MARY ANN DEVOLDER AND JAMES DEVOLDER, APPELLANTS,
v.
CAROLYN GARRETT SANDAGE, APPELLEE
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The Devolders appealed a trial court's denial of full interest on a judgment on mandate in a personal injury case. The appellate court held that because the defendant failed to make an unconditional tender of the judgment amount or place funds in the court registry, the plaintiffs were entitled to interest on the full amount from the date of the original judgment.
The court held that Sandage's tender was not unconditional because it required the Devolders to execute a satisfaction of judgment, which would have foreclosed their appellate rights. Because Sandage failed to make an unconditional tender or place funds in the court registry, the Devolders are entitled to interest on the full amount of the judgment from the date of the original judgment.
[1] A judgment debtor must make an unconditional tender of the full amount due on a judgment to stop the accrual of interest.
[2] A tender conditioned on the judgment creditor signing a satisfaction of judgment is not unconditional if it requires the creditor to accept the benefits of the judgment w…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The judgment debtor has two options available to stop the accrual of interest on a judgment. First, the debtor can make an unconditional tender for the full amount due on the judgment.”
Establishes the legal framework for when interest stops accruing on a judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn the underlying personal injury case, a jury awarded damages to the Devolders. The trial court reduced the award by fifty percent, but on the Devold…
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RYDER, Judge.
Mary Ann and James Devolder (Devold-ers) challenge the trial court’s order denying them full interest on their judgment entered pursuant to the mandate (judgment on mandate) in the original appeal of this personal injury case.
We agree that the trial court erred in refusing to allow interest on the full amount, because defendant, Carolyn Sandage (Sandage), failed to give an unconditional tender. On the Devolders’ original appeal, this court reversed the judgment which reduced the Devolders’ award by fifty percent and ordered the trial court to enter judgment on the unreduced amount of the verdict as reached by the jury. Devolder v. Sandage, 544 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The Devolders then moved for interest on the entire amount of the judgment on mandate.
The trial court awarded only partial interest because Sandage had “tendered” the full amount of the original judgment and the Devolders had declined to accept the offer. The judgment debtor has two options available to stop the accrual of interest on a judgment.
First, the debtor can make an unconditional tender for the full amount due on the judgment. See Konigsburg v. Grand, 529 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
In the instant case, Sandage tendered the full amount of the original judgment accompanied by a letter which stated that the check was in full satisfaction of the judgment and furthermore, Sandage enclosed a satisfaction of judgment which was to be signed. This was not an unconditional tender in this case because it required the Devolders to execute the satisfaction of judgment, thereby accepting the benefits of the original judg ment while awaiting the resolution of their appeal. Acceptance of this tender would have foreclosed their rights on appeal, because the issue on appeal was whether the Devolders were entitled to a new trial on all of the damages. See McMullen v. Fort Pierce Financing & Const. Co., 108 Fla. 492, 146 So. 567 (1933).
Therefore, this case does not fall under either exception to the “acceptance of benefits” doctrine. See Hurst v.
First National Bank of Tampa, 381 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
The second option that a judgment debt-or has is the ability to place the funds in the court registry. See § 55.141, Fla.Stat. (1987); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.600. Therefore, if Sandage wanted to stop the accrual of interest with this procedure, it was her responsibility to place the funds in the court registry, not the Devolders’. See Gerardi v. Carlisle, 232 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
Accordingly, because Sandage failed to make an unconditional tender, or to take advantage of the procedure for placing the funds in the court registry, we hold that this case falls under the reasoning of Gilmore v. Morrison, 341 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), wherein the court held that “where the judgment of a trial court is modified upon appeal and not reversed, the modification stands as of the date of the original judgment, and interest accrues on the judgment as modified”. Id. at 780.
We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion for interest on the full amount, and remand with instructions to award the Devolders interest on the full amount of the judgment on mandate from the date of the original judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
SCHOONOVER, C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
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Citator
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Easkold v. Elouise Rhodes, 632 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…as correct that these two attempted tenders of payment were insufficient to stop the running of interest on the judgment because they were not unconditional. The proposed satisfaction of judgment rendered the tender conditional. Devolder v. Sandage, 575 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Therefore, Easkold must pay interest on the judgment. On this point we affirm the trial court. The next question is when the interest started running. The trial court held that the interest runs from the date of the jury ve…
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Metro. Dade Cnty. & Metro. Dade Cnty. Self-Insured Fund v. Rolle, 678 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…in any manner be said to have suffered prejudice. If the E/C had desired to prevent the accrual of interest on the sum originally ordered, it could have availed itself of a clearly defined procedure for so doing, as outlined in Devolder v. Sandage, 575 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), i.e., (1) by making an unconditional tender of the full amount due on the judgment, or (2) by placing the funds in the court’s registry. Id. at 313. As the E/C in the present ease did neither,1 we hardly think it can validly clai…
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Palm Lake P'rs II, LLC v. C & C Powerline, Inc., 38 So. 3d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…al of prejudgment interest only when the tender is absolute and unconditional.” Ismark v. W.G. Mills, Inc., 899 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). See also Metro. Dade County v. Rolle, 678 So. 2d 904, 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Devolder v. Sandage, 575 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). We leave for the trial court on remand the questions whether and, if so, when a valid tender occurred in the present case. . "There is no question that parties to a contract may agree to limit their respective remedies and…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hunt v. First Nat'l Bank OF Tampa, 381 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- McMullen v. Fort Pierce Fin. & Constr. Co., 108 Fla. 492 (Fla. 1933)
- State ex rel. First Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Southerland, 108 Fla. 433 (Fla. 1933)
- Gerardi v. Carlisle, 232 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
- Gilmore v. Morrison, 341 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Devolder v. Sandage, 544 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Scott v. State, 529 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Konigsburg v. Grand, 529 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)