FELICIA BLAIR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Felicia Blair challenged the denial of her motion to suppress cocaine found during a vehicle stop. The court reversed, holding that the officer lacked founded suspicion to detain Blair and probable cause to search her person, making the seizure of cocaine illegal.
The officer lacked founded suspicion to detain Blair and probable cause to search her person. The detention was illegal because no contraband was found in the vehicle or on other occupants, and a bulge in pants does not constitute probable cause. The cocaine was illegally seized because Blair did not consent to the search.
[1] A founded suspicion for a vehicle stop must be based upon specific facts and circumstances observed by an officer, interpreted in light of their knowledge and experience,…
[2] A founded suspicion cannot be based upon a mere hunch or guess.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order for the temporary detention of Blair to be lawful, the officer must have a "founded" suspicion of criminal activity.”
Establishes the legal standard for investigative detentions under Terry v. Ohio
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Livingston stopped a vehicle for speeding with Blair as a passenger. After the driver consented to a vehicle search that yielded no contraband…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Illegal Search And Seizure cases and more on FLexlaw
RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
Felicia Blair challenges the trial court’s order denying her motion to suppress the cocaine found on her. Because we hold that the police officer had no founded suspicion to detain and search Blair, we reverse.
Blair was charged with possession of cocaine. She filed a motion to suppress, arguing that an illegal search uncovered the seized cocaine. The trial court denied this motion. Blair entered a no contest plea reserving the right to appeal the motion to suppress. The trial court adjudicated Blair guilty and sentenced her to two years of community control.
On March 31, 1987, Officer David Livingston stopped a motor vehicle for speeding. Blair was a passenger in the car. When the driver failed to produce the registration for the vehicle, Livingston asked for permission to search the automobile. The driver consented to the search. All occupants of the vehicle were ordered to exit the car. As Blair got out of the automobile, Livingston noticed a bulge in the front of her pants. Livingston found no contraband in the car. After searching both male occupants of the car, Livingston read Miranda rights to Blair and explained the interdiction program to her. Livingston later testified that he did not believe that Blair was armed or dangerous and added that he did not ask for Blair’s consent to a search of her person. Livingston testified he told Blair, “If you have rock cocaine, go ahead and pull it out.” He further advised Blair that if she did not pull the cocaine out, he would have a female officer search her. After Livingston asked Blair to explain the bulge in her pants, she pulled out two bags containing cocaine.
In order for the temporary detention of Blair to be lawful, the officer must have a “founded” suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Livingston found no contraband in the stopped vehicle or on the other occupants. A “bare” suspicion of illegal activity cannot support a stop. Freeman v. State, 433 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Livingston did not have a “founded” suspicion that Blair was involved in criminal conduct, possessed a weapon or was, in fact, dangerous. Thus, the detention of Blair after searching the car was illegal.
Livingston’s conduct in demanding Blair to pull the cocaine out of her pants constituted a search. See Wallace v. State, 540 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). The situation confronting Livingston had stabilized, and he did not feel he was in danger, therefore, he had no probable cause to conduct a search. Thomas v. State, 533 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Observing the bulge in Blair’s pants does not amount to probable cause which would justify a search. See Gray v. State, 550 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Because Livingston had no probable cause to search Blair and she did not consent to the search, the cocaine was illegally seized. The judgment and sentence are reversed and set aside and the case is remanded for entry of an order granting the motion to suppress and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
HALL and ALTENBERND, JJ. concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Harris v. State, 574 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…9 (1968). The officer’s additional directive for appellant to empty his pockets, when there was no indication of a weapon contained therein, exceeded the scope of a protective pat-down and was also constitutionally impermissible. See Blair v. State, 563 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Sanchez v. State, 516 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); see also, Piediscalzo v. State, 549 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Since the search of appellant’s person was unlawful, the physical evidence and statements derived therefrom…
-
Anthanase Williams v. State, 564 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…t that Swafford’s order to “spit it out” only was to encourage Williams to stop mumbling and speak more plainly, we view Swafford’s entreaty otherwise. Officer Swafford’s order that he “spit it out” constituted an illegal search. See Blair v. State, 563 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Wallace v. State, 540 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Accordingly, the judgment and sentence is reversed and set aside and the case is remanded for entry of an order granting the motion to suppress and for further proceedings con…
-
Q.E.G. v. State, 569 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Gipson v. State, 537 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); State v. Hughes, 562 So. 2d 795, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); § 901.151, Fla.Stat. (1989). A bare suspicion of illegal activity will not suffice. Blair v. State, 563 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1990); Freeman v. State, 433 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983). In looking at the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, it is noteworthy that the subject encounter was relatively free of the kind of factors which are typically…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Freeman v. State, 433 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Wallace v. State, 540 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Thomas v. State, 533 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Campbell v. State, 550 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Gray v. State, 550 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)