SEE HARRELL
v.
STATE
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Appellant Chrissie Demps appealed her conviction for Battery and Disorderly Conduct, raising three issues about trial court error regarding prosecutorial commentary and procedural rulings. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial court's evidentiary and procedural decisions.
The court affirmed the conviction on all three points. First, the prosecutor did not comment on appellant's right to remain silent because appellant never invoked it and voluntarily gave statements to police. Second, the point was not preserved for appeal because appellant's objection was on different grounds, and even if preserved, any error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, the two objections cited did not rise to the level of impermissible speaking objections because they properly stated legal grounds.
[1] A prosecutor may comment on a defendant's statements made after arrest, as such statements are not protected by the right to remain silent.
[2] An objection at trial must state the specific grounds for the objection to be preserved for appellate review.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The fallacy in Appellant's argument is that Appellant never remained silent. She talked to an officer at the scene, and again after her arrest when she voluntarily went to the sheriff's office several days later and gave a written statement. The prosecutor never commented on her right to remain silent.”
Establishes that no Fifth Amendment violation occurred because the appellant voluntarily provided statements to police, so the prosecutor's comment about consulting an attorney did not implicate her right to remain silent.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Demps was charged with Battery and Disorderly Conduct. She spoke with an officer at the scene and later voluntarily went to the sheriff's of…
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Before POWELL, APTE, and ROCHE, J.J.
PER CURIAM.
FINAL ORDER AFFIRMING TRIAL COURT
Appellant Chrissie Demps appeals her conviction for Battery and Disorderly Conduct. We have carefully considered the record on appeal, the briefs, the transcript of the trial, and applicable legal authorities. We dispense with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320, and affirm.
Appellant raises three points, each of which merits brief discussion. In Point I, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to comment on Appellant’s 5th 2 of 4 Amendment right to remain silent by asking Appellant on cross examination whether she had gone to see an attorney before she went to see the detectives after her arrest, and in his closing argument to comment that certain things happened, and “...in the meantime you had went to see an attorney.” The fallacy in Appellant’s argument is that Appellant never remained silent. She talked to an officer at the scene, and again after her arrest when she voluntarily went to the sheriff’s office several days later and gave a written statement. The prosecutor never commented on her right to remain silent.
As to Point II, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in allowing the state to comment on the testimony of state’s witnesses where the following occurred. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Q. Okay. So both de -– Deputy Paul and Detective Seifert, when they said that you spoke to the officer first,
you’re saying that’s not what happened?
THE WITNESS [Appellant]: A. It’s not what happened.
MS. ADAMSON: Objection, Your Honor. Improper test -–
THE WITNESS: I’m telling you that’s not what happened.
MS. ADAMSON: Objection, your Honor. She’s not testifying to things
that are not in -– in -– were not in evidence.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Since Appellant makes an argument here which was not the ground of her objection below, the point is not preserved for appeal. See Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 2005); Ruano v. State, 35 So. 3d 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). Furthermore, even had the point been preserved, we conclude that any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). Asking “that’s not what happened” is vastly different than asking outright “were the officers lying” and thereby condemning them as purveyors of deliberate 3 of 4 falsehood. Also, this question was asked only one time and the prosecutor did not mention it in her closing argument. It did not become a pervasive feature of the trial.
In Point III, Appellant argues that the court erred in allowing the State to use speaking objections, which amounted to unnecessary, argumentative, prejudicial commentary throughout the trial. In her brief, Appellant points to only two objections made by the prosecutor, which she claims were improper:
“Your honor, I’m objecting to relevance and an improper question if she’s
testifying as to specific medical condition.
“Objection. Speculation. I have personal knowledge [sic].”
We conclude that these objections did not rise to the level of reversible error. See Michaels v. State, 773 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) defining impermissible speaking objections as those which “...constitute nothing less than unauthorized communications with the jury. Such objections characteristically consist of impermissible editorials or comments strategically made by unscrupulous lawyers to influence the jury. They are distinguished from legitimate objections which simply state legal grounds...” The first part of each objection was proper because it stated a legal ground. To contend that the second part of each constituted an “editorial” or jury argument is, in colloquial terms, “a reach”. For the reasons set forth above, Appellant’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Orlando, Florida this __2nd___ day of _May______, 2012.
__/S/_______________________
ROM W. POWELL Senior Judge
/S/
_/S/_________________________ ALAN S. APTE RENEE A. ROCHE Circuit Judge Circuit Judge 4 of 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing order was furnished to Kathleen MacMillan, Assistant Public Defender, 435 N. Orange Avenue, Ste. 400, Orlando, Florida 32801; Dugald McMillan, Assistant State Attorney, 415 N. Orange Avenue, Ste. 200, Orlando, Florida 32802-1673; and Honorable Maureen Bell, 425 N. Orange Avenue, Orlando, Florida 32801, by mail, this _2nd___ day of __May______________, 2012.
_/S/________________________________
Judicial Assistant
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 2005)
- Michaels v. State, 773 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Ruano v. State, 35 So. 3d 1031 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)