JUAN S. CASTANO

v.

RUDY VEGA

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed November 19, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D25-0275 Lower Tribunal No. 25-DR-2-P

Juan S. Castano, Appellant,

vs.

Rudy Vega, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Sharon I. Hamilton, Judge.

Law Offices of Richard G. Dunberg, and Richard G. Dunberg for appellant.

Rudy Vega, in proper person.

Before FERNANDEZ, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Juan Castano appeals from a Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Stalking entered in favor of Appellee Rudy Vega.¹ We review these orders for competent substantial evidence. Sutton v. Fowler, 332 So. 3d 1001, 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“But the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” (internal citation omitted)).

Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's findings are not supported by competent substantial evidence and reverse. The record before us is insufficient to establish the minimum requirements of stalking pursuant to Section 784.048, Florida Statutes. Ozyesilpinar v. Jalali, 325 So. 3d 289, 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (concluding that where the trial court made no express findings of the statutory elements of stalking and where the incidents of record did not support the permanent stalking injunction, the injunction is reversed and remanded); see § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (defining stalking as “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing] another person”); see also Sutton, 332 So. 3d

at 1005 (“In order to be entitled to a stalking injunction two separate instances of stalking must be proven by competent substantial evidence."); Santiago v. Leon, 299 So. 3d 1114, 1117-18 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (concluding that the purported stalker appearing outside the petitioner's home on only one occasion and frequently visiting the same restaurants as the petitioner is neither "following,” nor willful or malicious); see also Klemple v. Gagliano, 197 So. 3d 1283, 1285-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (describing that evidence of the respondent outside the petitioner's front door and, on another occasion, the respondent waited in his car outside the petitioner's home “was vague and does not amount to following, particularly where the parties live in the same community”); Smith v. Melcher, 975 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (concluding the alleged stalker circling the restaurant where the petitioner was eating in his vehicle, looking at petitioner, pointing at the petitioner, and shaking his head was not stalking); Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So. 3d 986, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (finding no stalking where the alleged stalker stared at the petitioner while she sunbathed and there was no evidence the respondent made any accompanying statements or gestures evidencing a threat); § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (““Harass' means... 'engage[ment] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate

purpose."); § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (“Course of conduct” includes a pattern or a series of acts over any period, which evidences continuity of purpose.); Touhey v. Seda, 133 So. 3d 1203, 1204-05 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (concluding there is no basis for the finding of "substantial emotional distress” where a single incident occurs that the witnesses have no direct knowledge of the stalking and none of them report any threats); Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (reversing a stalking injunction where a single incident of passing by the petitioner falls short of harassment); Robinson v. Robinson, 257 So. 3d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) ("[M]ere uncivil behavior or annoyance is not sufficient to obtain an injunction[.]").

Reversed.