MORETRENCH AMERICAN CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
TAYLOR WOODROW CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION AND AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Moretrench American Corporation appealed the dismissal of its claim against a surety for equipment rental debt owed by a general contractor. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Moretrench failed to provide notice of nonpayment within 90 days after delivery of the equipment as required by Florida Statute § 255.05(2), and rejected Moretrench's argument that the 90-day period should begin from when the equipment was last available for use.
The 90-day notice period in § 255.05(2) begins from the date of delivery of the equipment to the job site, not from the last day it was available for use. The statute's language requiring notice "within 90 days ... after complete delivery of materials" is clear and unambiguous and does not permit the interpretation Moretrench advocated.
[1] Equipment provided under a rental agreement constitutes "materials" for purposes of statutory notice requirements regarding public works projects.
[2] A notice of nonpayment to a general contractor must be delivered within 90 days after the complete delivery of rental equipment to the job site.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“such notice shall be delivered "within 90 days ... after complete delivery of materials.... " Equipment provided under a rental agreement is for present purposes "materials."”
Establishes that rental equipment constitutes "materials" under the statute and the 90-day notice requirement applies to equipment rentals.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMoretrench furnished rental equipment to a subcontractor working on a general contractor's job. The general contractor and its surety were sued for th…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Legislative Intent cases and more on FLexlaw
[*862] LEHAN, Judge.
In this suit against a general contractor and its surety for a debt owed for the rental of equipment furnished by appellant to a subcontractor on the job we affirm the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of count one of appellant’s complaint which sought recovery against the surety. The appellant’s notice to the general contractor of delivery of the equipment and of nonpayment therefor was not delivered to the general contractor within 90 days after the delivery of the equipment as required by section 255.05(2), Florida Statutes (1987). That section provides in relevant part that such notice shall be delivered “within 90 days ... after complete delivery of materials.... ” Equipment provided under a rental agreement is for present purposes “materials.” See § 713.01(6), Fla.Stat. (1987).
Appellant contends that the 90 day period did not begin until the last day of the availibility for use of the equipment on the job.
Appellant argues persuasively that to interpret the “complete delivery” language of section 255.05(2) otherwise regarding rental equipment would result in an anomalous situation in which in some instances materialmen furnishing rental equipment would not only have to send notices of nonpayment before they knew if their equipment had been used but also would have to do so before they had even billed for that use.
However, while we agree that in particular situations the statute would seem to require the sending of a notice of nonpayment before payment was actually due, that does not appear to have been the situation in this case, nor does appellant contend that it was.
Appellant cites as support for its foregoing contention cases decided under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270b, e.g., United States ex rel. Carter-Schneider-Nelson, Inc. v. Campbell, 293 F. 2d 816 (9th Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987, 82 S.Ct. 601, 7 L.Ed.2d 524 (1962); United States for the Use of SGB Universal Builders Supply, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, 475 F.Supp. 672 (E.D.N. Y.1979).
However, the pertinent language in the Miller Act which was dealt with in those cases was significantly different. That language required that the notice be given “within ninety days from the date on which such person ... furnished or supplied the last of the material for which such claim is made.” 293 F. 2d at 820; 475 F.Supp. at 673. While it may be rationalized that rental equipment delivered to a job was last “furnished or supplied” on the day it was last available for use on that job, we can conceive of no way validly to rationalize that its delivery was later than the time it was delivered, i.e., was placed at the job site.
We must agree with appellee that the foregoing portion of section 255.05(2) is clear and unambiguous and requires the result reached by the trial court.
However wise it would appear to be to adopt the 90 day period argued for by appellant, the legislature has not done so. It is not the function of the courts to engraft an exception onto a clear and unambiguous statutory provision. “It is neither the function nor prerogative of the courts to speculate on constructions more or less reasonable, when the language itself conveys an unequivocal meaning.” Heredia v. Allstate Insurance Co., 358 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Fla.1978), as quoted in City of St. Petersburg v. Clark, 492 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). “A court’s employment of perceived rationality and sensibleness as a guide to ascertaining legislative intent ... is in contrast to a situation where there is a clear manifestation of legislative intent which may not lead to what a court perceives to be a wise result.” Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Marchesano, 482 So. 2d 422, 426 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
See also Dufrian v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 538 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Pfeiffer v. City of Tampa, 470 So. 2d 10, 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
Affirmed.
RYDER, A.C.J., and CLAIRE K. LUTEN, Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…onstitute a rational interpretation of legislative intent.” Pfeiffer v. City of Tampa, 470 So. 2d 10, 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). See also Blount v. State, 581 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Moretrench American Corp. v. Taylor Woodrow Construction Corp., 565 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Dubrian v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 538 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Nationwide Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marchesano, 482 So. 2d 422, 426 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). As Moretrench says, It is not the function of the cou…
-
Taylor Woodrow Constr. Corp. v. The Burke Co., 606 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 1992)…HARDING, Justice. We have for review Burke Co. v. Bruce M. Ross Co., 585 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), based upon certified direct conflict with Moretrench American Corp. v. Taylor Woodrow Construction Corp., 565 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). We have jurisdiction based on article Y, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. The issue here is whether section 255.05(2), Florida Statutes (1989), requires a supplier of rental equipment, who is not in privity with the…
-
Blount v. State, 581 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…urt might perceive to be a wise result in order to constitute a rational interpretation of legislative intent.” Pfeiffer v. City of Tampa, 470 So. 2d 10, 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). See also Moretrench American Corp. v. Taylor Woodrow Construction Corp., 565 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Dubrian v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 538 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Marchesano, 482 So. 2d 422, 426 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). As Moretrench says, It is neither the function n…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Heredia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1978)
- Pfeiffer v. City OF Tampa, 470 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- United States ex rel. Carter-Schneider-Nelson, Inc. v. Campbell, 293 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1961)
- Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Marchesano, 482 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- United States ex rel. Carter-Schneider-Nelson, Inc. v. Campbell, 368 U.S. 987 (U.S. 1962)
- Ginsburg v. Stern, 368 U.S. 987 (U.S. 1962)
- City OF ST. Petersburg v. Clark, 492 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Dubrian v. Allstate Indem. Co., 538 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)