BRUCE H. SAVAGE, SR., APPELLANT,
v.
SHEILA G. SAVAGE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this dissolution of marriage case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of the husband's interest in the marital home to the wife as lump sum alimony, finding that partition of the home should have been granted. The court remanded for further proceedings to reconsider the distribution of marital assets and related awards.
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to order partition of the marital home. The husband's plea for partition substantially complied with statutory requirements and should have been granted. The award of the husband's interest in the home to the wife as lump sum alimony cannot be sustained absent necessity or legal justification.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by awarding a party's interest in the marital home as lump sum alimony absent necessity or legal justification, especially when it res…
[2] A plea for partition of a marital home substantially complies with statutory requirements and due process when the legal description is stipulated to by the parties at tr…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“However, under the facts of this case the husband has been shortchanged. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order partition of the marital home.”
Establishes the core holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying partition and awarding the home as lump sum alimony.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband and wife were dissolving their marriage and had two minor children. The marital home, valued between $220,000 and $235,000, was the only a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Partition Of Marital Home cases and more on FLexlaw
RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
The husband in this dissolution action challenges the distribution of property and alimony and child support awards in the final judgment dissolving the marriage of the parties. We reverse the award of the husband’s interest in the marital home to the wife and remand this case for further proceedings.
The husband asked for partition of the marital home. The parties estimated the value of the home at between $220,-000.00 and $235,000.00. This was the only asset of significant value owned by the parties. The trial court denied the plea for partition, and awarded the husband’s interest in the marital home to the wife as lump sum alimony in order to achieve equitable distribution. She was also awarded primary residential custody of the two minor children, and the husband was ordered to pay $1,000.00 per month per child to the wife as child support. Additionally, the husband was required to pay to the wife $600.00 per month as permanent periodic alimony. The trial court’s distribution of marital assets resulted in the wife receiving 82% and the husband receiving 18% of the assets accumulated during the marriage.
We recognize that a trial court need not equalize the financial positions of the parties in distributing marital assets. Cana-karis v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). However, under the facts of this case the husband has been shortchanged. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order partition of the marital home. Because the marital home is the only asset of significant value, and because the facts show no necessity nor legal justification, the lump sum award cannot be sustained. See Marcoux v. Marcoux, 464 So. 2d 542 (Fla.1985); Wynn v. Wynn, 478 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Hiler v. Hiler, 442 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
The wife urges that the husband’s plea for partition was legally deficient because it failed to contain a legal description of the property. The wife did not challenge the sufficiency of the husband’s plea for partition at any stage of the proceedings other than by general denial of the merits. She has not argued on appeal that she did not have notice that partition of the marital home was sought. At the final hearing, the attorneys for the parties stipulated to the legal description of the property. We hold that the husband’s plea for partition substantially complied with section 64.041, Florida Statutes (1987), and due process was achieved. Therefore, partition should have been granted. See Pantuso v. Pantuso, 335 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Rankin v. Rankin, 258 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
We remand this case to the trial court for entry of an amended final judgment ordering partition of the marital home. Because one child of the parties is still a minor and resides in the home, we deem it appropriate for partition to be stayed and for the wife to have exclusive possession of the home until such time as the child reaches the age of majority or the wife remarries. Further, in light of our holding, the trial court may very well deem it appropriate to conduct further proceedings to reconsider other facets of awards and provisions of the final judgment, including adjustment in the amount of permanent periodic alimony awarded to the wife.
We find the remaining points raised by the husband to be without merit.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DANAHY and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Mauricio A. Arze v. Soheila Sadough-Arze, 789 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…l as a provision that the atuard may be terminated if the party in residence remarries. See Kirkland, 568 So. 2d at 496; Messal v. Messal, 424 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); White v. White, 413 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Savage v. Savage, 556 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Harvey v. Harvey, 411 So. 2d 324, 325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). It is error to extend exclusive use and possession of the marital home beyond the attainment of majority of a minor child, or remarriage of the party in residence,…
-
LEE v. LEE, 751 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…law which holds that a trial court abuses its discretion by awarding a marital home as lump sum alimony to one party when the home is the parties’ only significant asset. See Klinger v. Klinger, 570 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Savage v. Savage, 556 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Safferstone v. Safferstone, 501 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Mr. Lee fails to acknowledge, however, that the parties had other marital assets in the form of Mr. Lee’s retirement pension, valued at $16,000, and his 401K, valued…
-
Todd v. Todd, 734 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…ll as a provision that the award may be terminated if the party in residence remarries. See Kirkland, 568 So. 2d at 496; Messal v. Messal, 424 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); White v. White, 413 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Savage v. Savage, 556 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Harvey v. Harvey, 411 So. 2d 324, 325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). It is error to extend exclusive use and possession of the marital home beyond the attainment of majority of a minor child, or remarriage of the party in residence,…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Marcoux v. Marcoux, 464 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1985)
- Rankin v. Rankin, 258 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Hiler v. Hiler, 442 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Fair Lane Acres Prop. Owners Assn., Inc. v. Fair Lane Utils., Inc., 478 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Wynn v. Wynn, 478 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Rucker v. State, 335 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)