JUAN GARCIA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Garcia was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellate court reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence because the trial court erroneously refused to give a jury instruction on third-degree felony murder, which was supported by the evidence and required under Florida law.
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the requested jury instruction on third-degree felony murder. The evidence of Garcia's repeated blows and the severity of the victim's injuries was sufficient to support a conviction on the underlying felony of battery or aggravated battery, which supported third-degree felony murder as a proper permissive lesser included offense.
[1] A trial court must give a jury instruction on third-degree felony murder when the evidence supports a conviction for battery or aggravated battery as the underlying felon…
[2] Evidence of repeated blows to a victim and the severity of resulting injuries may support a jury finding of battery or aggravated battery, thus requiring a third-degree f…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“although third-degree felony murder is not a necessary included offense of first-degree murder, it is, under certain circumstances and evidence, a proper permissive lesser included offense of first-degree murder, requiring a jury instruction to that effect”
Establishes the legal standard for when third-degree felony murder instructions are required as lesser included offenses
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGarcia repeatedly struck the victim multiple times, causing severe injuries. Witnesses testified that Garcia admitted hitting the victim because she h…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Underlying Felony cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from a judgment and sentence in which appellant was adjudicated guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. We find it necessary to reverse the judgment and sentence based on the trial court’s refusal to give a jury instruction on third-degree felony murder as required by Green v. State, 475 So. 2d 235 (Fla.1985), and Johnson v. State, 423 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
The Supreme Court in Green, supra, at 236, held that “[although third-degree felony murder is not a necessary included offense of first-degree murder, it is, under certain circumstances and evidence, a proper permissive lesser included offense of first-degree murder, requiring a jury instruction to that effect.” In the present case, the evidence warranted a jury instruction on third-degree felony murder. Johnson, supra, is particularly relevant. This court there reversed a second-degree murder conviction based on the trial court’s failure to give a requested jury instruction on third-degree murder. As in this case, the State argued in Johnson that there was no evidence which would support a third-degree murder conviction. This court held that appellant’s repeated hitting and kicking of the victim, and the severity of the victim’s injuries as testified to by the doctors, would support a conviction of battery or aggravated battery. The battery or aggravated battery was an underlying felony sufficient to support a conviction of third-degree murder. This court therefore found that the trial court erred in failing to give jury instructions on third-degree murder, and further found that the error was not harmless. Id. at 615; see also, Herrington v. State, 538 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla.1989) (“in the case of degree crimes, requested instructions on all lesser degrees that are supported by the evidence must be given regardless of the allegations of the charging document”).
In the present case, appellant’s repeated blows to the victim, and the severity of her injuries, likewise are sufficient to require a third-degree felony murder instruction based on the underlying felony of battery or aggravated battery. Several witnesses testified to appellant’s admissions that he struck the victim several times because she had a “boyfriend.” The victim’s friend and baby-sitter both testified that appellant called them to come over to help after the victim was injured. Appellant told the victim’s friend that he thought victim was pretending to be paralyzed. He called the baby-sitter when the victim would not wake up. When she did not come immediately, he called her repeatedly until she came. Moreover, appellant did not continuously beat the victim until the point of death. Based on the recited evidence upon which a jury could find third-degree felony murder, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the requested jury instruction. The judge improperly took a factual question from the jury, treating it as an issue of law for the court.
We find no merit in other issues presented here by appellant as to rulings on juror challenges, admission of evidence, motions for mistrial and judgment of acquittal, and departure from the sentencing guidelines, which we affirm.
The trial court’s judgment is therefore reversed and the sentence vacated based on the court’s refusal to give instructions on third-degree felony murder, and the cause is remanded for further consistent proceedings.
BOOTH and MINER, JJ., concur. WENTWORTH, J., concurs specially with written opinion.
WENTWORTH, Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree with reversal of the judgment for the reasons stated by the majority, but would find the other issues to be mooted by that disposition of the appeal.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Wiley v. State, 60 So. 3d 588 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…convicted Wiley of third-degree murder. If an aggravated battery results in death, it can be third-degree murder. Sheridan v. State, 799 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Elkin v. State, 636 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Garcia v. State, 574 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Johnson v. State, 423 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). We find the evidence sufficient to sustain Wiley’s conviction for third-degree murder. Therefore, we vacate Wiley’s conviction for second-degree murder, and remand…
-
Sheridan v. State, 799 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…e was persuaded not to submit the instruction. The trial judge’s first inclination was correct. If an aggravated battery results in death, it can indeed be third-degree murder. See Elkin v. State, 636 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Garcia v. State, 574 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Johnson v. State, 423 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Further, if there is evidence supporting the lesser charge of third-degree murder, the defendant is entitled to such an instruction to the jury. Green v. State, 475 So. 2d 23…
-
Elkin v. State, 636 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…d in refusing the requested instruction, and the ease must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. See Herrington, 538 So. 2d at 850; Green v. State, 475 So. 2d 235 (Fla.1985); Jackson v. State, 622 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Garcia v. State, 574 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Reversed and remanded for a new trial.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Green v. State, 475 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1985)
- Herrington v. State, 538 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1989)
- Harrison W. Johnson v. State, 423 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)