009, the mandate issued, and Diaz’s judgment and sentence became final. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d)(5) provides: A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review shall…
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Brugmann v. The State of Fla. & Sean Casey, 117 So. 3d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…Casey appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his plea. On appeal, the tapes were not provided to this Court, and this Court, without the benefit of the tapes, affirmed the trial court’s order without issuing a written opinion. Casey v. State, 8 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Following Casey’s unsuccessful appeal of the denial of his motion to vacate his plea, he filed a pro se Motion for Relief of Judgment Because of Fraud Upon the Court. In this motion, Casey alleged that Hirseh, Rappaport, and the…
Authorities Cited
- Melara v. State, 997 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
- Diaz v. State, 8 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)