PAFFORD
v.
STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. OF INDIANA
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The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision to dismiss a claim for double indemnity life insurance benefits. The court held that a passenger on a commercial airline was participating in aviation and thus excluded from coverage under the policy's accidental death benefit clause.
Yes, a fare-paying passenger on a regularly scheduled commercial airline carrier is considered to be participating in aviation or aeronautics. Therefore, the exclusion in the policy applies, and the double indemnity benefit is not payable.
“that death shall not have resulted from bodily injuries sustained while participating in aviation or aeronautics * * *”
This quote is the specific policy exclusion that the court interpreted.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharles Herbert Pafford, Jr. died in an airplane crash while a paying passenger on a commercial airline. His life insurance policy included a double i…
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J. Compton French and Hull, Landis, Graham & French, De Land, for appellee. TERRELL, Justice.
March 7, 1950, Charles Herbert Pafford, Jr., was killed in an accidental crash of a regularly scheduled commercial air line carrier. At the time of his death he held a policy of insurance with appellee for $10,000, with double indemnity or additional accidental death benefit of $10,000 to be paid in the event "that death shall not have resulted from bodily injuries sustained while participating in aviation or aeronautics * * *". Appellee paid the death benefit but refused to pay the double indemnity because of the quoted provision of the policy.
This action was brought by appellant, the mother of the deceased, to recover the principal and interest of the double indemnity, including a reasonable attorney's fee. A motion to dismiss the complaint was granted and the plaintiff electing not to plead further, final judgment was entered for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.
It is agreed that the point for determination is whether or not a paying passenger on a regularly scheduled commercial air carrier is participating in aviation or aeronautics.
It appears that we answered this question in the affirmative in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128, 89 So. 418 and in Price v. Prudential Insurance Co., 98 Fla. 1044, 124 So. 817. The gist of appellant's contention is that these cases should now be overruled because of advance and new developments in aviation and because other jurisdictions have held that pay passengers on a commercial air carrier are not participants in aviation or aeronautics. Kansas City Ins. Co. v. Wells, 8 Cir., 133 F. 2d 224; Lee v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 187 Misc. 221, 46 N.Y.S.2d 241; Funk v. New York Life Ins. Co., 186 Misc. 449, 60 N.Y.S.2d 349 and others.
We are conscious of the doctrine announced in the cases relied on by appellant but in the cases cited herein this court saw fit to follow a different rule and the cases are not in parallel. Where contracts and statutes are ambiguous interpretation may be necessary, but here we are confronted with a contract, the meaning of which was well understood in the cases here cited, the case of Travelers Insurance Co. v. Peake being similar to the case at bar. When the meaning of a contract is well settled the court is not at liberty to modify it by interpretation, though it may modify judge made rules for better conformity with justice. We think the cases cited rule the case at bar. Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., ROBERTS, J., and PARKS, Associate Justice, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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NEW Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Addison, 169 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)…Life Ins. Co. v. Kincaid, 1939, 136 Fla. 120, 186 So. 675; King v. Sturge, Fla.App.1959, 113 So. 2d 257. If the language used is clear and unambiguous, it will be accorded its natural meaning. Pafford v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of Indiana, Fla. 1951, 52 So. 2d 910. The court should not extend strictness in construction to the point of adding a meaning to language that is clear. Rigel v. National Casualty Company, Fla. 1954, 76 So. 2d 285. For statement of the above principles, see 18 Fla. Jur., Insurance, sec…
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Miller Elec. Co. OF Fla. v. The Emp'rs' Liab. Assurance Corp., 171 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)…ubject of this review. Reversed. STURGIS, Chief Judge, and RAWLS, J., concur. . King v. Sturge (Fla.App.1959) 113 So. 2d 257; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kincaid, 136 Fla. 120, 186 So. 675. . Pafford v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of Indiana (Fla.1951) 52 So. 2d 910. . Rigel v. National Casualty Company (Fla.1954) 76 So. 2d 285. . Firemans Fund Ins. Co. of San Francisco, Cal. v. Boyd (Fla.1950) 45 So. 2d 499. . Beasley v. Wolf (Fla.App.1963) 151 So. 2d 679. . Tlie Praetorians v. Fisher (Fla.1956) 89 So. 2d…
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Fin. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Callaham, 199 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…Life Ins. Co. v. Kincaid, 1939, 136 Fla. 120, 186 So. 675; King v. Sturge, Fla.App.1959, 113 So. 2d 257. If the language used is clear and unambiguous, it will be accorded its natural meaning. Pafford v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of Indiana, Fla.1951, 52 So. 2d 910. The court should not extend strictness in construction to the point of adding a meaning to language that is clear. Rigel v. National Casualty Company, Fla.1954, 76 So. 2d 285. For statement of the above principles, see 18 Fla.Jur., Insurance, Secti…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Price v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 98 Fla. 1044 (Fla. 1929)
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128 (Fla. 1921)
- Pafford v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of Ind., 52 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1951)
- Kan. City Life Ins. Co. v. Wells, 133 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1943)