NACEUR KHELIFI, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Khelifi was convicted of trafficking in cocaine after undercover officers, introduced by an informant seeking a reduced sentence, conducted a drug transaction with him. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that while the informant's substantial assistance agreement motivated the drug setup, this alone does not constitute a due process violation absent threats, persistent enticements, or evidence of overcoming initial refusal.
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that while the informant's substantial assistance agreement may have motivated setting up the large cocaine purchase, this fact alone does not constitute a due process violation without evidence of threats, persistent enticements, or inducements overcoming an initial refusal to participate in criminal activity.
[1] Law enforcement's use of an informant to initiate a drug transaction does not violate due process when the informant does not employ persistent inducements or threats to…
[2] The mere fact that an informant is motivated by a desire for a reduced sentence in another case does not, in itself, constitute a due process violation in a subsequent dr…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In Hunter, the informant was a major prosecution witness in the case and evidence showed that he had used persistent inducements to overcome an initial refusal by the defendant in that case to participate.”
Establishes the distinction between Hunter's case and Khelifi's case, showing why Hunter's stricter protections do not apply here
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn informant, seeking a reduced sentence in another case, introduced undercover officers to Boutelle and arranged a cocaine transaction. The officers …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Predisposition cases and more on FLexlaw
STONE, Judge.
The appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine. He contends it was error to deny his motion to dismiss on due process grounds. The transaction culminating in his arrest was initiated by an informant performing substantial assistance in order to obtain a reduced sentence in another case. See Hunter v. State, 531 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
Here, the informant introduced undercover officers to the appellant’s codefend-ant, Boutelle. The informant advised the officers that Boutelle was interested in buying drugs. The police knew nothing about the background of either the informant, Boutelle or Khelifi. Boutelle arranged to meet the officers in a parking lot to buy a kilo of cocaine. He said that someone, meeting appellant’s description, would accompany him.
The two officers, wearing listening devices, met Boutelle and the appellant as arranged. The officers indicated the sale price was eleven thousand dollars. The defendant advised them that he had the money, showing them one packet in his sock and another in his shirt pocket. The appellant and one officer entered the officer’s car where Khelifi sampled the cocaine, discussed doing future deals, and addressed the details of the transfer. Shortly thereafter, the cocaine was passed to appellant and he was arrested.
The appellant argues that he was not seeking to traffic, that he was a cocaine addict, and would have purchased a lesser amount if given that option. He asserts that the informant determined the one kilo amount in order to arrange a big deal. Appellant claims that he was ensnared because law enforcement officers encouraged the informant to initiate new criminal activity as a condition for obtaining a reduced sentence, rather than simply seeking assistance in apprehending those already engaging in a crime. See State v. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla.1985); Hunter v. State.
We recognize that Hunter is presently under review in the supreme court but, in any event, we deem that case to be inapposite here. In Hunter, the informant was a major prosecution witness in the case and evidence showed that he had used persistent inducements to overcome an initial refusal by the defendant in that case to participate. In this case, the informant played no role in the transaction and his uncorroborated testimony was not necessary for trial. In addition, there were no threats or persistent enticements causing the defendant to act contrary to a law abiding predisposition. The appellant argues the informant acted pursuant to a substantial assistance agreement. This caused him to intentionally set up the large cocaine purchase by the codefendants even though the authorities knew of no prior criminal activity by them. However, these factors alone do not amount to a violation of due process rights as a matter of law. E.g. Hunter v. State; Perez v. State, 517 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); State v. Ruiz, 495 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Therefore, the judgment and sentence are affirmed.
HERSEY, C.J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in conclusion only.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Krajewski v. State, 587 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…the informer’s performance of a substantial assistance agreement resulting in avoidance of a minimum mandatory prison term violated appellant’s due process rights. In Jamarillo v. State, 576 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), and in Khelifi v. State, 560 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), this court distinguished Anders and Hunter on the ground that there was no violation of due process where the informant’s testimony was not a vital part of the state’s case. The Jamarillo and the Khelifi opinions are not control…
-
State v. Laing, 182 So. 3d 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…-and telling the defendant that he liked to “party,” which he- explained as meaning the use of cocaine, was not so outrageous as. to >warrant,, dismissal- of charges against the defendant for providing crystal-meth to the officer); Khelifi v. State, 560 So. 2d 333, 333-34 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (holding no-violation of due process where informant, who acted pursuant to a substantial assistance agreement, intentionally. set up a large cocaine-purchase by the codefendants; the informant did not make any “threats o…
-
Herndon v. State, 591 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…ddress the underlying facts in this appeal because we must assume that Maugeri, the codefendant-tar-get, was properly discharged. For this reason we also need not consider Jamarillo v. State, 576 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), and Khelifi v. State, 560 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 574 So. 2d 141 (Fla.1990). Therefore, the judgment and sentence are reversed. Upon remand, the defendant is to be discharged. As to all other issues raised we find no error or abuse of discretion. We certify to the sup…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Boyce E. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985)
- Watkins v. State, 531 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Hunter v. State, 531 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- State v. Ruiz, 495 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Perez v. State, 517 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)