SHEARSON LEHMAN HUTTON, INC., ETC., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
DIANNA MEYER, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Shearson Lehman Hutton appealed two interlocutory orders denying dissolution and modification of a temporary injunction that prevented the company from terminating or disciplining three female financial consultants who alleged gender and age discrimination. The court held that injunctive relief is inappropriate to prevent employment termination because employees have an adequate remedy at law through damages.
A temporary injunction preventing employment termination is inappropriate because employees have an adequate remedy at law through damages. The court reversed the trial court's refusal to modify the injunction to permit termination and discipline, holding that if wrongful termination occurs, the appellees may pursue damages in the ongoing civil action.
[1] Injunctive relief is not available to prevent the termination of private employment when the employee has an adequate remedy at law.
[2] A trial court errs in modifying a temporary injunction to allow termination of private employment if the injunction prevents termination for reasons unrelated to discrimi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Injunctive relief is simply not available to prevent a termination of private employment inasmuch as the employee has an adequate remedy at law.”
Establishes the central legal principle that injunctions cannot be used to prevent employment termination when damages provide an adequate remedy.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThree female financial consultants (Meyer, Frank, and Stover) were employed by Shearson Lehman Hutton at its Winter Park office. When seven new financ…
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[*1332] COBB, Judge.
These two interlocutory appeals, consolidated for appellate purposes, are from two orders entered by the trial court, the first declining to dissolve a temporary injunction (Case No. 89-1210) and the second denying a motion to modify that same injunction (Case No. 89-1605).
We initially address Case No. 89-1605, the modification issue. The facts adduced by the record show that the appellees— Meyer, Frank and Stover — were female financial consultants employed by Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (hereinafter Shear-son) at its Winter Park office. Gerry Hel-mich, manager of the office, reassigned office space when seven new financial consultants were hired from another firm. The appellees were moved from private offices to an open area and no longer had immediate access to the same equipment— e.g., quotrons, multi-line phones, and research files.
Consequently, the three women sought relief in state circuit court, alleging that their reduction in status was based on gender and age discrimination.
The trial court entered a temporary injunction enjoining Shearson and Helmich from terminating the appointment of the three women, or engaging in any punitive, disciplinary, other actions, or activities detrimental to them.
The trial court then denied a motion to dissolve and declined to modify its injunction to allow termination of the three women for reasons unrelated to age or sex discrimination.
We find that it erred in the latter respect. Injunctive relief is simply not available to prevent a termination of private employment inasmuch as the employee has an adequate remedy at law. Pallen v. Richardson, 531 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Mosely v, DeMoya, 497 So. 2d 696, 697-98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Dania Jai-Alai International v. Murua, 375 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Oxford International Bank & Trust, Ltd. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 374 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.1980); Butler v. Lomelo, 355 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); and Montgomery Pipe & Tube Co. of Fla. v. Mann, 205 So. 2d 660, 661-62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
As contended by the appellants, if they are not permitted to terminate or discipline the three employees for any reason then they cannot effectively manage their own business or properly supervise their own employees, as required of them by the federal securities laws. The appellees respond that the appellants might terminate them, if allowed to do so, for an improper reason; but, if such termination later is determined to be wrongful, the remedy at that time would be damages as provided by the cases cited above. There is no authority, and no reasonable basis, for a trial court to manage a private, ongoing business, which is the ultimate effect of the instant injunctive order.
We reverse the trial court’s refusal to modify the temporary injunction to allow termination and discipline of the appellees by Shearson and Helmich. Thereafter, in the event of termination, the pending action may continue, with appropriate amendments, as an action for damages at the option of the appellees. In view of the foregoing modification of the injunction, we decline to address the other issues raised by the instant appeal.
REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
PETERSON, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.
W. SHARP, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. If reinstatement and mandatory decrees requiring an employer to treat all of its employees equally, without regard to sex, age, race, etc., are permissible then I see no reason why a temporary injunction freezing the status quo pending resolution of the merits of the cause is not a reasonable alternative open to a trial court. See Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 884 F. 2d 312 (7th Cir.1989); Welborn v. Reynolds Metals Co., 868 F. 2d 389 (11th Cir.1989); Ford v. Nicks, 866 F. 2d 865 (6th Cir.1989); Title VII, § 706(g), Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, et seq.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Seaescape, Ltd., Inc. v. Maximum Mktg. Exposure, Inc., 568 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…tion to dissolve should have been granted. The contracts at issue here are ordinary contracts for employment or personal services. Such contracts are not enforceable by injunction or specific performance. E.g., Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Meyer, 561 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Mosely v. De Moya, 497 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 367(1)(1981); 11 S. Williston, A Treatise on the La…
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Montaner v. BIG Show Prods., S.A., 620 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…ding contracts. Contracts for employment or personal services should not be enforced by injunction or specific performance. Seaescape, Ltd. v. Maximum Marketing Exposure, 568 So. 2d 952, 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Meyer, 561 So. 2d 1331, 1332 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Mosely v. De Moya, 497 So. 2d 696, 697-98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The appropriate remedy is an action for damages for breach of contract. Id. An injunction to prevent the breach of a personal service contract is not available.…
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Jetborne Int'l, Inc. v. Cohan, 584 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…mance ... [and that] [t]he appropriate remedy in such cases is an action for damages for breach of contract.” Seaescape, Ltd. v. Maximum Marketing Exposure, Inc., 568 So. 2d 952, 954 (Fla.3d DCA 1990); see also Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Meyer, 561 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Mosely v. De Moya, 497 So. 2d 696, 697-98 (Fla.3d DCA 1986); Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 367(1) (1981); 11 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law…
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Oxford Int'l Bank & Tr., Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, 374 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Harris v. Fla. Dep't OF Labor & Emp. Sec., 374 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Dania JAI Alai Int'l, Inc. v. Murua, 375 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Ford v. Chancellor Roy S. Nicks, 866 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 1989)
- Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Mosely v. de Moya, 497 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Montgomery Pipe & Tube Co. OF Fla. v. Mann, 205 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Butler v. Lomelo, 355 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Pallen v. Richardson, 531 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Welborn v. Reynolds Metals Co., 868 F.2d 389 (11th Cir. 1989)