STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES TAYLOR, JR., APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1990-03-09
No. 89-02027
FRANK, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
557 So. 2d 941 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1990) Caution
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a circuit court's order suppressing cocaine found during a traffic stop and subsequent search of James Taylor's vehicle. The court held that the traffic stop was valid because Taylor committed a civil traffic violation that officers could lawfully enforce, regardless of any additional investigative motive, and that Taylor's disorderly conduct after the stop independently justified his arrest and the search.


Holding

The court held that the traffic stop was valid because Taylor committed a civil traffic violation that officers could have lawfully cited, and that it is not material whether police had an additional motive if a reasonable officer would have made the stop absent that motive. Additionally, Taylor's disorderly conduct after the stop independently justified his arrest and dissipated any taint from a potentially pretextual stop, making the search lawful.


Headnotes

[1] A traffic stop is not rendered invalid merely because police may have an additional motive for detaining a suspect, provided a reasonable officer would have stopped the v…

[2] A traffic stop and an interdiction program are not mutually exclusive.

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Key Quotes

“in ascertaining the validity of such a stop the court should determine whether 'under the facts and circumstances a reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle absent an additional invalid purpose.'”

Establishes the legal standard for evaluating pretextual traffic stops—the relevant question is whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop regardless of alleged additional motives.

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Facts & Procedural History

Taylor was stopped during a narcotics enforcement operation called 'Operation Crackdown' after committing a civil traffic infraction directly in front…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The state appeals an order of the circuit court granting appellee James Taylor’s motion to suppress cocaine. We reverse.

Taylor was arrested during the course of “Operation Crackdown,” wherein the Lee County Sheriff’s Department patrolled so-called “hot spots ... normally associated with drug dealings.” Taylor committed a civil traffic infraction directly in front of the arresting officers’ vehicle, and when they activated their blue light he appeared to accelerate. During this interval Taylor was observed bending down as if to conceal something. After stopping Taylor became belligerent, eventually drawing a large and hostile crowd. The officers arrested Taylor for disorderly conduct, searched his automobile, and discovered a plastic bag of crack cocaine pushed down into the front seat.

The circuit court’s order does not specify a basis for its ruling. Taylor’s motion to suppress alleged that the search of his car “was not incident to a lawful arrest” and was not based on probable cause. However, at the suppression hearing defense counsel primarily argued that the traffic stop was merely a pretext. On cross-examination one officer did agree that such minor traffic stops “get[] your foot in the door,” but that same officer also denied that anyone involved in the operation “made traffic stops that you would not routinely make.”

Our recent decision in State v. Renda, 553 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), is dispositive. It is undisputed that Taylor committed a civil traffic violation for which he could have been issued a citation. In such circumstances it is not always material that police may have some additional motive for detaining the suspect. Rather, in ascertaining the validity of such a stop the court should determine whether “under the facts and circumstances a reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle absent an additional invalid purpose.” Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla.1988). As the state points out in its brief, “a traffic stop and an interdiction program are not mutually exclusive.” The record before us contains no evidence that the average police officer, on routine traffic patrol, would have foresworn issuing Taylor a ticket.

It is not a matter of serious dispute that Taylor’s abusive and highly confrontational behavior, once the traffic stop had been effected, justified his arrest for disorderly conduct and thus the subsequent search of the vehicle. Though it does not appear to have been explicitly argued as an alternative justification for the search, this intervening misconduct would have served to dissipate any taint from a pretextual stop, assuming that to have been the case. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486-7, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416-7, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 454-5 (1963); Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242, 1249 and ff. (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1264, 104 S.Ct. 3559, 82 L.Ed.2d 860 (1984); People v. Sesslin, 68 Cal.2d 418, 439 P. 2d 321, 67 Cal.Rptr. 409 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1080, 89 S.Ct. 850, 21 L.Ed.2d 772 (1969). See also, State v. Johnson, 382 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (defendant not justified in resorting to violence to resist unlawful arrest).

Reversed.

FRANK, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Ulysses R. Williams v. State, 640 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
    …ed by exploitation of his initial detention but, instead, was sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of any assumed primary taint. Wong Sun; Sheff v. State, 301 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), aff'd, 329 So. 2d 270 (Fla.1976). Cf. State v. Taylor, 557 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (“[intervening misconduct would have served to dissipate any taint from a pretextual stop, assuming that to have been the case.”) We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence. Affirmed.…
  • State v. Freeney, 613 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
    …al force against these police officers in response to this unlawful stop. See Wallace v. State, 557 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). His use of force is not fruit of any illegal search or seizure, but an independent act of misconduct. State v. Taylor, 557 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Mr. Freeney was arrested on November 25,1991, and charged with battery on a law enforcement officer and obstructing an officer without violence. At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer explained that he and another off…
  • State v. Velez, 649 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …ad taken place at all.3 See State v. Pollard, 625 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); State v. Barrio, 619 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Springle v. State, 613 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), review dismissed, 626 So. 2d 208 (Fla.1993); State v. Taylor, 557 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Moreland v. State, 552 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), review denied 562 So. 2d 346 (Fla.1990). Although State v. Irvin, 483 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), review denied 491 So. 2d 279 (Fla.1986) was decided pre-Kehoe, it is base…
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