RYAN D. MAXEY
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Ryan Maxey appeals a trial court order vacating its prior decision granting his motion to remove the sex offender registration requirement under Florida Statute section 943.04354. The court affirmed the vacation order, holding that Maxey did not qualify for removal under the statute because his conviction was not for one of the specified offenses and he was more than four years older than his victim.
The trial court correctly lacked discretion to grant Maxey relief under section 943.04354 because Maxey did not satisfy the statutory requirements: his conviction was not for one of the specified qualifying offenses (sections 800.04, 827.071, or 847.0135(5)), and he was more than four years older than his victim at the time of the offense.
[1] A trial court lacks discretion to grant relief under section 943.04354, Florida Statutes, if the petitioner does not meet the statutory eligibility requirements.
[2] Eligibility for removal from the sexual offender registry under section 943.04354 requires conviction or adjudication for specific enumerated offenses.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a person shall be considered for removal of the requirement to register as a sexual offender . . . only if the person . . . [w]as convicted . . . or adjudicated delinquent of a violation of" section 800.04, 827.071, or 847.0135(5)”
Establishes the specific statutory offenses that qualify for removal consideration under section 943.04354
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaxey was 28 years old when he committed a violation of section 847.0135(3) involving a perceived 14-year-old victim. Maxey was required to register a…
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MIZE, J.
Appellant, Ryan D. Maxey ("Maxey"), challenges the lower court's order vacating its prior order which granted Maxey's motion for removal of the requirement to register as a sexual offender under section 943.04354, Florida Statutes (2022). Because the trial court was correct that it did not have discretion to grant Maxey relief under section 943.04354, we affirm.
This Court reviews “a trial court's interpretation of a statute de novo." Marlin Constr. Grp., LLC v. Bollinger, 412 So. 3d 812, 815 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024). “In matters involving statutory interpretation, courts must first look to the actual language of the statute and examine the statute's plain meaning." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Under section 943.04354, “a person shall be considered for removal of the requirement to register as a sexual offender . . . only if the person . . . [w]as convicted or adjudicated delinquent of a violation of" section 800.04, 827.071, or 847.0135(5), “is required to register as a sexual offender . . . solely on the basis of this conviction or adjudication,” and “[i]s not more than 4 years older than the victim of this violation who was 13 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age at the time the person committed this violation." § 943.04354(1)(a), (b)1., (c), Fla. Stat. Maxey was 28 years old when he committed a violation of section 847.0135(3) involving a perceived 14-year-old victim. Since the offense of which Maxey was convicted is not one of the offenses listed in section 943.04354, and Maxey also was more than four years older than the perceived victim of his offense at the time of the offense, Maxey did not qualify for consideration of removal from the sex offender registry under section 943.04354, and the trial court was correct to vacate its prior order granting Maxey's motion.
AFFIRMED.
TRAVER, C.J., and PRATT, J., concur. Briana Fosah and Robert I. Mandell, of Mandell Law, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alyssa M. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
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Maxey v. State (Fla. 6th DCA 2026)…s (2022). Because the trial court was correct that it did not have discretion to grant Maxey relief under section 943.04354, we affirm. This Court reviews “a trial court's interpretation of a statute de novo." Marlin Constr. Grp., LLC v. Bollinger, 412 So. 3d 812, 815 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024). “In [*2] matters involving statutory interpretation, courts must first look to the actual language of the statute and examine the statute's plain meaning." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Under section 943.04354, “a per…
Authorities Cited
- Maxey v. State (Fla. 6th DCA 2026)