RAY SANDSTROM, APPELLANT,
v.
JODI SANDSTROM, APPELLEE
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A husband appeals a temporary injunction restraining him from selling or disposing of marital assets during divorce proceedings. The Florida appellate court affirmed the injunction, holding that Section 61.11 authorizes courts to enjoin dissipation of marital assets before final judgment to secure alimony and equitable distribution.
Section 61.11 applies to restrain dissipation of marital assets both before and after the final dissolution judgment. The temporary restraining order satisfied procedural requirements under Rule 1.610(c) by specifying reasons for entry and identifying the irreparable harm to the wife's right to equitable distribution.
[1] A court may issue an injunction to prevent a party from selling or disposing of marital assets when that party is about to fraudulently convey or conceal them, in order t…
[2] The statute governing the effect of a judgment of alimony applies to the dissipation of marital assets both before and after a final dissolution judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When either party is about to remove himself or his property out of the state, or fraudulently convey or conceal it, the court may award a ne exeat or injunction against him or his property and make such orders as will secure alimony to the party who should receive it.”
Establishes statutory authority under Section 61.11 for courts to issue injunctions against asset dissipation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring pending dissolution of marriage proceedings, the husband, an attorney, transferred interests in the marital residence, a Wyoming ranch, and an …
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PER CURIAM.
The husband appeals the trial court’s issuance of a temporary injunction which restrained him from selling or disposing of marital assets.
We note that Section 61.11, Florida Statutes (1989) reads in relevant part:
When either party is about to remove himself or his property out of the state, or fraudulently convey or conceal it, the court may award a ne exeat or injunction against him or his property and make such orders as will secure alimony to the party who should receive it.
Although this section is entitled, “Effect of judgment of alimony,” we hold that this section applies whether a spouse is attempting to dissipate marital assets before or after the final dissolution judgment. If the other spouse removes, conceals or fraudulently conveys marital assets before the entry of the final judgment, alimony will not be secured to the “party who should receive it.” See 26 Fla.Jur.2d Family Law § 608 and § 609 (1981). Section 61.11 is the wife’s authority to seek to enjoin the husband's removal, concealment or fraudulent conveyance of his assets which may be part of her alimony award in the plan of equitable distribution.
Rule 1.610(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure reads in part:
Every injunction shall specify the reasons for entry,....
The wife’s Emergency Motion for Restraining Order states, in part:
6. The Husband is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Florida and well knows that once a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage is filed, all marital assets are under the jurisdiction of the Court to be distributed upon a final hearing and that neither party shall frustrate the Court’s ability to accomplish an equitable distribution by selling, transferring and/or hiding marital assets during the pendency of these proceedings. 7. By giving his girlfriend, Debra Jo Hocherl, an interest in the marital residence, an interest in the ranch in Wyoming and an interest [sic] the office building on South Andrews Avenue and by selling the marital residence and maybe the ranch in Wyoming, the Husband has in fact committed fraud upon the Court by transferring and/or selling assets which are under the Court’s jurisdiction for purposes of an equitable distribution.
The Temporary Restraining Order states that, “The Wife is in imminent fear of irreparable harm if the Husband is not estopped or restrained, from selling, transferring, conveying, and/or dissipating any further assets.” Our combined reading of the motion and the order leads us to conclude that the order satisfies the requirements of Rule 1.610(c). Simply put, the wife seeks to avoid irreparable harm to her right to have a Florida court equitably distribute the parties’ marital assets.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s Temporary Restraining Order and remand for further proceedings. However, our opinion is issued without prejudice to the husband to seek a hearing to determine which of his assets need to be subject to the injunction or to provide other means to secure the wife’s potential alimony award.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
WAT,DEN, POLEN and GARRETT, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Delphia Neal v. Evans Clay Neal, 636 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…While section 61.11 contains no express requirement for an injunction bond, entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of injunction is determined by reference to the rule 1.610(b) requirements. Hathcock, 533 So. 2d at 803-804; Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 565 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Although the motion and supporting affidavits for injunction in this case alleged the husband feared physical injury from the wife, the record does not support the allegation. In his deposition, the husband testified concerning…
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Stefanowitz v. Stefanowitz, 586 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…ssion is secure from the possibility of foreclosure on the marital residence. Cases supporting the trial court’s decision are Lamar v. Lamar, 323 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (security may be had for future obligations); and Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 565 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (court may issue injunction to prevent dissipation of marital assets either before or after final dissolution). Appellant’s ability to encumber the property would defeat the interest Mrs. Stefanowitz possesses in the residence an…
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Gooding v. Gooding, 602 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…dissipation of property which is or may later be determined to be marital property. See, e.g., Woodrum v. Woodrum, 590 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Stefanowitz v. Stefanowitz, 586 So. 2d 460, 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 565 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Rouse v. Rouse, 313 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). In the instant case, appellant asserts that she has been irreparably harmed by appel-lee’s previous improper transfers of their company’s funds to his own personal account…
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