JAMES ODELL ALLEN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court resolved a certified question about whether 1988 amendments to the habitual offender statute made sentencing mandatory or permissive. The Court held that sentencing under the statute remains permissive, not mandatory, and reinstated the trial court's 40-year sentence for Allen's conviction of cocaine possession with intent to sell while armed.
The 1988 amendments did not alter the operative language regarding habitual offender sentencing, and sentencing under section 775.084(4)(a) and (4)(b) remains permissive, not mandatory. The trial court's sentence of forty years was therefore valid.
[1] Sentencing under Florida's habitual offender statute, section 775.084(4)(a), is permissive, not mandatory.
[2] The 1988 amendments to Florida's habitual offender statute did not alter the Supreme Court's prior ruling that sentencing under the statute is permissive.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“sentencing under sections 775.084(4)(a)l and 775.084(4)(b)l is permissive, not mandatory”
The Court's holding that the 1988 amendments did not alter the permissive nature of sentencing under the habitual offender statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames Odell Allen was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell while carrying a firearm. The State sought an enhanced sentence under the…
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HARDING, Justice.
We have for review State v. Allen, 573 So. 2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), in which the Second District Court of Appeal certified the following question to be of great public importance:
HAS THE 1988 AMENDMENT OF SECTION 775.084, FLORIDA STATUTES, ALTERED THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN BROWN, HOLDING THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED SENTENCING UNDER SECTION 775.-084(4)(A) TO BE PERMISSIVE, RATHER THAN MANDATORY, AS STATED IN DONALD?
We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.
James Odell Allen (Allen) was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, while carrying a firearm. The State filed notice of intention to seek an enhanced sentence under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989). The trial court found that Allen met the statutory criteria for sentencing as a habitual offender under the statute, and sentenced him to forty years in state prison, followed by ten years’ probation. Id. at 170-171.
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence. The court reasoned that under the habitual offender statute a defendant must receive the sentence designated in section 775.084(4)(a)l, 2, or 3. As applied to Allen, who was sentenced for a first-degree felony, the district court determined that Allen must be sentenced to life as provided in subsection (4)(a)l if he is sentenced as a habitual offender. The district court determined that its decision and the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in Donald v. State, 562 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), review denied, 576 So. 2d 291 (Fla.1991), were in apparent conflict with this Court’s decision in State v. Brown, 530 So. 2d 51 (Fla.1988). In order to clarify whether the 1988 amendments to the habitual offender statute altered our ruling in Brown, the district court certified the question to this Court.
We find that our recent decision in Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1992), is controlling in this case. In Burdick, we determined that the 1988 amendments did not alter the operative language in subsections (4)(a) or (4)(b). Consequently, we held that sentencing under sections 775.-084(4)(a)l and 775.084(4)(b)l is permissive, not mandatory. Id. at 271. Based upon Burdick, we answer the certified question in this case in the negative.1
Accordingly, we quash the decision below and remand this cause for reinstatement of the sentence imposed by the trial court.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. . We reject Allen’s equal protection claim because we hold that sentencing is permissive for both habitual felony offenders and habitual violent felony offenders.
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Copeland v. State, 118 So. 3d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…er, we write to clarify that sentencing under both the HVFO and HFO statutes is permissive, not mandatory. King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136, 1138 (Fla.1996), receded from on other grounds by Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.2001); Allen v. State, 599 So. 2d 996, 997 (Fla.1992) (holding that maximum sentences in HFO statutes are permissive); Stephens v. State, 974 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that the sentencing court has discretion when imposing an HFO sentence); Pankhurst v. State, 796 So.…
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Akins v. State, 98 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…nded after a term of years and replaced with a term of probation. In other words, one’s status as a habitual offender does not prohibit the trial court from imposing a split sentence. See McKnight v. State, 616 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1993); Allen v. State, 599 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1992) (holding that maximum sentences in habitual felony offender statutes are permissive, affirming split sentence). Mr. Akins is arguing that when a trial court revokes probation in such a case, the revocation also rescinds the earlier deter…
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Tucker v. State, 609 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…of thirty years on each count of two counts of sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine. It appears from the record that the trial judge, guided by this court’s decision in State v. Allen, 573 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), quashed, Allen v. State, 599 So. 2d 996 (Fla.1992), concluded that he was required to sentence appellant to the maximum penalties designated by the habitual offender statute, section 775.-084(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). The holding in Allen has subsequently not only been quashed by ou…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1992)
- Vermon T. Donald v. State, 562 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- State v. Brown, 530 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Allen, 573 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)