CAMERON CRANDALL

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

LAMBERT, J.

Cameron Crandall appeals the summary denial of his pro se “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” that was filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Concluding that, under the chronology discussed below, the motion was both unauthorized and a nullity, we reverse and remand with directions that Crandall’s pro se motion be stricken.

Crandall was convicted of burglary of a conveyance and placed on probation. Crandall was later found to have violated his probation. The trial court revoked his probation and imposed a downward departure prison sentence, which the State appealed. This court reversed Crandall’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. State v. Crandall, 376 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).

Crandall thereafter appeared before the trial court, with his appointed counsel, and was resentenced. Three days later, Crandall filed the subject rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. The next day, the trial court entered the order now on appeal summarily denying the motion. Later that same day, Crandall’s trial counsel filed a notice of appeal of the judgment and sentence, which is separately pending before this court.

I.

Rule 3.800(a)(1) permits a party to file a motion to correct an illegal sentence at any time, except that the motion cannot be filed during the time allowed for the filing of a motion under rule 3.800(b)(1) or during the pendency of a direct appeal. Pertinent here, rule 3.800(b)(1) provides that during the time allowed for the filing of a notice of appeal of a sentence, a defendant or the State may file a motion to correct sentencing error. As a defendant has thirty days to file a notice of appeal of a judgment and sentence,¹ chronologically, a rule 3.800(a)(1) motion cannot be filed within the first thirty days of sentencing. Crandall’s pro se motion, filed three days after he was resentenced, was premature.

II.

Crandall’s pro se motion was also filed at a time when he was still being represented by his court-appointed defense counsel. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) specifically addresses how and when defense counsel withdraws from representation after the judgment and sentence. It states, in pertinent part:

(e) Withdrawal of Defense Counsel After Judgment and Sentence. The attorney of record for a defendant in a criminal proceeding shall not be relieved of any duties, nor be permitted to withdraw as counsel of record, except with approval of the lower tribunal on good cause shown on written motion, until after: (1) the filing of: (A) a notice of appeal; (B) a statement of judicial acts to be reviewed, if a transcript will require the expenditure of public funds; (C) directions to the clerk, if necessary; and (D) a designation of that portion of the reporter’s transcript that supports the statement of judicial acts to be reviewed, if a transcript will require expenditure of public funds; or (2) substitute counsel has been obtained or appointed, or a statement has been filed with the appellate court that the appellant has exercised the right to self-representation. In publicly funded cases, the public defender for the local circuit court shall be appointed initially until the record is transmitted to the appellate court; or (3) the time has expired for filing of a notice of appeal, and no notice has been filed. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(e)(1)–(3). Under this rule, Crandall was still being represented by counsel when he filed his rule 3.800(a) motion. A defendant does not have a constitutional right to “hybrid” representation—in other words, to be represented by both counsel and by himself. Whiting v. State, 929 So. 2d 673, 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 472, 474 (Fla. 2003)). Pro se pleadings

filed in such circumstances are generally considered nullities. Id. (providing that “[p]ro se pleadings filed by a criminal defendant who is represented by counsel are generally treated as a nullity unless they include an unequivocal request to discharge counsel” (citation omitted)); see also Padilla-Padial v. State, 152 So. 3d 51, 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“[S]ince appellate counsel represented Padilla-Padial when he filed his pro se motion [to correct illegal sentence], and the motion did not contain an unequivocal request to discharge counsel, the trial court should have stricken the motion as a nullity.” (citation omitted)).

Crandall’s motion did not contain an unequivocal request to discharge his counsel. His motion was therefore a nullity and should have been stricken. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand with directions for the court to enter an order striking Crandall’s pro se motion. Our decision is without prejudice to Crandall filing an appropriate motion either under rule 3.800(b)(2) during his direct appeal or under rule 3.800(a) after his direct appeal of the judgment and current sentence becomes final.2

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

JAY and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur. _____________________________