ALLEN TASCARELLA AND BARBARA AMBS TASCARELLA, PETITIONERS,
v.
THE HONORABLE RUSSELL E. SEAY, JR., JUDGE OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The court held that an extension for exceptional circumstances under Rule 3.191(d)(2) is invalid if the speedy trial period has already expired when the extension is sought.
[1] A speedy trial period may not be extended after its expiration, even for exceptional circumstances.
[2] An ex parte order extending speedy trial is rendered ineffective if subsequently vacated without objection by the state.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe state sought an extension of speedy trial after the period had expired, following an earlier ex parte extension that was vacated. The defendants m…
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STONE, Judge.
The state moves for a rehearing to review an order of this court granting a petition for a writ of prohibition and ordering the discharge of the petitioners based on a denial of their speedy trial rights. We deny the state’s motion for rehearing.
The defendants were arrested on February 8, 1989. Subsequently, following an order in limine excluding certain state witnesses, the state moved to extend speedy trial. The trial court granted the extension ex parte on July 25, 1989. Defendants moved to vacate the ex parte order and, on August 7, 1989, the state did not object to the entry of an order vacating the July 25th extension of speedy trial. The state did not seek, and no order was entered, extending speedy trial at that time. On August 21, 1989, two weeks after the speedy trial period expired, a motion for discharge was filed and a hearing was timely held pursuant to rule 3.191(i)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Subsequent to the filing of the motion for discharge, the state moved for and was granted an extension of time for exceptional circumstances.
Rule 3.191(f) authorizes extensions for exceptional circumstances as permitted by (d)(2) of the rule. Rule 3.191(d)(2) expressly provides in part:
The periods of time established by this Rule may be extended provided the period of time sought to be extended has not expired at the time the extension was procured.
Clearly, the speedy time period in this case had expired by the time the court attempted to grant the extension. By failing to procure an extension of time prior to the expiration of the periods of time provided by rule 3.191, the state ran afoul of the clear proscription of subsection (d)(2), which provides that an extension may be procured for exceptional circumstances pri-or to the expiration of the time period provided by the rule.
Accordingly, we are compelled to grant the petition for writ of prohibition and order that the petitioners be discharged.
DELL and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
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Brown v. State, 715 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1998)…he court system and to act as a stimulus to prosecutors to bring defendants to trial as soon as practicable_”). . See Heller v. State, 601 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Vallieres v. Grossman, 573 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Tascarella v. Seay, 564 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Cf. J.T. v. State, 601 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (same rule for juvenile proceedings).…
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Vallieres v. The Honorable Mel Grossman, 573 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…a.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(2). In the present case the state’s motion for extension of the speedy trial period was filed after 175 days from the petitioner’s arrest had passed, thus it was untimely. Following our previous decision in Tas-carella v. Seay, 564 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), we hold that an extension of speedy trial time cannot be obtained for “exceptional circumstances” after expiration of the 175 days afforded under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. Accordingly, the petition for writ of p…
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Heller v. State, 601 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…PER CURIAM. While this appeal was pending, we decided J.T. v. State, 601 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (citing Tascarella v. Seay, 564 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)), which is dispositive. The fifteen-day window period provided the State by rule 3.191(i)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, to proceed with a trial of the defendant after the speedy trial period has expired and a motion fo…
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