MARILYN WHITE, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT WHITE, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by reducing stipulated attorney's fees and costs and by ordering the wife to pay a portion of those fees when the husband's income was substantially higher.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion when it reduces the number of hours or hourly rate for attorney's fees that have been stipulated to as reasonable by the parties.
[2] A trial court must set forth specific findings justifying any reduction in attorney's fees from the amount stipulated to by the parties.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife's counsel sought attorney's fees and costs. The husband's counsel stipulated to the reasonableness of the hourly rate and hours expended. The…
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CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant/Wife argues on appeal that the trial court improperly approved only a portion of her attorney’s fees and improperly required her to pay thirty percent of those fees while requiring Husband to pay seventy percent. We agree and reverse.
In his motion, Wife’s counsel had requested a total fee of $5,562 and costs of $2,768.46 for a total of $8,330.46. He presented a detailed statement setting forth the hours expended (41.2) at an hourly rate of $135. The court found that Wife’s counsel was entitled to $130 per hour for 20.9 hours (or $2,717 in fees) and to $919 in costs. The court ordered Husband to pay seventy percent of Wife’s fees and costs, and ordered Wife to pay thirty percent. At trial, Wife had been prepared to present expert testimony in support of the fees, but Husband’s counsel stipulated to the reasonableness of the hourly rate and number of hours, so no testimony was presented.
We conclude that by reducing the stipulated reasonableness of the number of hours expended and the stipulated reasonableness of the hourly rate, the court abused its discretion. See Tendrich v. Tendrich, 544 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The court also erred when it failed to set forth specific findings justifying the reduction as required by Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985).
Finally, the court erred when it ordered Wife to pay thirty percent of her attorney’s fees and costs. Where one spouse’s income is far superior to the other’s, that spouse will be required to pay the less fortunate spouse’s attorney’s fees. Walton v. Walton, 540 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Husband’s income here is nearly six times that of Wife, and Wife’s assets are not substantial. Wife should not be required to use her rehabilitative alimony to pay attorney’s fees.
We reverse the trial court order and remand with directions to the trial court to enter an order granting Wife’s counsel’s motion for fees and costs and requiring Husband to pay all of Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs.
FRANK and HALL, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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Hamlin v. Hamlin, 722 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…rital assets to pay attorney’s fees. Third, considering the vast income disparity, we question why the former husband was not required to pay all of the former wife’s fees. See Greeley v. Greeley, 583 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); White v. White, 575 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Next, we note that in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, courts should consider the following factors: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, and the legal skill required; (2) the likel…
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Dinsmore v. Dixie A. Dinsmore, 623 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…) (given [*639] great disparity in parties’ incomes, trial court reversibly erred in ordering husband to pay only one-half rather than entire amount of wife’s attorney’s fees); Askegard v. Askegard, 584 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); White v. White, 575 So. 2d 767 (Fla.2d DCA 1991) (reversing award of only 70% of wife’s attorney’s fees and ordering husband to pay entire amount, where wife’s income was not substantial and circumstances would have required her to dip into rehabilitative alimony to pay counsel).…
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Holloway v. Washburn, 795 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…simply add thereto that on remand the trial court should reconsider the propriety of awarding the former wife some or all of her attorney’s fees. There is a wide disparity of income and income-earning ability between the parties. See White v. White, 575 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The former wife should not have to use her assets obtained through equitable distribution or alimony to pay her attorney’s fees under these circumstances. See Flemming v. Flemming, 742 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). However, thi…
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Lampley v. State, 540 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Tendrich v. Tendrich, 544 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)