BLUE DOLPHIN FIBERGLASS POOLS OF FLORIDA, INC., AND CHARLES KASPER, APPELLANTS,
v.
SWIM INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Blue Dolphin Fiberglass Pools and Charles Kasper appealed from an injunction and declaratory order issued by the trial court after a judgment against defendants. The court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Blue Dolphin and Kasper to issue the injunction and void the stock transfer, respectively.
The trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Blue Dolphin to enjoin it from disposing of assets and lacked jurisdiction over Kasper, the stock transferee, to declare the prior stock transfer void. A person whose rights and interests are affected by a decree and whose actions are to be controlled must be a necessary party to the action.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin a corporation from transferring assets if the corporation has not been properly served and brought under the court's personal j…
[2] A trial court cannot declare a stock transfer void if the transferee has not been properly served and brought under the court's personal jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Blue Dolphin argues that since the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction of it when the injunction order of May 3, 1991, was entered, the trial court had no power to enjoin Blue Dolphin from any act. That position is correct.”
Establishes the core holding that a court cannot enjoin an entity over which it lacks personal jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee obtained a $1,779,560 judgment against Arnold Morris, Gail Morris, and John Perez on April 23, 1991. On April 22, 1991, the day before judgme…
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DANAHY, Judge.
This appeal arises from an action brought by the appellee as plaintiff against Arnold Morris, Gail Morris, and John Perez. During the pendency of the action, the defendant Morris formed the appellant Blue Dolphin Fiberglass Pools of Florida, Inc. (Blue Dolphin), with Charles Kasper (Kasper). Morris owned fifty percent of the stock of Blue Dolphin and Kasper owned the other fifty percent. On April 23, 1991, the appellee obtained a judgment against all defendants in the amount of $1,779,560. On the previous day, April 22, 1991, Kasper purchased from Morris the other fifty percent stock ownership in Blue Dolphin.
At the request of the appellee, the trial court entered an order on May 3, 1991, in which, among other things, it enjoined Blue Dolphin from transferring or disposing of any of its assets other than in the normal course of business and declared that any transfer by the defendants Morris of stock in Blue Dolphin “after jury verdict is void.” Later Blue Dolphin filed a motion to dissolve the injunction against it and that motion was denied. The appellants seek review of the May 3, 1991, order and the order denying Blue Dolphin’s motion to dissolve.
The appellants’ positions on this appeal are simple. Blue Dolphin argues that since the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction of it when the injunction order of May 3, 1991, was entered, the trial court had no power to enjoin Blue Dolphin from any act. That position is correct. Riddick v. Suncoast Beauty College, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Kas-per asserts that the trial court was without jurisdiction to declare a prior stock transfer void when the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction of Kasper, the transferee. That position also is correct. A person whose rights and interests are to be affected by a decree and whose actions with reference to the subject matter of litigation are to be controlled by a decree is a necessary party to the action and the trial court cannot proceed without that person. See Heisler v. Florida Mortgage Title & Bonding Co., 105 Fla. 657, 142 So. 242 (1932); Troublejield v. Troublefield, 60 Fla. 387, 53 So. 518 (1910).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order of May 3, 1991, to the extent that it enjoins Blue Dolphin from disposing of assets and to the extent that it declares void a prior transfer of stock from the defendants Morris to the appellant Kasper. SCHOONOVER, C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
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Trans Health Mgmt. Inc. v. Nunziata, 159 So. 3d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…may not issue an injunction that interferes with the rights of those who are not parties to the action. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Shell, 978 So. 2d 885, 891 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Blue Dolphin Fiberglass Pools of Fla., Inc. v. Swim Indus. Corp., 597 So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Chastain v. Uiterwyk, 462 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Trisotto v. Trisotto, 966 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Leighton v. First Universal Lending, LLC, 925 So. 2d 462, 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Sheoah Highlan…
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Myers v. Hwy. 46 Holdings, L.L.C., 65 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…he management of Highway 46 Holdings, LLC. Since the appellees asked for this declaration, it is clear that the Hachenbergers’ joinder is necessary for a complete determination. See Blue Dolphin Fiberglass Pools of Florida Inc. v. Swim Indus. Corp., 597 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Moreover, the Hachenbergers are signatories to many of the agreements and documents that form the basis of this suit and were involved to various extents in several of the causes of action made out by the pleadings.4 Thus we conc…
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Mem'l Health Sys., Inc. v. Halifax Hospice, Inc., 689 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…MHS's standing, we need not on this interlocutory appeal reach the question whether, as MHS contends, it was a necessary or indispensable party to the proceedings below. See generally Blue Dolphin Fiberglass Pools of Fla., Inc. v. Swim Indus. Corp., 597 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lilly K. Heisler v. Fla. Mortg. Title & Bonding Co. & N. A. Perry, 105 Fla. 657 (Fla. 1932)
- Cooper v. Gen. Commercial Sec. Corp., 105 Fla. 670 (Fla. 1932)
- Ogelean Riddick & Suncoast Beauty Sch. of Fla., Inc. v. Suncoast Beauty Coll., Inc., 570 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Troublefield v. Troublefield, 60 Fla. 387 (Fla. 1910)