SAMUEL D. ROSEN,
v.
TIFFANY OF BAL HARBOUR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Fla. 3d DCA | 2020-05-27
No. 20-0688
Per Curiam
Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2020)

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Synopsis

Samuel Rosen sought a writ of prohibition to disqualify a trial judge after the trial court denied his fourth motion to disqualify. The appellate court granted the petition not on the merits of the disqualification motion itself, but because the trial judge personally filed a response to the prohibition petition that created an adversarial atmosphere and an independent basis for disqualification.


Holding

The court grants the petition for writ of prohibition and remands for reassignment of the action. The trial judge's personal filing of a response that controverted the factual allegations in the disqualification motion created an adversarial atmosphere and an independent basis for disqualification, warranting the issuance of the writ.


Headnotes

[1] A trial judge's personal response to a petition for writ of prohibition, which attempts to refute factual allegations supporting a motion to disqualify, creates an advers…

[2] A trial judge should remain silent and allow the opposing party to respond to a petition for writ of prohibition.

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Key Quotes

“the trial judge created an adversarial atmosphere and an independent basis for disqualification”

Establishes the court's reasoning for granting the petition—the judge's personal response itself became disqualifying

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Facts & Procedural History

Rosen filed a fourth motion to disqualify the trial judge in the underlying case. The trial court denied this motion. Rosen then sought a writ of proh…

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Opinion of the Court
Emas

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Samuel Rosen seeks our issuance of a writ of prohibition following the trial court’s order denying Rosen’s fourth motion to disqualify the trial judge in the lower court case. Were we to reach the merits, we might well deny the petition and conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion to disqualify as legally insufficient.

Instead, however, we are constrained to grant this petition. After we issued an order directing a response to the petition, the trial judge personally1 filed a response which took issue with, and purported to refute, factual allegations in the underlying motion to disqualify. In doing so, the trial judge created an adversarial atmosphere and an independent basis for disqualification. See Gieseke v. Moriarty, 471 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (granting prohibition where trial judge, in filing her own response to the Fourth District’s order to show cause why relief should not be granted, undertook to controvert the asserted grounds for disqualification).

We grant the petition and remand for reassignment of the action below.

Footnotes
1 Although our standard order permits the trial judge to file a response, such a response is rare. More to the point, on those occasions when such a response is filed, it is ordinarily by the Circuit Court’s Office of General Counsel, or by the Attorney General’s Office, on behalf of the trial court, and even then should not attempt to refute the factual allegations asserted in support of the underlying motion. Masten v. State, 159 So. 3d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Ellis v. Henning, 678 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We have previously noted that in a prohibition proceeding such as this “it is the safer practice for the judge to remain silent and let the adversarial party supply the response.” Masten, 159 So. 3d 997 (quoting Ellis, 678 So. 2d 828).

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