STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIE MONROE NEELY, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's suppression of crack cocaine evidence found during a police stop at a condemned house known as a crack house. The appellate court reverses, finding the search justified under the plain view doctrine and as a search incident to a lawful arrest for trespass.
The court reversed, holding that the suppression motion should have been denied because: (1) the circumstances justified an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio; (2) the command to stand and plain viewing of the crack cocaine did not constitute a search after the investigatory stop; and (3) appellee's trespass in the condemned house gave officers probable cause to arrest him, justifying any search incident to arrest.
[1] An investigatory stop is justified when officers have a legitimate founded suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity.
[2] An officer's command for a person to stand, following a lawful investigatory stop, does not constitute a search.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“clearly, the circumstances surrounding the officer's apprehension of appellee lead to a legitimate founded suspicion that appellee was engaged in criminal activity sufficient to justify an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio”
Establishes the court's rationale that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop based on the facts and circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring an undercover crack cocaine operation on April 15, 1989, sheriff's officers completed a controlled buy at a condemned crack house in Jacksonvil…
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
The State of Florida appeals the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to suppress physical evidence — crack cocaine. We reverse.
The record shows that the factual scenario leading to appellee’s arrest for possession of crack cocaine was as follows: At approximately 8:00 p.m. on April 15, 1989, during an undercover crack cocaine operation, sheriff's officers completed a controlled buy in Jacksonville, Florida on the front porch of 1341 West State Street, which was a condemned house known by the officers to be a “crack house.” Backup officers then rushed the house and the crack dealer ran into it with Detective Deal and other officers in hot pursuit. Upon entering the premises, Deal observed appel-lee seated in a chair two or three feet from the dealer who, by that time, had been apprehended by another detective. Deal saw “something in [appellee’s] hand and I saw him placing it underneath his right buttock.” He was not certain what appel-lee was putting under his buttock. He told appellee to stand up. When appellee hesitated, Deal “grabbed him by his shirt and pulled him up and at that time I saw a piece of crack sitting in the chair and that’s the only thing in the chair.” The record shows that on March 22, 1989, appellant had been arrested and charged with the misdemeanor offense of trespassing after warning at 1341 West State Street.
The trial judge determined that Deal’s “search and seizure” of appellee was unreasonable and was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement. Consequently, he granted appellee’s motion to suppress the crack cocaine.
For several reasons, appellee’s motion to suppress should have been denied. First, clearly, the circumstances surrounding the officer’s apprehension of appellee lead to a legitimate founded suspicion that appellee was engaged in criminal activity sufficient to justify an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and Section 901.151, Florida Statutes. See State v. Pye, 551 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Adams v. State, 523 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); and Piediscalzo v. State, 549 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Further, the command to appellee to merely stand, which was issued under the officer’s clear justification in reasonably detaining him, and the subsequent plain viewing of the crack cocaine in the chair did not even amount to a “search” of appellee after the investigatory stop and detention. Finally, the fact that appellee was committing the crime of trespass in the condemned house gave the officers probable cause to arrest appellant for trespass and any arguable search incident to arrest was therefore justified. See Pye.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
SHIVERS, C.J., and BARFIELD, J., concur.
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State v. Rand, 209 So. 3d 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…cient basis for believing that an offense has been committed.”). We have held that an officer who observes a defendant committing the crime of trespass has probable cause to arrest the defendant and search him pursuant to the arrest. State v. Neely, 560 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). What Officer Jackson knew at the point of arrest begins with the legal foundation in which he was trained and on which he performed his duties. He testified that he had been trained in, and was familiar with, Florida’s sc…
Authorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- State v. PYE, 551 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Adams v. State, 523 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- McLEOD v. State, 549 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)