STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
JAMES ODELL ALLEN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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The State appeals a 40-year sentence imposed on James Odell Allen for possession of cocaine with intent to sell while carrying a firearm, arguing the trial court erred by not imposing a mandatory life sentence under the habitual offender statute. The appellate court agrees, finding that once habitual offender status is established, Florida law mandates a life sentence for first-degree felonies, and remands for resentencing.
Once a court determines that a defendant meets the criteria for habitual offender status under section 775.084(1)(a), it must impose the sentence designated by the legislature in section 775.084(4)(a), which for first-degree felonies is a life sentence. The trial court's 40-year sentence was improper because it is unclear whether the court intended to sentence Allen as a habitual offender or attempted to use habitual offender status as a reason for departure from guidelines.
[1] A trial court errs by failing to impose a mandatory sentence under the habitual offender statute when the defendant meets the statutory criteria.
[2] A determination that a defendant is a habitual offender is not a valid reason for departure from sentencing guidelines.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under section 775.084, as amended in 1988, once the court determines that a defendant has met the criteria as set forth in section 775.084(1)(a) and is a habitual offender, it must sentence the defendant to such sentence as has been designated by the legislature in section 775.084(4)(a) 1, 2, or 3.”
Establishes the mandatory nature of sentencing for habitual offenders after the 1988 amendment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames Odell Allen was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to sell while carrying a firearm. The trial court found that Allen met the sta…
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HALL, Acting Chief Judge.
The state appeals from the sentence imposed upon the appellee/cross-appellant, James Odell Allen. It contends that the trial court erred in not sentencing Allen to a life sentence under the habitual offender statute. We agree that the trial court erred and remand for resentencing.
Allen was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, while carrying a firearm. The state filed notice of intention to seek an enhanced sentence under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989). The trial court found that Allen met the statutory criteria for sentencing as a habitual offender under section 775.084 and checked the habitual offender section on the sentencing guidelines scoresheet. The trial court also wrote “habitual offender” in the space provided for reasons for departure from the guidelines. The trial court then sentenced Allen to forty years in state prison, followed by ten years’ probation.
Under section 775.084, as amended in 1988, once the court determines that a defendant has met the criteria as set forth in section 775.084(1)(a) and is a habitual offender, it must sentence the defendant to such sentence as has been designated by the legislature in section 775.084(4)(a) 1, 2, or 3. See Donald v. State, 562 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In the instant case, Allen’s sentence is for a felony of the first-degree, therefore, according to subsection (4)(a)l, he must be sentenced to life if he is sentenced as a habitual offender. Since we cannot determine whether the trial court intended to sentence Allen as a habitual offender or attempted to use habitual offender status as a reason for departure from the guidelines, we remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the sentence. In so holding, we note that a determination that a defendant is a habitual offender is not a valid reason for departure. Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1986).
We find no merit to the points raised by Allen, on his cross-appeal, except for his argument that costs and fees should not have been imposed upon him without notice or hearing. Therefore, we strike the costs and fees without prejudice to the state to seek reimposition after proper notice and opportunity to be heard.
We affirm the conviction but reverse the sentence and remand with directions consistent herewith.
Since our decision in this case and the case of Donald v. State appear to be in conflict with State v. Brown, 530 So. 2d 51 (Fla.1988), we certify the following question to the supreme court:
HAS THE 1988 AMENDMENT OF SECTION 775.084, FLORIDA STATUTES, ALTERED THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN BROWN, HOLDING THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED SENTENCING UNDER SECTION 775.-084(4)(A) TO BE PERMISSIVE, RATHER THAN MANDATORY, AS STATED IN DONALD"1.
PARKER and PATTERSON, JJ„ concur.
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King v. State, 597 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…bitual offender statute, section 775.084, much more closely and broadly than we have before been called upon to do and reassess our holdings in previous decisions of this court. Walsingham v. State, 576 So. 2d 365 (Pla. 2d DCA 1991); State v. Allen, 573 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); State v. Davis, 559 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). First, we reject appellant’s argument that a sentence of community control following habitualization of a defendant is illegal. As we have previously observed, even were we abl…1 / 2
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Allen v. State, 599 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1992)…HARDING, Justice. We have for review State v. Allen, 573 So. 2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), in which the Second District Court of Appeal certified the following question to be of great public importance: HAS THE 1988 AMENDMENT OF SECTION 775.084, FLORIDA STATUTES, ALTERED THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN BROWN, HOLDI…
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Cotton v. State, 588 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…A 1991). Thus, the defendant’s sentence is vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. On remand, the trial court may, within its discretion, reimpose the present sentence or impose a lesser sentence. We certify conflict with State v. Allen, 573 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Pittman v. State, 570 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 166 (Fla.1991); and Donald v. State, 562 So. 2d 792 (Fla. [*696] 1st DCA 1990), rev. denied, 576 So. 2d 291 (Fla.1991). Conviction affirmed; sentence…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1986)
- Vermon T. Donald v. State, 562 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- State v. Brown, 530 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1988)