RICHARD LEE CARNEGIE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Richard Lee Carnegie appeals his conviction and 30-year sentence for escape as a habitual violent felony offender. The Florida appellate court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence due to sentencing errors, remanding for resentencing.
The conviction for escape is affirmed because the evidence about the girlfriend argument was properly excluded as irrelevant. However, the 30-year sentence is vacated because: (1) the 1988 amendment to section 775.084 cannot be applied retroactively under ex post facto principles, and (2) the sentencing guidelines scoresheet improperly included a separate computation for legal constraint, which is an essential element of escape and should not be independently scored.
[1] The offense of escape requires an intent to avoid lawful confinement.
[2] A defendant's argument with a girlfriend is not a defense of necessity to the charge of escape.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the offense of escape requires an intent to avoid lawful confinement”
Establishes the legal requirement that escape must involve intent to avoid confinement, making the girlfriend argument irrelevant
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCarnegie was convicted of escape for failing to return to a correctional facility until the day after expiration of a 12-hour furlough. He attempted t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Escape cases and more on FLexlaw
WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant seeks review of a judgment of conviction and sentence for the offense of escape. Appellant was sentenced to a 30-year term of imprisonment as an habitual violent felony offender. We find that sentencing errors require that this sentence be vacated, and the cause must be remanded for resentencing.
Appellant’s conviction for escape was predicated upon his failure to return to a correctional facility until the day following the expiration of a 12-hour furlough. Appellant sought to present evidence that while on furlough he argued with his girlfriend, suggesting that this caused him to lose track of the time. Earlier decisions indicate that the offense of escape requires an intent to avoid lawful confinement. See Watford v. State, 353 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Helton v. State, 311 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). But in the present instance the state established a prima facie case, to which appellant’s only available defense was one of necessity predicated upon imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. See Watford; Meuro v. State, 445 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Appellant’s argument with his girlfriend was not relevant either to this or any other asserted issue supported by the record, and the court thus properly declined to admit the evidence.
Appellant was sentenced as an habitual violent felony offender under section 775.084, Florida Statutes, as amended in 1988. This amendment was not yet effective when appellant committed his offense, and the state agrees that under the ex post facto analysis of Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), and Smith v. State, 526 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), the amendment may not be applied in sentencing appellant for this offense. Although no objection was made below, this is a fundamental error which requires resentencing. On remand the court may consider the applicability of an habitual offender sentence under section 775.084, Florida Statutes, as it existed at the time of appellant’s offense. See Holmes v. State, 502 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), pet. for rev. dismissed 520 So. 2d 270 (Fla.1988).
The sentencing guidelines score-sheet which the court utilized included a computation for legal constraint at the time of the offense. It has been established that the constraint from which an offender escapes should not be separately scored on a guidelines scoresheet for the escape, as such constraint is an essential element of the offense. See Brown v. State, 502 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The state concedes error in this regard, and on resentencing the court should utilize a corrected guidelines scoresheet.
The judgment is affirmed, but the sentence is vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing.
ERVIN and MINER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Swinson v. State, 588 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses. ... (emphasis added) . Parrish v. State, 571 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). . U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10; Art. 1, § 10, Fla. Const. . Carnegie v. State, 564 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). See also Ghianuly v. State, 516 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). . Carter v. State, 571 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), jurisdiction accepted, 581 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1991); Green v. State, 570 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Flowe…
-
Canterbury v. State, 606 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…the county jail. The state concedes that since legal constraint is an essential element of the crime of escape, it is improper to assess legal constraint points to enhance a sentence imposed upon conviction for escape. [*505] See Carnegie v. State, 564 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Brown v. State, 502 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Chenault v. State, 543 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Further, where a guidelines score-sheet error results in a reduced sentencing range of one or more cells, the sentence…
-
Calloway v. State, 734 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…version of section 775.084 then in effect. It is fundamental error to apply an amended version of the habitual offender statute to increase the punishment for an offense committed before the effective date of the amendment. See Carnegie v. State, 564 So. 2d 233, 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Swinson v. State, 588 So. 2d 296, 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Notwithstanding the reasonableness of the section 924.051(3) restrictions on the right to appeal, see Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 685 So…
Authorities Cited
- Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (U.S. 1987)
- Watford v. State, 353 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Helton v. State, 311 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Tarrence L. Smith v. State, 526 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Brown v. State, 502 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Holmes v. State, 502 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Muro v. State, 445 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Walt Disney World Co. v. Marietta Goode, 520 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1988)
- Holmes v. State, 520 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1988)