DARYL CLARK, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1990-10-16
No. 89-2413
Before NESBITT, JORGENSON and GERSTEN, JJ.
567 So. 2d 1070 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1990)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that limiting cross-examination of a crucial witness regarding their credibility constitutes error, even in a non-jury proceeding.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court errs by limiting the scope of cross-examination when the excluded testimony is relevant to the credibility of a crucial prosecution witness.

[2] Cross-examination of a witness is permissible to impeach their credibility regarding allegations made in a sworn affidavit.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellant was found in contempt for violating a permanent injunction. He asserted the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of his wife,…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
GERSTEN, Judge.

GERSTEN, Judge.

Appellant, Daryl Clark, appeals his judgment and sentence of contempt for violating a permanent injunction. We reverse and remand.

The permanent injunction enjoined appellant from entering his wife and minor children’s residence. The injunction further enjoined him from threatening his wife.

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in limiting the scope of appellant’s cross-examination of appellant’s wife, the crucial prosecution witness. The appellee, State, contends that the scope of the cross-examination was properly limited because appellant sought testimony regarding a collateral matter. We conclude the trial court erred in preventing appellant from cross-examining this pivotal witness. The trial court refused to allow any cross-examination concerning an incident the wife, in her duly sworn affidavit, claimed had occurred on July 12, 1989. Appellant alleged that this July 12 incident had been fabricated by his wife. Thus, cross-examination of her was necessary to impeach her credibility regarding the contumacious action.

The rule is well-settled that “limiting the scope of cross-examination in a manner which keeps from the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial testimony constitutes error, especially where the cross-examination is directed to the key prosecution witness.” Stradtman v. State, 334 So. 2d 100, 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), approved, 346 So. 2d 67 (Fla.1977); accord daggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321 (Fla.2d DCA 1988); Williams v. State, 386 So. 2d 25 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). We note that although this was a non-jury proceeding, this rule similarly applies to situations where the trial court sits as the finder of fact.

Moreover, “[wjhenever a witness takes the stand, he ipso facto places his credibility in issue.” Mendez v. State, 412 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla.2d DCA 1982); Baxter v. State, 294 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 981, 95 S.Ct. 1412, 43 L.Ed.2d 664 (1975).

Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of contempt is reversed and remanded for a new trial.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw