BRICKELL STATION TOWERS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
JDC (AMERICA) CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Brickell Station Towers appealed the trial court's order appointing a corporate real estate broker as receiver over mortgaged property and other real estate. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed the appointment of the unauthorized receiver and the overbroad scope of receivership, but affirmed the trial court's decision to appoint a receiver over the mortgaged property itself.
A corporate real estate broker cannot serve as a receiver under Florida law; only natural persons, banks or trust companies with trust powers incorporated in Florida, and national or federal banking associations located in Florida with trust powers may serve as receivers. The receivership was properly limited in principle to the mortgaged property, and the trial court exceeded its authority by extending it to additional property not requested in the pleadings.
[1] A corporate real estate broker organized under the Florida General Corporation Act may not serve as a receiver.
[2] Only natural persons, banks or trust companies with trust powers, and national banking associations or federal associations with trust powers, may serve as receivers in F…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Banking Code and the Florida General Corporation Act each contemplate that only natural persons, banks or trust companies, incorporated under the laws of this state and having trust powers, and national banking associations or federal associations, located in this state and having trust powers, may serve as receivers.”
Establishes the statutory requirements for who may serve as a receiver under Florida law, disqualifying the corporate real estate broker.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellee JDC (America) Corporation sought to foreclose a mortgage against appellant Brickell Station Towers and filed three motions for appointmen…
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse the order appointing as receiver a corporate real estate broker organized pursuant to the Florida General Corporation Act, Chapter 607, Florida Statutes (1989). The Banking Code and the Florida General Corporation Act each contemplate that only natural persons, banks or trust companies, incorporated under the laws of this state and having trust powers, and national banking associations or federal associations, located in this state and having trust powers, may serve as receivers. See §§ 660.41, 607.281, 607.1432, Fla. Stat. (1989). Therefore, because the brokerage firm did not fit in any of the above categories, the trial court’s order must be reversed.
Also, the court order exceeded the scope of the pleadings in appointing a receiver not only over the mortgaged property but also over other real estate not subject to the mortgage. The complaint filed by appellee sought to foreclose a mortgage. While appellee’s amended complaint alleged appellant’s breach of their Joint Venture Agreement, the three motions for receiver filed by appellee all sought a receiver only over the mortgaged property; none were amended to seek a receiver over all joint venture property. Nevertheless, the order of receivership was not limited to the mortgaged property as it should have been. See Lovett v. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768 (1927) (jurisdiction of court remains at rest until called into action by some suitor); see also Cravero v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 91 So. 2d 312 (Fla.1956) (reversal required where pleadings provided no basis for court’s order).
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to appoint a receiver over the mortgaged property. That receiver must meet the statutory requirements stated above. Any additional property of the appellant which appellee seeks to place in receivership should be requested by appropriate pleading or motion and supported by a showing of the necessity to preserve the appellee’s interest in the subject property pending resolution of the primary claim.
Although the evidence clearly supported the appointment of a receiver for the mortgaged property, the receiver appointed was unauthorized and the property over which he was appointed was overbroad.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Brickell Station Towers, Inc. v. The Honorable Harvey Goldstein, 571 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…Following reversal of an order appointing a receiver, Brickell Station Towers, Inc. v. JDC (Am.) Corp., 560 So. 2d 1391 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), Brickell Station Towers filed an application in the alternative for [*491] mandamus, prohibition, and common law certiorari which essentially sought to prohibit the lower tribunal from conducting fee hearings for the former recei…
Authorities Cited
- Lovett v. Lovett, 112 So. 768 (Fla. 1927)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Maule Indus., Inc. v. Honorable George E. Holt, 91 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1956)