SUSAN JONES LIBBY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Susan Jones Libby was arrested after police stopped her car in a known drug area and discovered an outstanding warrant. The trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained from the illegal stop, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the initial stop lacked founded suspicion and the discovery of the warrant did not validate the illegal detention.
The court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the officer lacked founded suspicion to justify the initial stop based merely on the appellant's presence in a high crime area, and the subsequent discovery of a warrant did not validate the illegal detention. Additionally, Libby's confession was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal police conduct to be admissible.
[1] A traffic stop based solely on a driver's presence in a known drug area, without further founded suspicion of criminal activity, is illegal.
[2] Evidence discovered during an illegal detention is inadmissible, even if an outstanding warrant is discovered during that detention.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is clear from the record in this case that the arresting officer stopped the appellant solely based on her presence in a "known drug area."”
Establishes the sole basis for the traffic stop, critical to finding the stop was illegal.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA police officer stopped Libby's car solely because she was in a known drug area. During the stop, the officer ran a warrant check and discovered an o…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Warrant Check cases and more on FLexlaw
PATTERSON, Judge.
Susan Jones Libby appeals from her judgment and sentence for possession of cocaine and challenges the denial of her motion to suppress contraband, paraphernalia, and statements made to the police after her arrest. We reverse.
It is clear from the record in this case that the arresting officer stopped the appellant solely based on her presence in a “known drug area.” After the officer stopped her car, he took the appellant’s driver’s license and ran a local warrant check. According to the officer, the appellant was not free to leave. One to two minutes later, the computer revealed an outstanding bench warrant for the appellant.
The officer informed the appellant that she was under arrest and proceeded to search her. The officer found the type of pipe used for smoking crack cocaine in the appellant’s pocket. Later, when the car was searched prior to towing, two matchbooks were found with cocaine ash left in them. At the police department the officer questioned the appellant about the pipe, and she stated that it was hers and that she had been smoking crack cocaine.
The trial judge denied the appellant’s motion to suppress because the officer found the evidence after he became aware of a valid warrant for her arrest. The appellant pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance, and the state entered a nolle prosequi in the paraphernalia charge. The appellant specifically reserved the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress.
The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The arresting officer did not have a founded suspicion of criminal activity based on the appellant’s presence in a high crime area. Martin v. State, 521 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The fact that a computer check revealed an outstanding warrant for the appellant does not validate the illegal detention. Kimbrough v. State, 539 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). In Kimbrough, a computer check also revealed an outstanding arrest warrant after an illegal stop of the defen dant. The Fourth District reversed the denial of the motion to suppress because there was no founded suspicion to justify the officer’s initial stop. The facts of the present case mandate the same result.
The state argues, based on United States v. Edmondson, 791 F. 2d 1512 (11th Cir.1986), that the appellant’s confession at the police department after her arrest was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal police conduct to be admissible. Edmondson is distinguishable in that there the defendant initiated the confession. Here, the officer who illegally detained the appellant specifically questioned her about the product of the illegal search. Upon questioning, she admitted that the pipe the officer found in her pocket was hers and that she had been smoking crack cocaine. There were no intervening circumstances, such as consultation with counsel or release from custody, to sufficiently attenuate the confession. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-2262, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 427 (1975); 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4(b) at 398 (2d ed. 1987). The denial of the motion to suppress is reversed.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2006)…receding illegality in a manner that has no parallel in the acquisition of physical evidence in a search incident to arrest. The distinction between a confession and a physical search following illegal police conduct is reflected in Libby v. State, 561 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), which involves both a confession and a search. There the Second District ruled inadmissible the fruits of a search incident to arrest on an outstanding warrant discovered during an illegal detention, stating only that “[t]he fact…
-
Madison Mays v. State, 887 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…istence of a valid warrant for Mays’ arrest, Mays would then be entitled to the suppression of the cocaine because it was discovered as the result of an illegal encounter. See Rollins v. State, 578 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Libby v. State, 561 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Frierson v. State, 851 So. 2d 293, 300 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); but see State v. Foust, 262 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).3 Based on our conclusion that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, we affirm the final jud…
-
Rollins v. State, 578 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…e, which requires either a founded suspicion of criminal activity or cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred. The fact that the officer subsequently discovered an outstanding warrant does not validate an illegal detention. Libby v. State, 561 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Kimbrough v. State, 539 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Since this was allegedly a traffic stop, the determination of whether the officer had cause to stop the vehicle based on a reasonable belief that he had observed a traffic…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (U.S. 1975)
- United States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1986)
- Martin v. State, 521 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Kimbrough v. State, 539 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)