MICHAEL VALLIERES, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE MEL GROSSMAN, CIRCUIT JUDGE, 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND/OR OTHER CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENTS
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Michael Vallieres sought a writ of prohibition to prevent trial after the trial court improperly denied his motion for discharge based on violation of speedy trial rights. The appellate court granted the writ, holding that a trial court cannot extend the 175-day speedy trial period for "exceptional circumstances" after that period has already expired.
A trial court cannot extend the speedy trial period for "exceptional circumstances" after the 175-day period has expired. An extension of speedy trial time may only be obtained upon motion by a party before the period expires.
[1] Prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent a trial court from proceeding against an accused after a motion for discharge for lack of speedy trial has been improperl…
[2] Every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall be brought to trial within 175 days if the crime charged is a felony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The period for speedy trial may be extended, upon motion by a party, in exceptional circumstances provided that the period of time sought to be extended has not expired at the time the extension is procured.”
Establishes the rule that extensions are conditional on being requested before the period expires
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVallieres was arrested on April 7, 1990, and charged with attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault. Trial was set for October 16, 1990. The 175t…
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PER CURIAM.
Michael Vallieres petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition claiming that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1). We granted the petition on December 12, 1990, and ordered that the writ be issued for the reasons stated in this opinion.
The petitioner was arrested on April 7, 1990, and charged by information with attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault. The state sought and was granted a continuance of the trial on July 18, 1990, and trial was set for October 16, 1990. The 175th day from the time of arrest was September 29, 1990, a Saturday. The following Monday was October 1, 1990.
On October 12, 1990, the state moved for an extension of the speedy trial time period on the grounds of “exceptional circumstances.” On October 16, 1990, the court heard the state’s motion and the petitioner filed and presented a motion for discharge, claiming that the petitioner had not been brought to trial within 175 days of his arrest. Over the petitioner’s objection, the trial court granted the State’s motion and denied the petitioner’s motion for discharge.
On November 9,1990, the petitioner filed a second motion for discharge which was heard by the court on November 19, 1990. The trial court denied the motion for discharge on the grounds that the State had obtained an extension of the speedy trial period. The petitioner then obtained a stay of all proceedings below, pending this court’s review of his petition for writ of prohibition.
Prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent a trial court from proceeding against tbe accused after a motion for discharge for lack of speedy trial has been improperly denied. Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1983). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1) provides that every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall be brought to trial within 175 days if the crime charged is a felony. The 175-day time period commences when the person charged is taken into custody, in this case when he was arrested. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(4).
The period for speedy trial may be extended, upon motion by a party, in exceptional circumstances provided that the period of time sought to be extended has not expired at the time the extension is procured. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2). In the present case the state’s motion for extension of the speedy trial period was filed after 175 days from the petitioner’s arrest had passed, thus it was untimely.
Following our previous decision in Tas-carella v. Seay, 564 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), we hold that an extension of speedy trial time cannot be obtained for “exceptional circumstances” after expiration of the 175 days afforded under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.
Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition in this ease was granted and the trial court was ordered to discharge the petitioner. HERSEY, C.J., and GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Brown v. State, 715 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1998)…ulgated in order to promote the efficient operation of the court system and to act as a stimulus to prosecutors to bring defendants to trial as soon as practicable_”). . See Heller v. State, 601 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Vallieres v. Grossman, 573 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Tascarella v. Seay, 564 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Cf. J.T. v. State, 601 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (same rule for juvenile proceedings).…1 / 3
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Trainer v. Honorable Virginia Gay Broome, 666 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…es of speedy trial. Initially, we note that prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent a trial court from proceeding against the accused after a motion for discharge for lack of speedy trial has been erroneously denied. Vallieres v. Grossman, 573 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a) provides that “every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall be brought to trial within ... 175 days if the crime charged is a felony.” The time period for speed…
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Bogue v. The Honorable John E. Fennelly, 705 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…to prohibit a trial court from proceeding against the accused after a motion for discharge for lack of speedy trial has been erroneously denied. See Trainer v. Broome, 666 So. 2d 1019, review denied, 675 So. 2d 119 (Fla.1996); Vallieres v. Grossman, 573 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); see generally Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1983). Here, defendant has not yet been returned to Florida. Thus, there are no proceedings to prohibit and no jurisdiction to exceed. Cf. Subervi v. Miller, 555 So. 2d 452 (…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sherrod v. The Honorable Arthur J. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1983)
- Tascarella v. The Honorable Russell E. Seay, Jr., 564 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)