PATRICIA ANN GREENLEE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A defendant can waive the procedural requirements of the habitual felony offender statute by knowingly and voluntarily stipulating to habitual offender status.
Defendant pleaded no contest to battery charges, agreeing to concurrent ten-year habitual felony offender sentences and stipulating to meeting the cri…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals her sentences imposed pursuant to the habitual felony offender statute, § 775.084, Fla.Stat. (1989), contending that the trial court erred in failing to follow the procedural requirements of section 775.084(1). We affirm.
Defendant pleaded no contest to three counts of battery on a law enforcement officer with the understanding that she would receive three concurrent ten-year habitual felony offender sentences. At the plea hearing, she specifically stipulated that she would meet the criteria for a habitual felony offender. The record reveals that the plea and stipulation were knowingly and voluntarily made.
In Jefferson v. State, 571 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the first district held that a defendant may waive the procedural requirements of section 775.084(3). In Jefferson, as in the present case, the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily stipulated that he qualified as a habitual felony offender and agreed to be sentenced as such. We follow the first district’s analysis and affirm defendant’s sentences.
LEHAN, A.C.J., and HALL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (24 total)
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State v. Will, 645 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…; accord Bell v. State, 637 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). That being so, no useful purpose would be served by holding the habitual offender hearing, or obtaining an on-the-record waiver of the habitual offender hearing.3 See Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310, 310-11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). But see Harper v. State, 605 So. 2d 994, 995 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).4 Assuming arguendo that it was necessary to obtain an on-the-record waiver, or to conduct a habitual offender hearing, defendant would still be entitled t…
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Suarez v. State, 616 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…that appellant both accepted the habitual offender sentence and, expressly waived his right to a hearing under the habitual offender statute. Chalk v. State, 600 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (Anstead, J. concurring specially); Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Jefferson v. State, 571 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); cf., Harper v. State, 605 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Any error in failing to make the requisite findings was harmless error. State v. Rucker, 613 So. 2d 460 (Fla.1993).…
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LEE v. State, 731 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…rs of the date of his conviction for the last prior felony or within five years of release from a prison sentence or other commitment imposed as a result of a prior felony conviction. See § 775.084(1). The trial court, relying on Greenlee v. State, 591 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), concluded that Lee had stipulated to his [*73] habitual offender sentence as part of a plea agreement and, therefore, waived compliance with the requirements of section 775.084. We find Greenlee to be inap-posite. In Greenlee, t…
Previewing 3 of 24 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jefferson v. State, 571 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Haines v. State, 571 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)