J. M. TROUBLEFIELD, APPELLANT,
v.
H. M. E. TROUBLEFIELD, APPELLEE
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A Florida court granted a divorce and attempted to reform property deeds, but the Supreme Court affirmed the divorce while reversing the property decree because an absent third party had an interest in the land and the constructive service did not adequately notify interested parties regarding the property claims.
The divorce portion of the decree is affirmed because the allegations relating to divorce were substantially sustained and the essential elements appeared despite defects not demurred to. However, the decree affecting title to the land is reversed because an absent third party had an interest in the property and the constructive service did not adequately notify parties regarding the land litigation.
“The two subjects of litigation contained in the bill of complaint are not so kindred as to make their joinder in one bill of complaint necessarily proper.”
Establishes that divorce and property claims were insufficiently related to be properly joined in a single action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee alleged she married appellant in 1898 and lived with him as his wife until he deserted her in November 1906. She further alleged she purchase…
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Whitfield, C. J.
The appellee filed a bill in equity in the circuit court for Orange county, Florida, against the appellant in which it is alleged in substance that the appellee is an actual resident of Orange county, Florida, and that she has been a resident in Floridá for thirteen years; that in 1898, she was lawfully married to appellant in GreemCove Springs, Florida; that they lived together as man and wife till November, 1906, she faithfully performing her marital duties; that on November 8, 1906, the appellant wilfully deserted and absented himself from appellee and for more than one year has persisted in such desertion and continues so to do.
The bill contains other allegations that certain lands were paid for by appellee and the title thereto was taken in the name of the appellant. The prayer is for divorce and that appellant be restrained from disposing of the property paid for by appellee. Service by publication was had and the notice indicated that the suit was for divorce. It appears that subsequent to the constructive service, the bill of complaint was amended, showing that a conveyance of the land had been made to a third person. Later an amended bill was filed for a divorce as above stated and for a decree declaring title to the land to be in appellee and that the clerk of the circuit court as ex-officio recorder of deeds “be required to reform, correct or cancel” the deeds made to appellant conveying the lands paid for by appellee as alleged.
A decree was rendered reciting a decree .pro confesso granting the divorce and declaring void the deeds made to appellant and requiring the clerk to “reform said deeds so that the same shall read to Hariet Matilda Elizabeth Troublefield instead of John M. Troublefield,” after reciting that the grantor in the deeds, a corporation, no longer exists. On appeal the decree is assigned as error. The two subjects of litigation contained in the bill of complaint are not so kindred as to make their joinder in one bill of complaint necessarily proper. The defendant did not appear or plead. The constructive notice of the proceeding referred to the divorce proceeding, but made no reference to the litigation as to the lands, and the record shows a probable interest of a third person who was not a party to the decree.
The allegations relating to the divorce are not full and specific in the manner of statement, but the bill was not demurred to, and material matters of substance were not wholly omitted. After a divorce had been decreed defects in the allegations not demurred to may be disregarded if all the essentials appear and the evidence fully sustains the allegations and the decree. A decree may be affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The allegations of the bill of complaint in so far as they relate to the prayer for a divorce are in substance sustained, and as the constructive service related to divorce proceedings, the decree granting a divorce is affirmed; but as an absent third party appears to have an-interest in the decree as to the land, the decree affecting the title to the land described in the bill of complaint is reversed.
The appellant will pay the costs of this appeal.
Shackleford and Cockrell, J. J., concur. Taylor, Hocker and Parichill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
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Frederic G. Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196 (Fla. 1929)…ave been a resident within ten years; however, the allegation, being practically in the language of the statute, may be sufficient as. only ultimate facts are essential in pleadings of this kind. In the divorce case of Troublefield v. Troublefield, 60 Fla. 387, 53 So. R. 518, this Court held that after a divorce had been decreed, defects in the allegations not demurred to, may be disregarded, “if all the essentials appear and the evidence fully sustains the allegations and the decree. ’ ’ Does the eviden…
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Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Whyte, 130 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)…ined Metals Reduction Co., 10 Cir., 1949, 176 F. 2d 73, 75; I Restatement, Contracts, § 236(b); 17 Fla.Jur., Injunctions, § 49; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 328. . See Indian River Mfg. Co. v. Wooten, 48 Fla. 271, 37 So. 731; Troublefield v. Troublefield, 60 Fla. 387, 53 So. 518; Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co. v. City of Rockledge, 97 Fla. 644, 121 So. 807; Cline v. Cline, 101 Fla. 488, 134 So. 546; Cracowaner v. Worthington, 101 Fla. 756, 135 So. 304; Coral Realty Co. v. Peacock Holding Co., 103 Fla. 916, 1…
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