WILLIE JOE BRADLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A 16-year-old juvenile was convicted of grand theft and cocaine possession and sentenced to 36 months as a youthful offender. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to adequately address statutory sentencing criteria and imposed costs and restitution without proper notice or findings regarding the defendant's ability to pay.
The court affirmed the conviction but reversed and remanded for resentencing on two grounds: first, the trial court's order was deficient because its findings were conclusory without facts supporting them and failed to adequately address all six statutory criteria, though the court clarified that written findings need not be made at sentencing if the record reflects consideration of the factors; second, the trial court improperly imposed financial obligations without notice to the defendant and without making findings on his ability to pay, requiring a new sentencing hearing to address these issues with proper procedure.
[1] A trial court must strictly comply with statutory criteria when sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and failure to make findings addressing each criterion constitutes reve…
[2] A trial court's written order regarding statutory sentencing criteria must contain factual support for its conclusions, not merely conclusory statements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellate courts have insisted on strict compliance with section 39.111(7)(c) by the trial courts.”
Establishes the strict standard for compliance with juvenile sentencing statutory criteria
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWillie Joe Bradley, age 16, was charged with grand theft and possession of cocaine and entered no contest pleas to both charges. The trial court sente…
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POLEN, Judge.
Appellant, a sixteen year old juvenile, was charged by information with grand theft and possession of cocaine. He entered pleas of no contest to each charge.
The trial court held a sentencing hearing at which time the judge announced that he had received a presentence investigation and a predisposition report. The predisposition report recommended three alternative juvenile sanctions as appropriate for appellant.
The record indicates that appellant’s recommended guideline sentence was community control or twelve to thirty months’ incarceration.
However, the permissive range allowed a sentence up to three and one half years without written reasons.
The trial court sentenced appellant to thirty six months in the Department of Corrections as a youthful offender and imposed $200.00 in court costs in each case, public defender fees of $105.00 in each as well, and $400.00 restitution in the grand theft case.
Ten days later, the trial judge heard a motion to reconsider sentence pursuant to section 39.111(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1987). The court upheld the original sentence and entered a written order addressing the criteria under the statute. Appellant raises two points on appeal.
We find merit with both points and affirm appellant’s conviction but reverse and remand for resentencing. Section 39.111(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), sets forth specific criteria that the trial court must consider prior to sentencing a juvenile as an adult. Appellate courts have insisted on strict compliance with section 39.111(7)(c) by the trial courts. Brown v. State, 524 So. 2d 730 (Fla.4th DCA 1988). Numerous decisions have held that it is reversible error not to make findings addressed to each of the six criteria. West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla.4th DCA 1987).
In the instant case, we find that the trial court’s order is deficient in that the findings made were merely conclusions without facts supporting their application. Specifically the record fails to completely set forth specific findings under section 39.-111(7)(c)(1) and (2). Criterion 4 is addressed by the trial court in only general conclusory language without facts to support its conclusion. Criteria (5a), (5c) and (6) have not been addressed at all in the trial court’s order.
We reject appellant’s argument that the trial court must make written findings of fact which address each of the six criteria at sentencing and before reaching its decision. Hammonds v. State, 543 So. 2d 337 (Fla.4th DCA 1989).
However, the record must reflect that the trial court considered the six factors at the time of sentencing. In the same vein, we reject appellant’s argument that he must be re-sentenced as a juvenile. West, 503 So. 2d at 436.
Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s conviction but reverse and remand for re-sentencing as to point I on appeal.
Appellant’s second point on appeal also warrants remand. Without notice to appellant, the trial court imposed court costs in the amount of $200.00 and further ordered him to pay $105.00 in public defender fees and $400.00 in restitution. The trial judge made no findings on appellant’s ability to pay.
In Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984), the supreme court held that prior notice must be given to an indigent defendant before assessment of costs against him.
Moreover, a judicial finding must be made that the defendant has the ability to pay. Similarly, in Thomas v. State, 486 So. 2d 69 (Fla.4th DCA 1986), we held that assessment of public defender fees without notice constitutes reversible error.
Finally, before restitution is imposed, a defendant is entitled to a hearing to consider the factors set forth in section 775.089(6) and (7), Florida Statutes (1987). These factors include the defendant’s ability to pay. Mounds v. State, 526 So. 2d 1084 (Fla.4th DCA 1988).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order as to point II on appeal and remand for further action consistent with this opinion.
DELL and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
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Lang v. State, 566 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…k list reflects conclusions. Smith v. State, 543 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Although the trial judge may make the findings of fact on the record at the sentencing hearing, in the present case, such findings were not made. Bradley v. State, 559 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The only specific finding made was that the defendant committed an armed robbery.4 Because of the failure to make the requisite findings, the record in the instant case does not support the trial court’s conclusion that this juv…
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Tonny Mancini v. State, 593 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…ce. First, failure to address all of the statutory criteria of section 39.111(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), when sentencing a juvenile as an adult is reversible error. See Thompkin v. State, 573 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). In Bradley v. State, 559 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), we held: Section 39.111(7)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), sets forth specific criteria that the trial court must consider prior to sentencing a juvenile as an adult.... We reject appellant’s argument that the trial court must mak…1 / 2
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Padilla v. State, 622 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…e criteria requires reversal and remand. See Hill v. State, 605 So. 2d 514, 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Furthermore, a written order must be entered which provides more than mere conclusions without facts supporting their application. Bradley v. State, 559 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Although the Bradley Court rejected appellant’s argument that the trial court must make written factual findings to address each of the six criteria at sentencing and before reaching its decision, see Hammonds v. State, 543 So.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Brown v. State, 524 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- West v. State, 503 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Hammonds v. State, 543 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Thomas v. State, 486 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Levy, 526 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Odzer v. Wilson, 526 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)