C.W. WHITFIELD, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1990-02-13
No. 88-1905
Before BARKDULL, NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.
559 So. 2d 84 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1990) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

C.W. Whitfield appeals his conviction for cocaine trafficking after police conducted a pretextual traffic stop and vehicle search. The court reversed, finding the stop and search violated the Fourth Amendment under the pretextual search doctrine established in Kehoe v. State.


Holding

The court held that the facts of this case constitute a prohibited pretextual search under Kehoe v. State. The stop for a trivial traffic infraction, followed by a second pat-down and vehicle search, violated Fourth Amendment protections because no founded suspicion existed for the second detention and a reasonable officer would not have stopped the vehicle absent an invalid purpose.


Headnotes

[1] A pretextual search occurs when police use a minor traffic violation as a justification for a stop when their primary motive is to investigate other suspected criminal ac…

[2] A traffic stop is deemed pretextual if a reasonable officer would not have made the stop absent the additional invalid purpose.

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Key Quotes

“police may stop and investigate a motor vehicle when there is a 'founded' suspicion of criminal activity in the mind of the police officer”

Establishes the legal standard for lawful vehicle stops under Kehoe

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Facts & Procedural History

Police officers stopped Whitfield based on an anonymous tip about a drug sale, matching him to a physical description but finding no contraband or war…

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Opinion of the Court
FERGUSON, Judge.

FERGUSON, Judge.

C.W. Whitfield appeals a conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine. We reverse on a finding that the facts of this case place it squarely into the prohibited pretextual search mold defined by the supreme court in Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988).

Police officers, Roberts and Morales, acting on an anonymous telephone tip about a drug sale in the area, were dispatched to a northwest Miami intersection. They stopped Mr. Whitfield because he was a black male wearing clothing allegedly matching that described by the anonymous informant. Whitfield explained to the officers that he was on an errand to the nearby grocery store for his mother. Officer Roberts questioned Whitfield and patted him down. No weapons, contraband, or outstanding warrants were discovered. He was instructed to leave the area.

Officer Morales, who was at the scene of the initial stop, and who knew that the defendant had been frisked and ordered from the vicinity, followed Whitfield’s automobile out of the area. About ten minutes later he observed Whitfield make a right turn without giving a blinking light signal. The observation was made through Morales’ rear view mirror while passing Whitfield’s vehicle in a “perpendicular” direction.

A second pat-down search was administered after Whitfield had complied with orders to get out of his vehicle and place his hands atop the automobile. He was arrested for committing a battery while, according to Morales, attempting to flee the scene. There is no evidence in the record that a traffic citation was issued. After the arrest, Whitfield’s vehicle was impounded and searched in the engine compartment, interior, and trunk. Two brown paper bags of cocaine rocks and $884 in currency were found in a wooden box in the trunk.

Whitfield was charged with possession of more than twenty-eight grams of cocaine and battery upon a police officer. At trial, the defendant was found not guilty of battery on the officer — the offense relied upon as the basis for the search. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to thirty years of incarceration.

Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1095, holds that “[p]olice may stop and investigate a motor vehicle when there is a ‘founded’ suspicion of criminal activity in the mind of the police officer.” At the same time, however, the court condemned the police practice of justifying a stop on some obscure traffic violation where a suspicion is not well founded. After noting first that it is difficult to operate a vehicle without some occasional trivial violation, an objective test was adopted which asks simply whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the car absent the additional invalid purpose. Id. at 1096. It is clear from the record that there was no founded suspicion for a second nontraffic detention and that the stop for a trivial traffic infraction, followed by a second pat-down search, was a pretext for a vehicle search which violated fourth amendment proscriptions.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to discharge the defendant.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Alton Brown v. State, 577 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
    …onable officer would have stopped the vehicle. Kehoe at 1097. Here, several factors indicate a pretext, including the fact that Brown was not cited for a traffic violation. See Smith v. State, 564 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Whitfield v. State, 559 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Arnold v. State, 544 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Further, at the hearing, Officer Cuicci was unable to cite the ordinance and the state did not present evidence of such an ordinance. Moreover, the officer admitted that police…
  • Targaczewski v. State, 590 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
    …an everyday occasion, but I have used it to pick up on DUI’s before.” This concession, together with the fact that the officers followed for eleven blocks before making the stop, renders the stop pretextual and unauthorized. See Whitfield v. State, 559 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); C.V.H. v. State, 556 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). REVERSED. DANAHY, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.…
  • Pedro v. State, 578 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
    …e motion to suppress. Reversed. SCHEB, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur. . In determining if the stop for a minor traffic infraction was pretextual, it is a relevant consideration that Pedro was not issued a traffic citation. See Whitfield v. State, 559 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Arnold v. State, 544 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).…

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