WALTER BURKE CARTER, D/B/A WC INDUSTRIES AND BERNETTA GRIFFIN CARTER, D/B/A WC INDUSTRIES

v.

BLUE HOUSE PAINTING AND REMODELING, LLC

LABRIT, Judge. Walter Burke Carter and Bernetta Griffin Carter, who operate a contracting business under the fictitious name WC Industries (collectively WC), appeal a final summary judgment rendered in favor of Blue House Painting and Remodeling, LLC (Blue House). Because genuine disputes of material fact exist, we reverse. The case arose from a one-page construction contract between the parties. Under the contract, WC agreed "to provide all labor and materials to construct the wall and dumpster for the new daycare."

Approximately seven months after the parties signed the contract, Blue House filed a complaint against WC for breach of contract and other relief. Blue House alleged that it paid WC approximately two-thirds of the contract price but WC did not construct a wall or a dumpster; it only delivered unopened materials to the site valued at $2,229.12. Blue House later moved for summary judgment. The parties submitted competing affidavits before the hearing on Blue House's motion. Blue House's affidavit averred that WC "left the construction site" after delivering unopened materials, that "[t]here was no evidence of any labor being completed," and that WC "did not construct a wall or install a dumpster" at the daycare. WC's affidavits effectively stated the opposite. They averred that WC had "fulfilled [its] contractual obligations to [Blue House] by providing material and labor," that WC had "purchased the necessary materials for the job," and that "[c]onstruction of the wall was substantially complete." WC attached receipts and other records to its affidavits, showing purchases and payments for concrete block materials, equipment rentals, fencing, reinforcing steel, and labor. WC's records also reflected a $500 payment for a dumpster. Neither party submitted any photographic or visual evidence. After a hearing, the trial court rendered final summary judgment in favor of Blue House. The judgment does not explain the basis for the trial court's ruling, and we do not have the benefit of a hearing transcript.

Nonetheless, we review the judgment de novo.1 Fitness Int'l, 1 We apply the amended version of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 that became effective in May 2021 because the trial court granted summary judgment in July 2022. See In re Amends to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 77 (Fla. 2021) ("[T]he new rule must govern the adjudication of any summary judgment motion decided on or after [May 1, 2021]. . . .").

LLC v. 93 FLRPT, LLC, 48 Fla.

L. Weekly D947 (Fla. 2d DCA May 10, 2023) (citing Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a) provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Under this rule, which adopts the federal summary judgment standard, "the correct test for the existence of a genuine factual dispute is whether 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' " In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Stated another way, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 192 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52).

Given this standard, a party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

The nonmovant must "go beyond the pleadings and 'identify affirmative evidence' that creates a genuine dispute of material fact." Brevard County v. Waters Mark Dev. Enters., LC, 350 So. 3d 395, 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998)).

Where the nonmovant presents such evidence, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 ("[O]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962))).

Ultimately, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party," the trial court should grant summary judgment. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Here, the record taken as a whole, and viewed in WC's favor, could lead a rational trier of fact to find for WC. The case is not complex. It involves a one-page contract to construct a wall and install a dumpster at a daycare. Blue House—which bears the burden of proof at trial on its breach of contract claim—presented evidence showing that WC did not construct a wall or install a dumpster at the site. WC then presented affirmative evidence indicating that the wall was substantially complete and that it paid $500 for a dumpster. This evidence was sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute and it precluded the entry of summary judgment in Blue House's favor.

Therefore, we reverse the final summary judgment for Blue House and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded. KELLY and LaROSE, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.