HAROLD B. CARTWRIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Cartwright appealed the revocation of his probation and resulting 20-year sentence. The court affirmed the revocation but reversed the sentence as exceeding the statutory maximum for the offenses and remanded for resentencing.
Cartwright waived his right to counsel through his failure to hire counsel despite ample time, his refusal of appointed counsel, and the repeated continuances caused by his own representations. The revocation order is affirmed but corrected to remove the finding of violation of condition 3 (leaving the county without permission) as the State presented no evidence of this violation. The 20-year sentence is reversed because it exceeds the 15-year statutory maximum for the two second-degree felonies and the case is remanded for resentencing.
[1] A defendant waives the right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing by failing to secure private counsel after ample opportunity, refusing appointed counsel, and ca…
[2] A probation revocation order must be corrected to remove references to violations for which no evidence was presented.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We recognize that in the absence of an informed waiver, a defendant subject to a probation revocation has a right to counsel at the hearing.”
Establishes the baseline constitutional right to counsel in probation revocation hearings
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCartwright's probation violation hearing was the third hearing date set for this matter. At the hearing, Cartwright stated he wanted to hire private c…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Waiver Of Right To Counsel cases and more on FLexlaw
GOSHORN, Judge.
Harold B. Cartwright appeals the order revoking his probation and the sentence imposed pursuant to that order. We affirm the revocation order but reverse the sentence imposed and remand for resentencing.
On appeal, Cartwright first urges that the court erred by requiring him to proceed without counsel at his violation of probation hearing.
At the hearing on Cartwright’s violation of probation, Cartwright stated that it was his understanding that private counsel was “talked to yesterday and that he [the attorney] was supposed to be here in court this morning”. Cartwright did not represent that he had hired an attorney, instead he informed the court that he wanted to hire private counsel. Cartwright then refused the trial court’s offer to appoint a public defender to represent him. The state attorney pointed out that this was the third hearing date which had been set.
The record reflects that at least one of the previously set hearings was continued upon Cartwright’s representation that he would employ a private attorney. Because the hearing had already been continued twice, the trial court elected to proceed.
We recognize that in the absence of an informed waiver, a defendant subject to a probation revocation has a right to counsel at the hearing. State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1985); Shue v. State, 386 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Subjudi-ce, however, Cartwright had more than nine months after the date of his arrest for the violation of probation in which to obtain a private attorney. Neither at the hearing nor now on appeal does Cartwright make any representation that he had actually employed private counsel.
The State contends that defendant’s right to obtain private counsel is not a license to delay proceedings and waste the trial court’s time.
We agree. Both the State and the defendant are entitled to orderly and timely proceedings. See Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893, 105 S.Ct. 269, 83 L.Ed.2d 205 (1984).
We hold that Cartwright has waived his right to counsel because (1) he had over nine months to hire private counsel, if he so desired; (2) he does not represent that he did so; (3) his violation of probation case had been continued on two previous occasions and on at least one of the occasions Cartwright represented he would employ a private attorney, and; (4) Cartwright refused the appointment of the public defender. As proof of the violation of probation, the State offered in evidence a certified copy of Cartwright’s conviction for armed robbery in Marion County. Cartwright presented no evidence. The State concedes that no evidence was offered to prove that Cartwright was in Marion County without the consent of his probation officer.
Consequently, the order of revocation of probation is corrected to delete the reference to an alleged violation of condition 3, which required that the defendant not leave his county of residence without the permission of his probation officer. See Bogan v. State, 502 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (It is error for an order of revocation of probation to reflect that defendant was found guilty of three violations where the State presented evidence which supported only one of the violations).
At the conclusion of the hearing Cartwright’s probation was revoked and he was sentenced to the Department of Corrections for 20 years. The State also concedes this is error because the statutory maximum sentence for the two second degree felonies for which the defendant was being sentenced is 15 years. Where the guidelines sentence “exceeds the maximum sentence provided by statute for that offense, the statutory maximum sentence should be imposed.” Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(10); Stamper v. State, 528 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
Order of Revocation AFFIRMED as corrected; Sentence REVERSED; and REMANDED.
COBB and W. SHARP, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Foster v. State, 704 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ocation of the right to choose his own attorney may not be made in bad faith or “for the sake of arbitrary delay or to otherwise subvert judicial proceedings.” See Holley v. State, 484 So. 2d 634, 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); accord Cartwright v. State, 565 So. 2d 784, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (agreeing that a “defendant’s right to obtain private counsel is not a license to delay proceedings and waste the trial court’s time.”). The State contends on this appeal, as it did below, that appellant’s attempt to substi…
-
Alvarez v. State, 75 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…ocation of the right to choose his own attorney may not be made in bad faith or “for the sake of arbitrary delay or to otherwise subvert judicial proceedings.” See Holley v. State, 484 So. 2d 634, 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); accord Cartwright v. State, 565 So. 2d 784, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (agreeing that a “defendant’s right to obtain private counsel is not a license to delay proceedings and waste the trial court’s time.”). Id. at 173. In Foster, a defendant sought to discharge his court-appointed lawyer on t…
-
Anderson v. State, 595 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…rson convicted of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years. Because appellant’s sentence of 5½ years imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum, the sentence is illegal. See Cartwright v. State, 565 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Appellant’s sentence is vacated and this cause is remanded for resentencing within the guidelines and in accordance with the limitation set forth in Franklin v. State, 545 So. 2d 851 (Fla.1989). Sentence VACATED; cause REMANDE…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jones v. State, 449 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1984)
- Williford v. United States, 469 U.S. 893 (U.S. 1984)
- State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1985)
- Meyer Morderer and Irene Morderer v. Smith, 502 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Shue v. State, 386 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Stamper v. State, 528 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)