GLYNN HODAK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Glynn Hodak appealed his sexual battery conviction, arguing the trial court misconstrued the statutory definition by finding oral-vaginal contact constituted sexual battery without penetration. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that oral union with the sexual organ of another is expressly prohibited by the statute regardless of whether penetration occurs.
Oral union with the sexual organ of another is expressly proscribed by the statute and constitutes sexual battery regardless of whether penetration occurs. The defendant's tongue is encompassed by the word 'oral' in the statute, making penetration unnecessary.
[1] Sexual battery includes oral penetration of the vagina by the sexual organ of another.
[2] The statutory definition of sexual battery does not require penetration by an object when oral union with the sexual organ is established.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The term "sexual battery" means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object”
The statutory definition of sexual battery that the court interpreted; establishes that 'oral union' with the sexual organ is prohibited
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHodak was convicted of sexual battery based on contact between his tongue and the victim's vaginal area. The trial court found there was contact but n…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Sexual Battery cases and more on FLexlaw
COBB, Judge.
The appellant, Glynn Hodak, contests his conviction for sexual battery on the basis that the trial court misconstrued section 794.011(1)(h), Florida Statutes (1987), in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. That section defines the offense:
(h) The term “sexual battery” means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual battery does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.
Hodak contends that there was no “credible testimony” that the victim’s vagina was penetrated, only that there was contact between his tongue and the victim’s vaginal area, and that the trial court made that factual finding of record (which is true). He relies on Furlow v. State, 529 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), wherein it was held that digital penetration of the victim’s vagina, rather than mere contact or union with the vagina by the defendant’s finger, was an essential element of sexual battery pursuant to the statutory definition quoted above.
We. agree with the state that Furlow is not applicable to the instant factual situation. The defendant’s tongue is encompassed by the word “oral” in the statute, and oral union with the sexual organ of another (the victim’s vagina in this case) is expressly proscribed by the statute. See Grunzel v. State, 484 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The defendant’s finger, by contrast, falls into the category of “any other object,” as was the ease in Furlow.
The second point on appeal regarding the trial court’s instruction with respect to the sexual battery charge was not preserved for appeal, and, in any event, is without merit.
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Heuss v. State, 660 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…he child’s vagina to convict him of the offense as charged in the information. The statute defines this particular sexual battery to mean “oral union with the sexual organ of another.” § 794.011(1)(h), Fla.Stat. (emphasis added); see Hodak v. State, 555 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 5th DCA) (stating a defendant’s tongue is encompassed within the term “oral” as defined within the statute which expressly proscribes oral union with the sexual organ), rev. denied, 564 So. 2d 1086 (Fla.1990). The state correctly points out th…
-
State v. Pate, 656 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…idence established that the defendant either put his tongue or his mouth on, as opposed to in, the victim’s vagina. See, e.g., Pineiro v. State, 615 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Stone v. State, 547 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In Hodak v. State, 555 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), this court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for sexual battery under section 794.011(1)(h) based upon evidence that there was contact between the defendant’s tongue and the victim’s “vaginal area.” This court explained that:…
-
Trester L. Bryson v. State, 622 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Hodak v. State, 555 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 564 So. 2d 1086 (Fla.1990). W. SHARP, GOSHORN and PETERSON, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Grunzel v. State, 484 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Furlow v. State, 529 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)