PATRICK OMAR PUERTAS

v.

JENNIFER ANN RUIZ

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed November 26, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D25-0305 Lower Tribunal No. 20-16263-FC-04

Patrick Omar Puertas, Appellant,

vs.

Jennifer Ann Ruiz, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer Multack, Judge.

Law Offices of Maria del Carmen Calzon, P.A., and Maria Del Carmen Calzon, for appellant.

Patricia Mesa, P.A., and Patricia Mesa, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and GOODEN, JJ.

LINDSEY, J.

Appellant, Patrick Omar Puertas, appeals the trial court's Final Order of Relocation and Amended Court Ordered Parenting Plan.¹ Puertas makes several arguments asserting the trial court erred in granting a petition for relocation by misapplying the facts and law presented below. Puertas also argues the trial court abridged his due process rights by not allowing him to present rebuttal evidence. We affirm the trial court's decision because Puertas failed to attach the transcript of the final hearing, there is no error apparent on the face of the order, and nothing in the record shows the trial court prevented Puertas from introducing rebuttal evidence.

BACKGROUND

In February 2024, Ruiz filed her Petition to Relocate and for Modification and a Motion for Temporary Relocation. According to the motion, Ruiz, who formerly lived in Miami, Florida, moved to Gainesville, Florida, because Ruiz had to "vacate the home that she is residing in ... and cannot find affordable and adequate housing in Miami-Dade County, Florida."

Indeed, a week earlier, Ruiz signed a lease for a townhouse in Gainesville, Florida. But at the final hearing, for which we have no transcript,

the trial court heard evidence that Ruiz intended to move to another neighborhood in Gainesville. Unlike the previous neighborhood, this neighborhood has several safety concerns, including its remoteness and dense sexual predator population. The trial court also heard evidence on how to serve the child's best interest should relocation be granted.

After the final hearing, but before the trial court rendered a final order, Ruiz filed her Motion to Reopen Evidence Based on Newly Discovered Evidence. That motion argued that the trial court should consider new evidence that Ruiz would remain in the original and safer Gainesville residence because the sale of Ruiz's original residence “did not go through.”

In December 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, Puertas argued that it had no objection to Ruiz's motion, so long as Puertas is “allowed to address what is being reopened in terms of timeshare." In response, the trial court clarified that it had no problem with allowing Puertas to introduce evidence rebutting Ruiz's newly discovered evidence. But for a "separate issue, [the trial court would] need a motion." The trial court stated that Puertas “would be able to address timesharing at the location where she will be residing.” Puertas agreed to those terms, stating, "I understand, Your Honor. These are things that -- that are occurring now at that location."

A week later, the trial court rendered its final order. Based on the factors outlined in section 61.13001(7), Florida Statutes (2025), the trial court granted Ruiz's petition and ordered a new parenting plan, where Puertas received majority timesharing with the minor child and Ruiz was expected to incur much of the labor and costs that would come with having the minor child go back and forth from Miami to Gainesville.

Puertas responded with his Emergency Motion for Rehearing, Reconsideration, Correction, and Other Relief. That motion argued that the trial court made several misapplications of fact and law, but failed to raise that Puertas's due process rights were denied by granting Ruiz's Motion to Reopen Evidence. The trial court granted Puertas' motion in part, only to the extent that the trial court would amend some clerical errors and factual inconsistencies in the original final order. Puertas now appeals that final order. ANALYSIS

Puertas makes several arguments asserting that Ruiz failed to meet her burden to prove that relocation was in the best interest of the child and that modification would have been proper. That may be so, but we cannot confirm. We have no transcript of the final hearing—where almost all the evidence was presented—which the trial court relied on in rendering its final order.² See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory. Without knowing the factual context, neither can an appellate court reasonably conclude that the trial judge so misconceived the law as to require reversal.”). We are compelled to affirm.

Further, there is no reversible error apparent on the face of the record. Puertas argues that the trial court erred by only considering the relocation factors outlined in section 61.13001(7), Florida Statutes, thus ignoring the factors for modification of a parenting plan outlined in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2025). We disagree. When granting a petition for relocation

there is no need to conduct an independent analysis of the standards for modification outlined in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, because trial courts have discretion to amend prior and untenable parenting plans once relocation is granted. Ward v. Waters, 389 So. 3d 652, 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).

A trial court has discretion to modify aspects of a parenting plan so that relocation is executed in the best interest of the child. The plain text of section 61.13001(9)(a), Florida Statutes, states that if relocation is granted, a trial court has discretion to order “contact with the nonrelocating parent . . ., including access [and] time-sharing . . . to ensure that the child has frequent, continuing, and meaningful contact with the nonrelocating parent.” The trial court found Puertas and Ruiz “were operating under a [previous] timesharing plan that contemplated [Ruiz] living in Miami.” So because Ruiz moved to Gainesville, the trial court found that the "previous time-sharing plan is untenable for these parents.” In granting Ruiz's Petition for Relocation, the trial court “crafted a parenting plan consistent with" its findings for relocation. By a significant margin, Puertas remains the majority time-sharing parent under trial court's parenting plan and the new parenting plan properly reflects a desire for the child to have “frequent, continuing, and meaningful contact with the nonrelocating parent." § 61.13001(9)(a), Fla. Stat.

It is for this reason the “trial court is not required to independently address the applicable timesharing factors set forth in section 61.13, Florida Statutes” when rendering a final order on relocation. Ward, 389 So. 3d at 656. Instead, the trial court is “required to render the ultimate finding that the timesharing schedule comports with the best interests of the child.” Id. (citing Kelly v. Colston, 32 So. 3d 186, 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)). So when a prior time-sharing schedule is untenable, as it was here, the trial court may modify that schedule based on its findings for relocation. These findings are apparent on the face of the final order and the parenting plan.³

Finally, Puertas also argues that the trial court wrongly abridged his right to due process by barring him from presenting evidence after the trial court granted Ruiz's Motion to Reopen Evidence. We are not convinced. At the hearing on Ruiz's Motion to Reopen Evidence, Puertas stated he had no

objection to the motion so long as he was “allowed to address what is being reopened in terms of timeshare.” The trial court accepted Puertas's condition, but warned Puertas that it would not hear additional evidence on a separate issue without a motion. The trial court stated that Puertas "would be able to address timesharing at the location where she will be residing.” Puertas agreed and said, “I understand, Your Honor. These are things that— that are occurring now at that location."

So the trial court granted Puertas's request to introduce rebuttal evidence, but Puertas never took advantage of that opportunity; nothing in the record shows Puertas ever attempted to introduce rebuttal evidence. The trial court did not violate Puertas's due process rights. Cf. Cole v. Cole, 159 So. 3d 124, 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“We conclude that in ruling, without giving the Father an opportunity to present evidence, the trial court abused its discretion and violated the Father's right to procedural due process. The constitutional guarantee of due process dictates a full and fair opportunity to be heard in judicial proceedings.”); Garcia-Mathies Interiors, Inc. v. Pere, 259 So. 3d 213, 215 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“While the trial court has discretion in how it gives the sanctioned party an opportunity to be heard, the opportunity must be given.").⁴

For these reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.