PATRICIA T. BERGSTROM, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT BERGSTROM, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1990-01-30
No. 88-3060
Before BASKIN, LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.
559 So. 2d 82 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1990) Negative Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Patricia Bergstrom appealed a final divorce judgment in which the trial court awarded her the marital home and $144,000 in lump sum alimony while her husband received all other assets valued approximately $1,000,000 more than hers. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to justify the disparate distribution of marital assets.


Holding

The trial court's distribution was not equitable because it provided no justification for the substantial disparity in the asset awards. Under Florida law, marital assets should be distributed equally unless justifications for disparity exist, and the court failed to identify any such justification.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court distributing marital assets in a dissolution of marriage action should ensure that neither spouse falls from prosperity to misfortune.

[2] The general rule for asset distribution in dissolution of marriage cases is equal distribution, unless justifications for disparity exist.

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Key Quotes

“In distributing the assets in a dissolution of marriage, the trial court need not equalize the financial positions of the parties, but should insure that neither spouse falls from prosperity to misfortune.”

Establishes the foundational principle of equitable distribution in dissolution cases under Florida law.

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Facts & Procedural History

Patricia and Robert Bergstrom were married for twenty-one years and had six minor children. Neither spouse was employed; their income derived from rea…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We reverse and remand.

Appellant, Patricia Bergstrom (wife), and appellee, Robert Bergstrom (husband), were married for twenty-one years and had six minor children at the time of the final hearing. Neither appellant nor appellee is employed. Their source of income is real estate holdings. As part of the final judgment, the trial court awarded the wife the marital home and lump sum alimony. The husband received all other assets.

The assets at the time of the final hearing consisted of six properties, valued at between $3,176,000 and $3,717,000, including the marital home, valued at between $840,000 and $1,000,000. The trial court awarded the wife the marital home and $144,000 in lump sum alimony. The husband received all other properties.

From the assets the husband received, he was obligated to pay the lump sum alimony, payable in four installments of $36,000 per year. In addition to the lump sum alimony, the husband was ordered to pay child support of $600 per month per child, private school tuition for one child, and two-thirds medical, dental, and orthodontic expenses. Taking the valuation of the properties most favorable to the husband, and deducting the obligations set forth by the trial court to be paid by him, the husband received properties valued at approximately $1,000,000 more than those received by the wife.

In distributing the assets in a dissolution of marriage, the trial court need not equalize the financial positions of the parties, but should insure that neither spouse falls from prosperity to misfortune. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). The concept of equitable distribution adopted by Canakaris has evolved into the general rule that asset distribution should be equal, unless there exist justifications for disparity. See Bobb v. Bobb, 552 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) and cases cited therein. See also Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 550 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Villaverde v. Villaverde, 547 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Halberg v. Halberg, 519 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

The trial court cited no justification for the disparate distribution nor is any justification evident from the record. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a more equitable distribution.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Polley v. Polley, 588 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
    …ngful termination as a PPC officer and employee. Because no basis for the disproportionate award appears in the record, we vacate the award of the marital home to the husband.7 Soll v. Soll, 560 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 559 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 574 So. 2d 139 (Fla.1990); Zachary v. Zachary, 551 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Cobb; Satanonchai v. Satanonchai, 522 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see Canakaris. On remand, the trial court is directed to award the…
  • Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 597 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
    …solution proceeding is subject to the equitable distribution statute. Section 61.-075, Fla.Stat. (1991). Equitable distribution of marital assets is presumptively equal, but may be varied if there is good reason to do so. See Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 559 So. 2d 82, 83 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 574 So. 2d 139 (Fla.1990), and cases cited therein; § 61.075(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). Pursuant to this statute, “the court shall set apart to each spouse that spouse’s non-marital assets and liabilities and shall dis…
  • Dienstag v. Dienstag, 596 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274 (Fla.1985); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Weinstein v. Steele, 590 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 559 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 574 So. 2d 139 (Fla.1990); Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); O’Neal v. O’Neal, 410 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).…

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