JAMES JEFFERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Jefferson appealed his adjudication and sentencing as a habitual felony offender, arguing the trial court erred by failing to conduct a separate hearing on his habitual offender status. The Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a defendant may validly waive the statutory right to a separate hearing on habitual offender status through knowing and voluntary stipulation.
A defendant may validly waive the procedural right to a separate hearing on habitual felony offender status through knowing and voluntary stipulation. The trial court did not err in sentencing Jefferson as a habitual felony offender without conducting such a hearing when Jefferson had freely and voluntarily stipulated to his status.
[1] A defendant may waive the statutory right to a separate hearing to determine habitual felony offender status.
[2] A stipulation by a defendant to be sentenced as a habitual felony offender, made knowingly and voluntarily, can obviate the need for a separate hearing and factual findin…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find nothing in this statute implying that a defendant is not free to waive the procedural rights set forth therein, i.e., his right to a separate hearing at which he is accorded the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.”
Establishes the court's holding that defendants may waive statutory procedural rights even without express statutory authorization for waiver.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJefferson was sentenced to twelve years as part of a plea bargain agreement. The sentence fell within the range recommended by the applicable guidelin…
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ERVIN, Judge.
Appellant contests his adjudication and sentence as a habitual felony offender, contending that the lower court erred in so sentencing him without conducting a separate hearing to determine his status as such, notwithstanding that he had waived a formal hearing and entered into a stipulation agreeing that he was a habitual offender and should be so sentenced. We disagree with appellant’s contention and affirm.
The record discloses that appellant’s sentence of twelve years was part of a plea bargain agreement, and that the sentence imposed fell within the sentencing range recommended under the applicable guidelines scoresheet. The sentencing order states, and the record supports, that appellant freely, voluntarily, and knowingly stipulated that he was a habitual felon and agreed to be sentenced as a habitual felony offender. Based upon the stipulation, the court considered it unnecessary to make the requisite findings of fact, or to conduct a separate hearing to determine whether appellant complied with the criteria relating to habitual felony offenders, as required by Section 775.084(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1988).
We find nothing in this statute implying that a defendant is not free to waive the procedural rights set forth therein, i.e., his right to a separate hearing at which he is accorded the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel. Although we are not aware of any decisions which have specifically addressed the issue at bar, we are aware that in other contexts, defendants have been recognized as having the option to waive numerous substantive rights in the criminal justice area, even though waiver is not expressly provided by statute. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez-Acosta, 561 So. 2d 531 (Fla.1990) (statutory right to trial by twelve-person jury validly waived, and trial by six-person jury substituted therefor in exchange for the state’s waiver of the death penalty); R.F.R. v. State, 558 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (juvenile waived right to dismiss a petition for delinquency filed more than forty-five days after he was taken into custody in violation of Section 39.05(6), Florida Statutes (1987)); Jordan v. State, 561 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (waiver of statutory right to hearing on costs assessed); Rowe v. State, 496 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (no error in accepting plea to specific bargained-for sentence which was outside the guidelines in return for state’s promise not to seek enhanced penalty under habitual offender statute), review denied, 545 So. 2d 1368 (Fla.1989).
Having considered the above authorities, as well as the record which supports the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s plea and stipulation were knowingly and voluntarily made, we find no error resulting from the trial court’s sentence of appellant as a habitual felony offender. AFFIRMED.
WIGGINTON and MINER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (23 total)
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Irving v. State, 627 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…voluntarily waive his right to express factual findings qualifying the defendant as a habitual felony offender. Suarez v. State, 616 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Spriggs v. State, 615 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (en banc); Jefferson v. State, 571 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The record reflects that Irving both accepted the habitual offender sentence and, expressly waived his right to a hearing under the habitual offender statute. The State properly gave notice of its intent to seek a habitual viol…
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Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…lony offender sentences. At the plea hearing, she specifically stipulated that she would meet the criteria for a habitual felony offender. The record reveals that the plea and stipulation were knowingly and voluntarily made. In Jefferson v. State, 571 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the first district held that a defendant may waive the procedural requirements of section 775.084(3). In Jefferson, as in the present case, the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily stipulated that he qualified as a habitu…
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Suarez v. State, 616 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…tence and, expressly waived his right to a hearing under the habitual offender statute. Chalk v. State, 600 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (Anstead, J. concurring specially); Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Jefferson v. State, 571 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); cf., Harper v. State, 605 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Any error in failing to make the requisite findings was harmless error. State v. Rucker, 613 So. 2d 460 (Fla.1993). Prior to appellant’s plea, the State filed a notice t…
Previewing 3 of 23 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rowe v. State, 496 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Cook v. Cook, 558 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- State v. Rodriguez-Acosta, 561 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1990)
- Jordan v. State, 561 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)