SCOTT
v.
SCOTT

Fla. | 1950-04-25
45 So.2d 878 Florida Supreme Court (1950) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 45 So. 2d 878 · 1950 Fla. LEXIS 1401
Cited by 15 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a guardian could initiate a divorce action on behalf of a mentally incompetent ward. The court held that divorce is a personal right that cannot be exercised by a guardian, absent specific statutory authorization.


Holding

No, a guardian cannot institute and maintain an action for divorce on behalf of a mentally incompetent ward in Florida, as the right to divorce is personal and requires the instigation of the aggrieved spouse.


Key Quotes

“in the absence of a statute specifically authorizing suit for divorce by a guardian on behalf of an insane ward the right to maintain the suit is of such a strictly personal and volitional nature that it must, of necessity, remain personal to the spouse aggrieved by the acts and conduct of the other.”

This quote establishes the core legal principle that divorce is a personal right.

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Facts & Procedural History

A circuit judge certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court asking if a guardian could file for divorce on behalf of a ward who had been legally…

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Opinion of the Court
Sebring

SEBRING, Justice.

The Circuit Judge of Bay County has certified to this Court, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 38, the following proposition of law for determination: "May an action for divorce be instituted and maintained in this State by a guardian in behalf of a ward who prior to the time of the institution of suit has been duly adjudged to be mentally incompetent?"

It is settled by the holding of this Court in Schwob Co. of Florida v. Florida Industrial Commission, 152 Fla. 203, 11 So. 2d 782, that circuit courts may certify to this court, under Supreme Court Rule 38, any question affecting the jurisdiction of circuit courts, any procedural question, or any question that will dispose of the whole case at the outset by an answer to the question propounded, where the question certified is without controlling precedent in this state and an instruction from this court will facilitate the proper disposition of the cause. *879 The question propounded by the learned circuit judge is one affecting the jurisdiction of the circuit court from which the question was certified, is without controlling precedent in this state and hence is entitled to an answer. In answer to the certified question propounded, it is our view, which we think to be supported by the great weight of authority, that in the absence of a statute specifically authorizing suit for divorce by a guardian on behalf of an insane ward the right to maintain the suit is of such a strictly personal and volitional nature that it must, of necessity, remain personal to the spouse aggrieved by the acts and conduct of the other. Inasmuch as there are no marital offenses which in and of themselves work a dissolution of the marriage relation, or which may not be condoned, the marital relation can be dissolved only with the consent and at the instigation of the injured spouse personally, and manifestly, such consent cannot be given by one who is legally insane.

To hold to any other view would be to destroy the effect of condonation, which not only is a defense available to a defendant in proper cases but which also preserves to the injured spouse the right to forgive, excuse or pardon.

See annotations 70 A.L.R. 964 and 149 A.L.R. 1284.

See also 17 Am.

Jur. 290, 291, Divorce and Separation Sections 270, 272; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 89, p. 672.

The rule that an action for divorce may be maintained by a guardian in behalf of an insane ward appears to prevail only in the States of Massachusetts and Alabama.

In Massachusetts the right of the guardian to sue in such cases is expressly given by statute.

See Cohn v. Cohn, 310 Mass. 126, 37 N.E. 2d 260.

In Alabama the right of the guardian to maintain the suit is bottomed not upon express statutory authority but upon the view held by the court of last resort of that State that a general statute allowing a guardian to maintain a suit in behalf of his ward should be construed in pari materia with a general statute governing divorces, and that when so construed, the statutes vest authority in the guardian to institute such an action.

See Campbell v. Campbell, 242 Ala. 141, 5 So. 2d 401.

Our divergence from the holding of the Massachusetts Court is compulsory, for the reason that in Florida we have no specific statute authorizing the maintenance of such an action by a guardian.

Our disagreement with the rule adopted by the Alabama Court is occasioned by the fact that we cannot accept the logic by which the court has reached its conclusion.

Being of the opinion that the majority rule on the subject is more consonant with equity and reason, it follows that the question certified to this court should be answered in the negative and that the cause should be remanded for the entry of an appropriate order in accordance with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

ADAMS, C.J., and CHAPMAN and HOBSON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Forsyth v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 162 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
    …shall not be employed in such a way as to affect the jurisdiction of the appellate court or the lower court, and must be limited to those cases in which instructions will facilitate the final disposition of the cause.” . Scott v. Scott, (Fla.1950) 45 So. 2d 878. . Mims v. Reid, (Fla.1957) 98 So. 2d 498. . United Services Automobile Association v. Hills, (Neb.1961) 172 Neb. 128, 109 N.W. 2d 174. . Rosenthal et al. v. Scott, (Fla.1963) 150 So. 2d 433. . “Sec. 627.0127 Attorney fee “Upon the rendition of…
  • Scott v. Scott, 45 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1950)
    …45 So. 2d 878 (1950) SCOTT v. SCOTT. Supreme Court of Florida, Division B. April 25, 1950. W. Fred Turner, Panama City, for plaintiff. Joseph I. Mathis, Panama City, for defendant. SEBRING, Justice. The Circuit Judge of Bay County has certified to this Cou…
  • Mathis v. Virgin, 167 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
    …cting the jurisdiction of the circuit court or this court; and that an answer to said question will ultimately determine the final disposition of the cause. Therefore, it is our view that same is entitled to an answer. See: Scott v. Scott, Fla.1950, 45 So. 2d 878; Forsyth v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., Fla.App.1964, 162 So. 2d 916. From the record presented to us, it appears that the question arose out of the following factual situation: The minor plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident…

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