TRESTER L. BRYSON, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2005)
  …judgment because he did not raise an objection at the first post-verdict hearing was incorrect. The court reasoned that a party could object to an interlocutory ruling at any time prior to a final judgment. Id. at 1143 (citing Whitlock v. Drazinic, 622 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)). Furthermore, the Fifth District stated that the record showed that Mr. Matetzschk had only stipulated that Lamb was entitled to attorney’s fees but stated that the amount of the fee was to be determined at a later date. Id. Th…
• Nationsbank, N.A. v. Ziner, 726 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
  …r orders. A trial court has inherent authority to reconsider any of its interlocutory rulings prior to final judgment, and a successor judge has the same authority to vacate or vary an interlocutory order as the original judge. Whitlock v. Drazinic, 622 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA)(en banc), rev. den., 630 So. 2d 1103 (Fla.1993). The fact that Berezin did not appeal the initial denial of his motion to strike did not preclude the court form later reconsidering its order; contrary to Nationsbank’s arguments, nothi…
• Matetzschk v. Lamb, 849 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
  …ers of judgment because he did not raise it at the first post-verdict hearing. This determination by the trial court was incorrect because a party may object to an interlocutory ruling at any time prior to a final judgment. See Whitlock v. Drazinic, 622 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Moreover, the record clearly indicates that at the first hearing on attorney fees, William Matetzschk only stipulated that Lamb was entitled to an attorney fee, but the amount of that fee was to be determined at a later date. No…

Authorities Cited

• Glynn Hodak v. State, 555 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)