EDWARD MARK TARGACZEWSKI, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Targaczewski was convicted of cocaine possession after officers stopped his car and discovered crack cocaine in the passenger door. The court reversed his conviction, holding that the traffic stop was pretextual and violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and did not routinely enforce the traffic violation cited.
The court held that the stop was pretextual and unauthorized. While the officers suspected a drug transaction based on their observations, those observations did not provide well-founded suspicion of criminal activity. The traffic violation alone could not justify the stop because the officer admitted he did not routinely enforce right-turn signal violations and the officers followed the vehicle for eleven blocks before stopping it.
[1] A traffic stop is pretextual and unauthorized when officers follow a vehicle for an extended period and then stop it for a minor traffic violation, especially when the of…
[2] A defendant has standing to challenge a traffic stop that leads to their arrest.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Based on their observations, the officers suspected that a drug transaction had occurred. These observations, however, provide no well-founded suspicion of criminal activity which could support a detention.”
Establishes that suspicion of drug activity without reasonable suspicion does not justify a stop
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn June 29, 1990, at 2:45 a.m., Sarasota police officers observed Targaczewski, a white man, in the passenger seat talking to two black males who walk…
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PATTERSON, Judge.
The appellant challenges his conviction for possession of cocaine, contending that his motion to suppress should have been granted. We agree and reverse.
At 2:45 a.m. on June 29, 1990, Officers Blaine and Graham of the Sarasota Police Department observed the appellant, a white man seated in the passenger seat of a car, talking to two black males. The black males walked away and returned to the car twice. The driver of the car, a white female, then pulled away and made a right turn without using a turn signal. The officers followed the car for eleven blocks and then stopped it based on the traffic violation. While Officer Blaine talked to the driver, Graham ordered the appellant from the car. When the appellant opened the door, Graham observed a piece of rock cocaine between the door and the passenger seat, which was the basis for the appellant’s arrest. The appellant has standing to challenge the stop. See Wulff v. State, 533 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Based on their observations, the officers suspected that a drug transaction had occurred. These observations, however, provide no well-founded suspicion of criminal activity which could support a detention. Notwithstanding, the stop can be sustained if a reasonable officer would have stopped the car absent the additional invalid purpose. Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988). On this issue Blaine was asked if he usually stopped vehicles for failing to use a right-turn signal. He responded, “Not an everyday occasion, but I have used it to pick up on DUI’s before.” This concession, together with the fact that the officers followed for eleven blocks before making the stop, renders the stop pretextual and unauthorized. See Whitfield v. State, 559 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); C.V.H. v. State, 556 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
REVERSED.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Hal A. Davis, Jr. v. State, 606 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…etextual); Lagree (officer's testimony did not establish that he stops people for driving one-half block without lights on, therefore, circumstances did not support conclusion that reasonable officer would have made the stop); Targaczewski v. State, 590 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (court concluded stop was pretextual where officer testified he does not usually stop vehicles for failing to use turn signals and officers followed defendant for 11 blocks after violation before making stop); Mims v. State, 581 S…
Authorities Cited
- Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1988)
- Wulff v. State, 533 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- C.W. Whitfield v. State, 559 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Corrado Pastore and Lucille Pastore v. Cerese, 556 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- C.V.H. v. State, 556 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)