GENE STEVENS, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBBYN MUSE, APPELLEE
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The court reversed a trial court judgment that voided contracts between unmarried cohabitants, holding that agreements supported by valid, lawful consideration independent of sexual relations are enforceable even between parties in an illicit relationship.
Contracts between unmarried cohabitants are enforceable if the consideration for the agreement is not sexual intercourse and instead consists of valid, lawful consideration separate and apart from any express or implied agreement regarding sexual relations. The co-signing of the note, pledging of the certificate of deposit, and promise to repay the loan constituted such valid, lawful consideration.
[1] Agreements between unmarried cohabiting parties are not automatically unenforceable if they are supported by valid, lawful consideration separate from any agreement regar…
[2] The mere fact that parties are unmarried and cohabiting does not, ipso facto, preclude them from entering into legally enforceable contracts.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The general rule is that if the consideration for an agreement is illicit sexual intercourse the agreement is unenforceable. However, if the consideration for the agreement is not sexual intercourse then the mere fact the parties are not married should not ipso facto preclude the parties from contracting according to law.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard distinguishing enforceable from unenforceable agreements between unmarried cohabitants
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGene Stevens and Robbyn Muse lived together but were not married. Stevens agreed to co-sign a note and pledge a certificate of deposit to help Muse pu…
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GARRETT, Judge.
We treat this appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. The circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity affirmed the trial court’s final judgment.
The parties lived together, but not as husband and wife. She sued him for the return of certain property. He counter-sued for the proceeds of an insurance claim and the repayment of a loan.
He had agreed to co-sign a note and pledge a certificate of deposit so she could buy a car. She had agreed to transfer the title to his name and return the car to him. The car was totally destroyed in an accident and she kept the insurance proceeds. He also loaned her money which she agreed to pay back.
The county court judge found because the parties lived together the agreements were “unenforceable as violative of the public policy of the State of Florida in that said agreements were in consideration of immoral acts.” On appeal the circuit court merely affirmed the final judgment (we assume for the reasons expressed by the trial court).
We must determine whether the circuit court’s affirmance departed from the essential requirements of law. See Coral Springs Roofing Company, Inc. v. Campagna, 528 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). We find that the circuit court did so depart when it failed to follow the law as expressed by this court in Poe v. Estate of Levy, 411 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (citations omitted):
Apparently the trial judge felt the core of each cause of action alleged was the unlawful, meretricious relationship which [the parties] shared and, as a consequence, any agreement, express or implied, which arose therefrom was unenforceable. The general rule is that if the consideration for an agreement is illicit sexual intercourse the agreement is unenforceable. However, if the consideration for the agreement is not sexual intercourse then the mere fact the parties are not married should not ipso facto preclude the parties from contracting according to law. Thus it appears to us that a cause of action based on an express contract ... is enforceable regardless. of the fact that the parties may be cohabiting illicitly as long as it is clear there was valid, lawful consideration separate and apart from any express or implied agreement, regarding sexual relations.
The co-signing of the note, the pledging of the certificate of deposit and the promise to repay the loan all constituted valid and lawful consideration separate and apart from any express or implied agreement regarding sexual relations.
Accordingly, we grant the writ of certiorari, quash the circuit court’s opinion and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ANSTEAD and STONE, JJ., concur.
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Crossen v. Feldman, 673 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…ut leave to amend. Without attempting to define what may or may not be “palimony,” this ease simply involves whether these parties entered into a contract for support, which is something that they are legally capable of doing. See Stevens v. Muse, 562 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Poe v. Estate of Levy, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). It was therefore error to dismiss count II of the counterclaim. Although argued by the parties, the issue of the statute of frauds is not properly before us because the…
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Caryn Heidi Forrest v. Ami RON, 821 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…s.” Poe v. Estate of Levy, 411 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Dietrich v. Winters, 798 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Crossen v. Feldman, 673 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Stevens v. Muse, 562 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Evans v. Wall, 542 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)(court awarded funds to co-habitant on constructive trust theory). A review of the stipulation and the testimony shows that the stipulation was not illegal. Here, the parents’ ag…
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Dietrich v. Winters, 798 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…was written from that account and was commingled into the household bill paying accounts. The Court believes that the Mother should be able to recover her investment in said property either through partition or some other means. See Stevens v. Muse, 562 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Crossen v. Feldman, 673 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); and Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). This Court orders partition of said real property. Said property shall be sold by private sale within six (6) months…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- POE v. Est. OF Gertrude Levy, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Coral Springs Roofing Co., Inc. v. Mr. G.S. Campagna, 528 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)