DIYONNE MCGRAW

v.

GOVERNOR RON DESANTIS

OSTERHAUS, J.

Diyonne McGraw appeals an order denying a petition for writ of quo warranto that she filed against Governor Ron DeSantis, who declared the school board seat that she held to be vacant in 2021. We dismiss the appeal as moot in view of McGraw’s re-election in 2022.

In 2021, the Governor declared a school board vacancy as to Alachua County School Board District seat 2 after it was determined that McGraw did not live in the district. See § 1001.34(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring “[e]ach member of the district school board . . . shall be a resident of the district school board member residence area from which she or he is elected, and shall maintain said residency throughout her or his term of office.”). In response, McGraw sought a writ of quo warranto directing the Governor to explain his actions and arguing that he abused his constitutional powers and encroached on judicial powers. After a hearing, the trial court denied McGraw’s writ petition.

McGraw appealed. But, in the meantime, the county redrew the district boundary lines for school board seats, which placed McGraw’s residence within District 2. She was then re-elected in 2022 to the newly bounded District 2 seat where she resides. In view of these events, we issued an order to show cause regarding mootness and now conclude that McGraw’s appeal is moot.

Because McGraw has been re-elected and is serving in the school board seat of the reconfigured District 2, no actual controversy remains here. We lack authority to issue appellate opinions on moot or academic questions that lack practical effect in settling the rights of the litigants. See Pace v. King, 38 So. 2d 823, 827 (Fla. 1949). And here, any appellate decision on McGraw’s underlying petition would grant no effectual relief. See Montgomery v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 468 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (explaining that an appeal becomes moot if “by a change of circumstances prior to the appellate decision, an intervening event makes it impossible for the court to grant a party any effectual relief”); see also MacNeil v. Crestview Hosp. Corp., 292 So. 3d 840, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (dismissing “[a]bsent a showing of at least a colorable right which would be affected by the requested declaration [and so as to avoid issuing] an improper advisory opinion”).

In reaching this conclusion, we reject Appellant’s arguments against dismissing this appeal as moot. First, we don’t see that important gubernatorial authority issues should keep us from dismissing. Whatever discovery and process-related concerns McGraw has with how the Governor handled this situation, we see little of practical consequence extending from this case where McGraw didn’t contest where she lived and when state law is clear that school board members must reside in the district-boundary area from which they are elected. § 1001.34(1), Fla. Stat.; see also Art. X, § 3, Fla. Const. (providing that a “[v]acancy in office shall occur upon the . . . failure to maintain the residence required when elected or appointed”); § 114.01(1)(g) & (2), Fla. Stat. (directing gubernatorial action by executive order when an officer fails to maintain the required residence). Second, McGraw claims collateral legal consequences extend from this case to her federal voting-rights lawsuit, which also counsels against dismissing her appeal. Cf. Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 213–14 (Fla. 1992) (finding Appellant’s release from involuntary commitment not to be moot because other consequences flowed directly from the underlying order such as the imposition of a lien for unpaid services provided by the department). But her federal lawsuit, now pending in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, is a separate legal matter to which no collateral legal consequences will flow from the dismissal of this appeal.

DISMISSED as moot.

RAY and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. _____________________________