CARTER TODD PEYTON JENKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
ALEXANDRA O. JENKINS, APPELLEE
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This case addresses personal jurisdiction in a dissolution of marriage action where the former husband, a New York resident, challenged the Florida court's jurisdiction. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of residency but reversed on the long-arm jurisdiction issue, finding the petition's allegations insufficient to establish jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss based on lack of residency, holding that the former wife's six-month residency requirement was an evidentiary matter requiring a hearing rather than resolution on the pleadings. However, the court reversed the denial of the motion to quash service and dismiss, finding that the petition's allegations—limited to the fact that the parties were married in Palm Beach—were insufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(e).
[1] A party seeking dissolution of marriage in Florida must demonstrate an actual presence in Florida coupled with an intention at that time to make Florida the residence.
[2] A party's residence for dissolution purposes requires a concurrent showing of intent to establish a permanent residence and evidence of fulfilling that intention.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Residence" for purposes of dissolution means "an actual presence in Florida coupled with an intention at that time to make Florida the residence."”
Establishes the legal definition of residence for dissolution jurisdiction purposes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former husband, a New York resident, moved to dismiss a dissolution of marriage petition filed by his former wife in Florida. The former husband c…
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POLEN, Judge.
This case involves long-arm jurisdiction as it applies to former wife’s petition for dissolution of marriage and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in effect in both Florida and New York. Appellant, former husband, seeks review of the trial court’s August 16, 1989 order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and the August 24, 1989 order denying his motion to quash service of process and dismiss.
We affirm as to the August 16th order and reverse and remand as to the August 24th order. At the August 16th hearing, former husband alleged former wife had not met the six-month residence requirement as a prerequisite to bringing a dissolution action in Florida pursuant to section 61.021, Florida Statutes (1986). “Residence” for purposes of dissolution means “an actual presence in Florida coupled with an intention at that time to make Florida the residence.” Gillman v. Gillman, 413 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
We do not accept former husband’s argument that actual presence is required during the entire six-month time frame. We feel the requirement is that of a concurrent showing that the establishment of actual permanent residence is intended and evidence of fulfilling this intention. Bloomfield v. City of St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So. 2d 364 (Fla.1955).
In support of his motion to dismiss, former husband supplied only a conflicting affidavit listing the numerous residences of the parties. There was nothing to evidence intent. An evidentiary hearing was needed, offered by the trial court, and refused by former husband. We therefore, affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss without prejudice to bring the motion anew. Former husband’s allegation that Florida was not the child’s “home state” as defined by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is premature as the initial question is jurisdiction regarding the dissolution. At the August 24th hearing, former husband, a New York resident, claimed former wife’s petition for dissolution failed to allege sufficient facts to meet the statutory-requirements for long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident and thereby rendered service of process void. Feder v. Feder, 526 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Rand v. Rand, 491 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
Section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), states jurisdiction obtains only if the parties maintained a matrimonial domicile in the state at the time of commencement of the action or if the defendant resided in the state preceding the commencement of the action. While former wife alleges her six-month residence requirement, the only allegation as to former husband is the statement that the parties were married in Palm Beach, Florida. This is insufficient to enable the courts of Florida to obtain long-arm jurisdiction over appellant. Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). We therefore reverse and remand, allowing wife to amend her petition and require an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of residency.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
HERSEY, C.J., concurs.
LETTS, J., concurs in conclusion only.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Daniela Rudel v. Rudel, 111 So. 3d 285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…ies must reside 6 months in the state before filing a petition for dissolution. “Residence” as used in section 61.021 means “ ‘an actual presence in Florida coupled with an intention at that time to make Florida the residence.’ ” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 556 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (quoting Gillman v. Gillman, 413 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)) (emphasis supplied). “Whether or not a party is a resident (of the State of Florida within the meaning of Section [61.021], supra) is both a question of l…
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Rowland v. Debrah Rae Rowland, 868 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…idency under section 61.021[, Florida Statutes (1998),] means ‘an actual presence in Florida coupled with an intention at that time to make Florida the residence.’ ” Copas v. Copas, 687 So. 2d 885, 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins, 556 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)). The Husband contends that the Wife’s move to Pennsylvania in the summer of 1998 refuted her claim that she had been a resident of Florida for the six months immediately preceding her October 1998 filing of the petition. W…
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Copas v. Copas, 687 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…ed based on the facts of each case. Simpson v. Simpson, 339 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Residency under section 61.021 means “an actual presence in Florida coupled with an intention at that time to make Florida the residence.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 556 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 4th DCA) (citation and punctuation omitted), review denied, 569 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.1990). Continuous presence in the state, however, is not required for the entire six-month period. Beaucamp v. Beau-camp, 508 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bloomfield v. City OF ST. Petersburg Beach, 82 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1955)
- Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Gillman v. Anne Gillman, 413 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Hyder v. State, 526 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Rand v. Rand, 491 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)