LAURA JEAN GOODING, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS EARLE GOODING, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage action, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of a temporary injunction sought by the wife to prevent the husband's further dissipation of corporate funds from their family business. The court held that the husband's documented transfers of approximately $22,800 to his personal account constituted irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief pending determination of the parties' property rights.
The court held that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the temporary injunction. Appellant satisfied the requirements for temporary injunctive relief by demonstrating irreparable harm from the husband's prior unauthorized transfers of corporate funds, lack of an adequate remedy at law, a clear legal right to relief, and that the injunction would serve the public interest in preserving marital assets.
[1] Appellate review of an order denying a temporary injunction is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.
[2] To be entitled to a temporary injunction, a movant must demonstrate irreparable harm, lack of an adequate remedy at law, a clear legal right to relief, and that the injun…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To be entitled to the issuance of a temporary injunction, the movant must show: (1) she will suffer irreparable harm unless the status quo is maintained; (2) she has no adequate remedy at law; (3) she has a clear legal right to the relief requested; and, (4) the temporary injunction will serve the public interest.”
Establishes the four-part test for obtaining temporary injunctive relief applicable in this case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLaura Jean Gooding owns a majority interest in Thomas E. Gooding Demolition Corporation, the parties' primary asset. Appellant invested at least $4,50…
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HERSEY, Judge.
In a dissolution of marriage action appellant Laura Jean Gooding appeals from an order denying her application for a temporary injunction. We reverse.
Appellant owns a majority interest in the Thomas E. Gooding Demolition Corporation, the family business and the parties’ only major asset. There is evidence that appellant invested at least $4,500 in the corporation and that her parents invested approximately $22,000. There is also evidence that appellant has been wrongfully excluded from participating in the affairs of the corporation and that appellee Thomas Earle Gooding has been utilizing corporate funds for his own use. The precise status of the corporate stock has not yet been determined by the lower tribunal, nor has the extent of appellant’s special equity been established.
Appellate review of an order issued upon an application for an injunction seeks ultimately to determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion in granting or denying the request. E.g., M.G.K. Partners v. Cavallo, 515 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a temporary injunction will be reversed only upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion or a clearly improper ruling); South Fla. Limousines, Inc. v. Broward County Aviation Dep’t, 512 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (same).
A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted sparingly. Islandia Condo. Ass'n v. Vermut, 438 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Playpen S., Inc. v. City of Oakland Park, 396 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). To be entitled to the issuance of a temporary injunction, the movant must show: (1) she will suffer irreparable harm unless the status quo is maintained; (2) she has no adequate remedy at law; (3) she has a clear legal right to the relief requested; and, (4) the temporary injunction will serve the public interest. South Fla. Limousines, 512 So. 2d at 1061; Playpen S., 396 So. 2d at 830-31.
Injunctions in marital dissolution cases are specifically provided for by statute. In pertinent part, section 61.11, Florida Statutes (1991), provides:
When either party is about to remove himself or his property out of the state, or fraudulently convey or conceal it, the court may award a ne exeat or injunction against him or his property and make such orders as will secure alimony to the party who should receive it.
Examples abound of the use of injunctions to prevent the dissipation of property which is or may later be determined to be marital property. See, e.g., Woodrum v. Woodrum, 590 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Stefanowitz v. Stefanowitz, 586 So. 2d 460, 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 565 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Rouse v. Rouse, 313 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
In the instant case, appellant asserts that she has been irreparably harmed by appel-lee’s previous improper transfers of their company’s funds to his own personal account, and she argues that she will be further harmed unless an injunction is issued. Appellant testified that she reviewed some of the corporation’s financial records, and she found approximately $22,-800 worth of checks that appellee already has written to himself. Those funds were not put into the parties’ joint personal account, nor does appellant know what happened to that money.
Under the circumstances present in this case, we hold that it was an abuse of discretion not to grant a temporary injunction to maintain the status quo pending a determination by the court as to the extent of the entitlement of appellant to a share of the corporate and miscellaneous assets of the parties. Therefore, we reverse.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LETTS and GUNTHER, JJ„ concur.
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Delphia Neal v. Evans Clay Neal, 636 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…. As with rulings on pleadings, an appellate court’s review of an order issued upon application for, or removal of, an injunction will consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in the grant or denial of the request. Gooding v. Gooding, 602 So. 2d 615, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). The requirements for a temporary injunction are set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610; the provisions pertaining to an injunction bond state in pertinent part: (b) Bond. No temporary injunction shall be entere…
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T.J.R. Holding Co., Inc. v. Alachua Cnty., 617 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…denial clearly shows an abuse of that discretion. Bailey v. Christo, 453 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), rev. denied, 461 So. 2d 113 (Fla.1985). See also Groff G.M.C. Trucks v. Driggers, 101 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); Gooding v. Gooding, 602 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Cafe Risque has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition for temporary injunction in this instance. AFFIRMED. JOANOS, C.J., and WEBSTER, J., concur. . Subsection 125.66(6), Florida Statutes…
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Rosasco v. Rosasco, 641 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…la. 3d DCA 1987). As such, it was incumbent upon the wife to show: (1) irreparable harm; (2) no adequate remedy at law; (3) a clear legal right to relief; and (4) that the temporary injunction would serve the public interest. See Gooding v. Gooding, 602 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). The Wife has failed to carry that burden. The Wife’s claim of irreparable harm is based on the unsubstantiated allegation that the Husband is deliberately divesting himself of all property before an amount for fees is establish…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Playpen S., Inc. v. City OF Oakland Park, 396 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Stefanowitz v. Stefanowitz, 586 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 565 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- S. Fla. Limousines, Inc. v. Broward Cnty. Aviation Dep't, 512 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Islandia Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Vermut, 438 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- M.G.K. P'rs v. Cavallo, 515 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Rouse v. Gwendoline B. Rouse, 313 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Woodrum v. Woodrum, 590 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)