EDDIE D. BLOUNT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eddie Blount was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and robbery as a principal to a codefendant's armed robbery. The trial court imposed an upward departure from sentencing guidelines based on excessive physical trauma to the victim, reasoning that Blount was subject to the same punishment as if he had personally inflicted the trauma. The court reversed, holding that the sentencing departure statute narrowly requires that the defendant personally inflict the trauma, not merely participate in the crime.
The court held that although Blount could be convicted as a principal for the codefendant's shooting under accomplice liability doctrine, the sentencing departure statute, section 921.001(7), Florida Statutes, requires that the defendant personally inflict the victim's trauma. The trial court's departure was improper and the case must be remanded for resentencing within the guidelines range.
[1] A sentencing court may depart from guidelines only when the victim suffered excessive physical or emotional trauma at the hands of the defendant.
[2] A defendant's sentence may not be enhanced for the display or use of a firearm during the commission of a crime when the defendant did not personally possess the firearm.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“section 921.001(7), Florida Statutes (1989), which governs the issue on appeal in this case, provides for a departure sentence in this context only when 'the victim suffered excessive physical or emotional trauma at the hands of the defendant.'”
Establishes the statutory language limiting departure sentences to trauma personally inflicted by the defendant
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBlount and a codefendant committed a robbery together while the codefendant was armed with a gun. The codefendant shot the victim, inflicting physical…
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LEHAN, Judge.
Defendant appeals from his sentence upon his conviction for attempted first-degree murder and robbery. He contends that the trial court erred in departing from the sentencing guidelines on the basis of a finding of excessive physical trauma suffered by the victim. The basis for his contention is that a codefendant actually inflicted the trauma by shooting the victim. We reverse.
We recognize that, as the trial court found, defendant admitted he had been aware that the codefendant undertook the robbery while armed with the gun. We also recognize that, as the trial court also found, defendant actively participated in the robbery and took money from the victim immediately after the shooting which occurred in defendant’s immediate presence. Thus, the state persuasively argues, defendant was not only properly convicted but was also properly sentenced as though the victim had been shot by him. See § 777.011; Sons v. State, 99 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (“[I]t makes no difference which one of the two fired the fatal shot as they were both charged as principals and having been found guilty, appellant is subject to the identical punishment to which he would have been had he personally fired the fatal shot.”).
However, section 921.001(7), Florida Statutes (1989), which governs the issue on appeal in this case, provides for a departure sentence in this context only when “the victim suffered excessive physical or emotional trauma at the hands of the defendant.’’ (Emphasis added.) Thus, the legislature has specifically and unambiguously limited the grounds used by the trial court for the departure sentence in this case to circumstances in which the defendant himself personally inflicted the trauma. Whether the legislature was wise to do so and in effect to disagree in that regard with Sons is not the point. Our “construction of statutes need not produce what the court might perceive to be a wise result in order to constitute a rational interpretation of legislative intent.” Pfeiffer v. City of Tampa, 470 So. 2d 10, 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). See also Moretrench American Corp. v. Taylor Woodrow Construction Corp., 565 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Dubrian v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 538 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Marchesano, 482 So. 2d 422, 426 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). As Moretrench says,
It is neither the function nor prerogative of the courts to speculate on constructions more or less reasonable, when the language itself conveys an unequivocal meaning. Heredia v. Allstate Insurance Co., 358 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Fla.1978), as quoted in City of St. Petersburg v. Clark, 492 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
565 So. 2d at 862.
Furthermore, “[o]ne of the most fundamental principles of Florida law is that penal statutes must be strictly construed according to their letter.... Words and meanings beyond the literal language may not be entertained....” Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla.1991).
Cf. Earnest v. State, 351 So. 2d 957 (Fla.1977); State v. Rodriguez (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (a defendant’s sentence may not be enhanced for the display or use of a firearm during the commission of a crime when defendant did not personally possess the firearm).
Reversed and remanded for resentencing within the guidelines recommended range.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and PARKER, J„ concur.
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Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…uction of statutes need not produce what the court might perceive to be a wise result in order to constitute a rational interpretation of legislative intent.” Pfeiffer v. City of Tampa, 470 So. 2d 10, 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). See also Blount v. State, 581 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Moretrench American Corp. v. Taylor Woodrow Construction Corp., 565 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Dubrian v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 538 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Nationwide Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marchesano,…
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Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. & Nationwide Ins. Co., 613 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…ies with the legislature and not with [the] [c]ourt[s]. 606 So. 2d at 1155-56. See also Horizon Hospital v. Williams, 610 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Hillsborough County v. NCJ Investment Co., 605 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Blount v. State, 581 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Dubrian v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 538 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Nationwide Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marchesano, 482 So. 2d 422, 426 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), approved, 506 So. 2d 410 (Fla.1987); Pfeiffer v. City…
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Waychoff v. State, 624 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…e. Specifically, there is insufficient evidence to support that the egregious nature and the excessive brutality of the beatings were caused by or at the behest of Ms. Waychoff. See Dumas v. State, 592 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Blount v. State, 581 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). See also Marshall v. State, 600 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (departure based upon extraordinary or egregious harm reversed where another perpetrator struck the victim, not the defendants); Chenard v. State, 510 So. 2d 363 (Fla.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991)
- Earnest v. State, 351 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1977)
- Heredia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1978)
- Sons v. State, 99 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Pfeiffer v. City OF Tampa, 470 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Marchesano, 482 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Moretrench Am. Corp. v. Taylor Woodrow Constr. Corp. & Am. Home Assurance Co., 565 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- City OF ST. Petersburg v. Clark, 492 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Dubrian v. Allstate Indem. Co., 538 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)