JOSE A. REYES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jose Reyes appealed his conviction and sentencing as a habitual felony offender for two counts of grand theft. The court reversed the habitual offender designation because both prior felony convictions were rendered on the same date, violating the statutory requirement that the second prior conviction be for an offense committed after the first.
The trial court erred in sentencing Reyes as a habitual offender. Under the habitual offender statute, the state must show that the second prior conviction was imposed for an offense committed after the date of the initial prior conviction. Because both prior convictions were rendered on the same date, this requirement was not satisfied.
[1] A defendant cannot be classified as an habitual offender if the two prior felony convictions occurred on the same date.
[2] For purposes of habitual offender sentencing, the state must demonstrate that the second prior felony conviction was for an offense committed after the date of the initia…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in order to classify a defendant as an habitual offender, it must be shown that the defendant was previously convicted of two or more felonies”
States the basic statutory requirement for habitual offender classification
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReyes committed grand theft offenses on January 31, 1989 and March 21, 1989, and was sentenced on September 13, 1989. The trial court classified him a…
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PER CURIAM.
After pleading guilty to two counts of grand theft,1 defendant Jose A. Reyes was convicted and sentenced as an habitual felony offender to consecutive five year terms of incarceration. We conclude that the trial court erred in classifying defendant as an habitual offender and, therefore, reverse.
Defendant committed the grand theft offenses on January 31, 1989 and March 21, 1989, and was sentenced on September 13, 1989. Therefore, defendant was sentenced under the habitual offender statute as amended in 1988. See Ch. 88-131, Laws of Fla. Under that statute, in order to classify a defendant as an habitual offender, it must be shown that the defendant was previously convicted of two or more felonies. § 775.084(l)(a)l., Fla.Stat. (Supp.1988).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as an habitual offender because his two prior felony convictions were both rendered March 27, 1987. In Taylor v. State, 558 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), this court held that, with regard to the requirement of two prior felonies, the state must show that the second prior conviction was imposed for an offense committed after the date of the initial prior conviction. In Taylor, the defendant had previously been convicted of twelve felonies, but each felony was contained in the same judgment of conviction. Thus, none of the prior felonies could have been committed after the date of the initial felony conviction. See also Leboeuf v. State, 571 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Walker v. State, 567 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In the instant case, since both prior felonies resulted in convictions rendered on March 27, 1987, the second prior felony could not have been committed after the date of the initial felony conviction. Therefore, the trial court erred in sentencing defendant as an habitual offender. We realize that the trial court sentenced the defendant before we decided Taylor and, consequently, did not have the benefit of our holding in that case.
We do not address the other issues raised by the defendant on appeal since we find them to be without merit.
Judgments AFFIRMED; sentences REVERSED and cause REMANDED for re-sentencing.
COWART, GOSHORN and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. . § 812.014, Fla.Stat. (1988).
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Citator
Cited By
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Harrison v. State, 585 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…for an offense committed after the date of the initial prior conviction. Walsh v. State, 579 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Valentine v. State, 577 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Barnes v. State, 576 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Reyes v. State, 573 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Williams v. State, 573 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Bernard v. State, 571 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Taylor v. State, 558 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). This requirement of sequentiality was not eliminated in the amend…
Authorities Cited
- Romerio Latee Walker v. State, 567 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Taylor v. State, 558 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Leboeuf v. State, 571 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)